EIOPA's Bernadino with keynote speech - D'ohs and Don'ts...

Solvency II implementation
- Homer called it...

The latest pit stop on the Solvency II Last Legs tour was in the picturesque, almost-an-anagram, Slovenia, where EIOPA's gaffer joined a throng of hearty souls to deliver a keynote speech last week.

Given that the outside world is seemingly becoming more sensititve to the ensuing changes (at least from a capital adequacy perspective), it has been noticeable that EIOPA's speeches have become heavier in practical tone rather than the flabbier ethereal tones of yesteryear. In particular, conduct risks, conflicts of interest and the importance of an effective second pillar to counter the aggression and self interest of distribution arms/firms have all become prominent features of what is being touted as the Solvency II benefits package. Given what it has cost, we'd better deliver it!

Back to the speech, a few basic soundbites are littered throughout, which might benefit your training packs for the home stretch;

• Solvency II is "EIOPA's top priority", 
• It is a "pretty good starting point", rather than perfect, is "...a must and a true game changer", and "brings a new risk culture"
• It is "a tool to foster a true risk culture in the organisation"
• "It is clear that Solvency II will bring more awareness and transparency on the true risk profile of certain business models"
• It will deliver "intelligent and effective regulation which does not stifle innovation"

A couple of open-ended questions emerge from the text itself;

• Does Solvency II only "encourage" firms to define their risk profiles and risk appetites, as opposed to compel it?
• Is the Solvency II take on ORSA really "best practice at international level" - seems fair, but does anyone else want a shot at the title!
• Why is "overall solvency needs" constantly accompanied by bunny ears - if these guys aren't convinced by the term, what hope does the industry have of driving it into the glossary!
• Is it just executives who need to know that ORSA is a "cultural change", as opposed to NEDs, non C-suite senior management and wider stakeholders. Institutional investors would surely benefit a 101 class, given their demonstrable views on what SCR coverage ratios mean for the plausibility of some firm's strategies, and while Sr. Bernadino comments that "...effort needs to be made" to explain SCR volatility on p8, a dawn chorus with Karel van Hulle on how "ridiculous" the outside world's expectations are doesn't even qualify as an hors d'ouevre.
• That risk culture provides "...an appropriate balance with the natural sales driven culture" - EIOPA have alluded to this before, but never quite as explicitly as this. If the Risk function's job is predominantly to counter sales activity, can it ever be seen as value adding?

And a couple of specific themes are given special treatment for everyone's benefit;

Prudent Person Principle and the investment strategy of insurers

• PPP emphasised as not giving insurers a freebie to hit the roulette tables with their asset book, and will be "...closely monitored".
• Current environment encourages aggressive monitoring, with the "search for yield" quote now ubiquitous in supervisory speeches which touch on macro matters.
• "Asset risk calibration in Solvency II should not be used to privilege or incentive any specific asset class" - not convinced on this front, given the remit of your friendly local CIO must contain an element of maximising gains within appetite, and the calibration can surely influence that.

Product availability

• "Solvency II does not intend to unduly penalise specific products" - evidently does though, hence the sprint to the door from Ergo et al in the guaranteed interest rate product space (not unduly though to be fair, given the Teutonic pleas for transitional mercy!)

ORSA and Risk Culture

• The section somewhat labours the point on coverage of all risks, assessment of all mitigation techniques, and the role of the Board in driving the associated cultural changes, but I guess given the geographical location of the speech, some of the nearby countries may benefit from the encore un foi approach - no names naturally...
• "Capital will never cover up for the lack of proper governance"
• "ORSA is based on the companies' DNA - their strategy"
• "The key role in the implementation of ORSA belongs to the top management"
• "It is up to the Boards to set, communicate and enforce a strong risk culture..."

Insurers and Supervisors in general

• Talks of Risk Functions needing the correct skills to assess risks in asset classes - is there an implication here that functions will be light on quantitative skills post-2016?
• Squares the circle of prudential and conduct risks on p7, talking of mitigating conduct risks "since inception" in one's product development, design and marketing processes.
• That Solvency II "...requires an increased degree of supervisory judgement" in order to intervene at the right time, and the new supervisory requirements represent "...an upgrade in the quality of supervision". I'm sure some countries might take that as something of a slight, given the maturity of their existing processes, but probably fair for the majority.

Plenty of fuel for your respective Board and Senior Management briefing fires, so go forth and propogate!

UK Senior Insurance Managers Regime - just be natural...

The PRA’s Supervisory Statement on Strengthening Individual Accountability in Insurance (SS35/15) has been released, not that far apart from their demolition job on Co-op Bank’s system of governance, which demonstrated something of an absence of such accountability across all three lines of defence, quite a feat!

While the Banking industry have been catered for on this topic with a few more bells and whistles, most noticeably by including an element of criminal liability  for their senior management (thanks Fred!), the approach for insurers and banks is supposed to be largely consistent.

The doc itself rather awkwardly references multiple sections of the incoming PRA Rulebook which, as yet at least, doesn’t exist as a conventional reference site, though it is due for release in “the summer” (the PRA subsequently released the new site 3 days after I published this post - that'll teach me!). It still pays to fish through the appendices of old Consultation Papers to get the materials cross referenced in this Supervisory Statement (here for most of them, from p44)

SIMF Interviews - "Next"...

I did cover this topic when the consultation paper first hit the table, and for those of a nervous disposition, the PRA have since produced a nice one-pager summarising what you need to know in the context of Approved Persons, Solvency II etc here (and done so much better than me, I hasten to add!). In addition, the transitional map from CF-XX to SIMF-YY is already available here.

I had a look through (largely ignoring the Group and Third Country specifics) to see if there was anything new and exciting since the consultation, and naturally there isn't! That said, the industry feedback received is detailed here (section 2), while I noted a few things below for my own benefit;

• PRA not concerned about individuals located overseas, unless they are involved in strategic implementation, as opposed to strategy formulation (2.11).
• Alerting to potential PRA blocking of SIMF applications where someone wishes to wear more than one hat, citing the obvious CEO & Chair example (2.15)
• Persons allowed to do the same function in more than one firm - targeted perhaps at the floating actuary contignent who do the CF12 job for a few firms?
• Awkwardly try to accommodate SIMF job-sharing, but lean towards discouraging it in the text (2.17-2.19)
• List a few examples of what firms might consider to be "Key Functions" over and above those named in the Solvency II legislation, being particularly keen on Investments (2.25 and 2.27)
• On the list of 11 Prescribed Responsibilities, they do their best to keep the NED world out of assuming any of them (2.40)!
• Some attempt to informally restrict Chairpersons from filling their time with multiple other roles and responsibilities (2.44)
• A timely reference, given the Co-op Bank Final Notice, to ensuring that Boards understand the Threshold Conditions (p12-13) and Fundamental Rules.

The Individual Conduct Standards (from p16) all seem fair at face value, with a bit of devil in the details, such as;

• Key function holders being told (3.19) to not only meet the letter of the prevailing regulatory system, but also not to engage in "...creative compliance or regulatory arbitrage" - spoilsports!
• Expectations that Key Function holders "take reasonable steps" to ensure that the business has sufficient systems of control, even if they delegate some, or indeed most, of the associated tasks themselves (3.20-3.22).
• That should you breach any of the Conduct Standards, it materially affects your fitness and/or propriety, and therefore the PRA expect to be notified

Finally, to clear up that age-old debate, the PRA clarified in 2.4 that it "...does not expect persons other than natural persons to be approved for a SIMF". Anyone with career ambitions had better lay off the Botox and Bronzing then...

2015 FTSE Interim Reporting and Solvency II costs - forewarned and forearmed?

Solvency II costs - impressed?

I always liked to keep an eye on the FTSE lads’ Interim and Full Year pronouncements on the Solvency II front back in the day, but given the legslative delays and sporadic cost reporting over the last couple of years, plus the internal model hokey-cokey, disclosures on the topic have been “Slim Pickens” to say the least.

For those interested, the sweep I did last year is here, and while a few of the firms featured have attempted to expand out, they have largely disclosed the same information as last year (Boiler-plate disclosures? Never!).

However, a few of the great and good have chirped up some extras about Solvency II on the home straight, none more revealing than the Canary-supporting egg-chasers at Aviva. They dished up the basics as a matter of  course;

• Solvency II costs of £46m for the half year (£39m for last half year)

• Submitted Solvency II internal model in June and expect approval in December. – must be a good one, Hannover Re-style!

• Currently operating within our expected Solvency II target range, regardless of any changes in economic capital surplus quantum and composition driven by Solvency II

The InsuranceERM lads expanded on that, having presumably dialled in to associated conference call! In a suit-and-tie version of Surprise Surprise (R.I.P Cilla), the CEO shocked listeners with the following statements;

• "[Solvency II] has taken an inordinate amount of management time and I'd really like that time back"
• "It has cost us in the region of £400m [$620m]. This figure does not impress me one little bit…” – to my shame I did do the countback on published costs, as if a CEO couldn’t count to £400m, and it does add up!

RSA, in between flirting sessions with the watchmaking fraternity, were similarly revealing, confirming;

• Solvency II costs of £14m for the half year (same as last half-year)

• “…application for Internal Model approval under Solvency II has been submitted and we target a positive outcome by year end”

• "…current Internal Model for Solvency II shows higher coverage ratios than our ECA model.”

Old Mutual does its best to treat the SAM/Solvency II imposters the same in its reporting, but in recent times has been light on our side. There was a bit more in the bag this time round though, particularly;

• "Based on the current underlying timetable and regulation of Solvency II, we estimate the total cost of completion will be up to £20 million, of which £10 million will be incurred in H2 2015, and the balance running into H1 2016".

• "The Solvency II regime will introduce a different lens through which to look at Group capital. It will use a more conservative 1 in 200 stress scenario in determining capital requirements and apply a more rules-based determination of capital fungibility and transferability"

• Given their tone on the “inherent conservatism” of Solvency II and their loving gazes at the existing FGD treatment of capital fungibility, can we read some indifference to their current treatment as a Group by the PRA, perhaps?

• "During July 2015, we completed our initial reporting to regulators under the interim arrangements of Solvency II"

I suppose the biggest surprises continue to be the (potential) absence of compulsion to internally model for entities such as Old Mutual (confirmed as “out” of IMAP on p82 here). Given the PRA’s pronouncements on Standard Formula appropriateness and capital add-ons, you might expect them to be marched down the aisle before too long.

Standard Life,perhaps betraying where their strategic priorities lie (nicely covered here), did little more than state that they will “remain strong” on the capital front – nothing on costs, nothing on implications, and nothing on modelling (though they confirm here that they are “in” apparently!). “In”, but on the naughty step perhaps, or is the topic just unworthy of comment?

L&G were happy to talk technical, rather than cry about hundreds and millions of pounds of spilt milk – their release touched on the following;

• Implementing a ‘capital-lite’ model for bulk annuity new business, by reinsuring out some of the risk (light detail here and here, more detail on p5 of the interims).

• Solvency II internal model is being reviewed by the PRA, and “…It is anticipated that our Solvency II internal model will be approved in Q4 2015, ready for use on the Solvency II go live date - 1 January 2016”

• Also have applications in for the use of transitionals, matching adjustments and using deduction and aggregation for its American business

• “We expect the final outcome of Solvency II to result in a lower Group capital surplus and solvency ratio than the Economic Capital basis. Our Economic Capital model has not been reviewed by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), nor will it be.”

• "We note recent clarification from the PRA to the effect that transitional capital will count as Tier One capital, including for assessments of dividend-paying capacity". This is particularly piquant given Sam Woods’ coverage of the “dividend” issue a few weeks ago when trying to reassure a room full of analysts that the insurance sector isn’t a busted flush from an investment perspective!

A busy reporting week for sure, with seemingly no horror stories come at the top-end of the UK Insurance Industry...Including a post-script from the Pru today.

They have revealed a miniscule spend of £17m on Solvency II costs in the year-to-date (against £28m for all of last year), as well as a few nuggets in the same vein as the competition;

• "...we submitted our Solvency II internal model applications to the Prudential Regulation Authority in June 2015"
• "We continue to seek opportunities to transfer longevity risk to reinsurers or to the capital markets and have transacted when terms are sufficiently attractive and aligned with our risk management framework."
• "We also noted at the time that certain aspects of our economic capital methodology are different to those required under Solvency II and that the outcome under Solvency II would be lower than our reported economic capital level. This remains the case." - same issue as Old Mutual, one presumes?

They even dropped a Solvency II slide into this morning's presentation pack (slide 28). Interesting that they go to the trouble of highlighting that the transitionals and risk margin "broadly offset" on the UK Life book, as well as their distinct gripes in their Asian and US businesses. 

...and another post-script from Royal London (so I have everything on one page!)

• Royal London will use the Solvency II standard formula approach initially and will consider seeking approval for its internal capital model in due course

• We expect to meet the new Capital requirements without material adverse impact on policyholders but there are significant details which remain to be clarified about the new regime. It is possible the outcome from Solvency II will require insurance companies to hold more regulatory capital than is currently required. If Royal London was required to hold significantly increased capital, then the levels of Royal London Profit Share we are able to allocate to our participating members may need to be restricted

...and two more post scripts: firstly Admiral

• "Admiral is developing an internal economic capital model which will be used to calculate regulatory capital requirements following approvals from the Group's regulators in the UK and Gibraltar. Such approval is not likely to be sought or granted before 2017."
• "The Group's regulatory capital from January 2016 will, therefore, be based on the Solvency II Standard Formula, with a capital add-on agreed by the PRA to reflect recognised limitations in the Standard Formula with regards to Admiral Group's business (predominantly in respect of profit commission arrangements in co- and reinsurance agreements and risks arising from actual and potential Periodic Payment Order (PPO) claims)."
• "The level of capital add-on and resulting Group capital requirement from January 2016 is expected to be confirmed by the PRA in the final quarter of 2015."

...and secondly Phoenix

• "...submitted its application for regulatory approval of its Internal Model in June 2015"
• "...Group capital position under Solvency II expected to be in excess [of current surplus]
• "Over 2015, clarity on Solvency II regulations has improved but uncertainties remain in relation to the Group's IMAP and other Solvency II-related applications"

IRM on Internal Model Validation - Red Card or Green Card?

Cyclic Validation - Quelle horreur...

Just back from Paris, where I spent a weekend queueing behind selfie-taking tourists before taking out a second mortgage to buy bottled water. A beautiful place, though I found Depardieu was much quieter off-screen...

Onto the topic in hand, the PRA were pretty vicious back in the day on Validation efforts in their infancy, with Julian Adams lambasting both progress ("significantly behind") and validation scope ("narrow"). Given that the Solvency II sabbatical which bridged half of 2012 and all of 2013 gave firms time to catch up and widen, you might think that those with internal model ambitions would be pretty tidy by now. The PRA have even told firms how they believe "good" model application paperwork to look, carving out for themselves and the Validators of the world an easy-to-read "model reviewer" level of detail (p1).

In those salad days, Internal Model Validation felt to me like it would be the chernozem of the nascent Risk Management profession in insurers; a skill set that a quant or a non-quant could acquire, apply, and ultimately ease through the promotional path within insurance entities, given the depth and breadth of technical and strategic information the process challenges...

...but the moves never came. Despite the actuarial world themselves happily disassembling the complexities of quantitative modelling into easy-to-digest IM Validation themes, the non-quant world has waited patiently to see if anything of substance would emerge from one of its representative bodies.

And this week it arrived! The Institute of Risk Management has delivered, as part of its Internal Model Industry Forum (IMIF), a white paper on the validation cycle.

The IRM have been active in this area prior to the formation of the IMIF. I have covered an ERM in Insurance event at the start of 2014 here, while this more volumous slide pack featuring a number of the Billy and Betty Big Biscuits of the field emerged from summer of last year, when the IMIF seemed to come to fruition. This white paper itself appears to move along the concepts and ideas inside an IRM slide deck from last Christmas.

Given that the IRM is not-for-profit, there is always a likelihood that sponsors will unduly influence the products (indeed the IRM Chair notes in this that they rely on "enlightened industry support" to knock these documents out).

Sadly in this case, the sponsors include Three of the "Big 4" (with the fourth on the IMIF steering committee) , leaving the document dripping with consultancy hallmarks rather than pragmatic solutions to execute the tasks in hand.

That view is reinforced somewhat by this follow-on presentation to the IMIF from last week by this white paper's workstream lead and supporting consultant - one selected industry comment on slide 8 (presumably from a chocolate bar shortly before it ate itself) reads, "validators should really be experienced modellers"!

A few general points jump out of the white paper;

• That a firm's IM is "...at the heart of risk and capital evaluation" - I thought it was supposed to "inform" this evaluation, not dominate it (slide 3 here, as well as Julian Adams's speech from a couple of years ago [p4]).
• Is the insurance industry "...increasingly reliant on sophisticated models" - maybe in terms of AUM/Market Cap, but given the UK IMAP queue is down to approximately 40 firms out of over 400 (p4), and that number has steadily reduced over the last 3 years, feels a touch disingenuous. I've no doubt the firms represented on the Steering Group are "...increasingly reliant" though
• The document claims to set out "best practice principles" - not sure if "practice" and "principle" share the same bed, but that aside, would anyone find it remotely acceptable to have the consultancy world fund a document which details "best practice" on IM Validation?

And a few stand out elements from the proposed Validation Cycle, which is heavily influenced by EIOPA's guidelines:

• "Best practice now requires firms to demonstrate, with evidence, that the cycle...[is] being actively and effectively carried out" - how can best practice "require" anything from anyone?
• "...resulting best practice that is emerging" (p4)  - how is any practice considered "best" at this stage of proceedings, when we are literally practising! Against what criteria?
• References to "model risk impact assessment" and the "model risk assessment process" (p5) seem to come from nowhere. Alluding to something formal, but not very clear
• Lot of coverage of "triggers" of IM Validation, which feels like a fishing expedition for the paper sponsors, rather than direct address of L2 Art 241 - the number of areas of "change" to consider as IM Validation triggers covers pretty much any change, anywhere, both inside and outside of an insurer (p8)! Most would also be ad-hoc ORSA triggers in my experience, so this potentially sets up insurers for a bucketload of work every time they hear a pin drop.
• Formulaic and periodic IM Validation a "needless cost"? Surely periodic validation, no matter how badly executed, is compulsory (L1 Art 125)?
• The Trigger Impact Assessment stage (p10) is barely legible - "The trigger impact assessment against model risk appetite stage" - and terminologically it is all well above legislative requirements.
• "Unexpected triggers" (p12) get a mention. Again, not making sense to me - you either know your triggers or not.
• "Model validation is complex" and "less than black and white" (p16) - certainly is if you try and follow this process! A focus on plain questions and less quant can only help the models non-expert users (slide 7).
• If the validation cycle, processes and execution are "continuously evolving" (p18), are they reliable? Feels difficult to meet L2 Art 241.3, at least from a planning and execution perspective, if the process is constantly being tinkered with 
• "Developing a communications strategy" (p20) as part of the validation scoping and planning stage feels terribly over-elaborate.
• "Robust planning" expected to be common (p22), which doesn't necessarily marry up with the expectation of dynamic rather than cyclic validation in future (p10)

I think it is right to take the hump to a certain extent here. The PRA have been cunningly silent on capital add-ons to date, but given the implication that they will not be applied and renewed ICG-style (slide 13), there is likely to be many more less monied Partial IM applicants to follow over the next couple of years. Having the most influential consultancy firms decide on what is "best" in the validation world (and for it to have this many bells, whistles and legislative off-roads) feels like setting those firms up for either a fall, or another bill.

The PRA actually delivered something with much less padding to the IRM back at the end of 2013, so I'm struggling to see why that has justifiably been turbo-charged. Given they have three of their finest involved with the IMIF, but are continuing to be directly vocal on this topic (as recently as March 2015), it sends a worrying message to the capital add-on brigade that the IMAP early birds will be setting disproportionately high bars for 2017 and beyond when they deliver their PIMs.

Ultimately, I was disappointed by the publication, which reads more like a flannel manual, and is certainly not the kind of Risk Profession contribution that the topic so badly needs if the PRA's dreams of Board's "directing" and "owning" the IM valdiation process (slide 9) are ever going to come true. The 200 page novella world of Validation Reporting feels closer than ever...

Towers Watson's Global ERM Survey - Knowing ERM, Knowing You...

A couple of treats from two of the powerhouses of the 'writing things down' industry on the practical use of ERM to drive decision making, rather than simply accompany it.

Towers Watson are targeting the Solvency II audience (at least on this side of the Atlantic) with a timely release of the results of their 8th Biennial Global ERM Survey. I say the results, as there is no sign of the full survey itself - any closer to their chest, it would be an areola's backpack...

As ever, these kinds of publications oscillate between flannel and insight, so while I cover those below, feel free to read the infographic and call it quits!

General observations from the main press release include;

• Three-quarters of (the almost 400) respondents say they are viewed as "important strategic partners" by the Board and Executive - I'm less inclined to see that as a mark of superiority, given that risk functions in some firms won't have the ambition or aptitude to achieve that status
• Implication that some respondents do not have a risk appetite framework in place - very worrying, unless this is just bad wording.
• Some firms said to be only "...using ERM for regulatory compliance". It may depend on jurisdiction, but I'm not inclined to agree that is even possible.
• The "ultimate vision" for a firm's ERM capabilities is referred to, which is a brow furrer, even conceptually. TW seem to bundle up risk culture, risk monitoring and risk tolerance into the "Vision" bucket, in case that term takes your fancy.
• The expression "very strategic approach" appears in print for the first time!

Getting Value from ERM?
- "Kiss my Face"

From the more elaborate Q&A document, we find the main granular material which TW were prepared to publish. Fortunately for readers this side of the Atlantic, the EMEA Director Mike Wilkinson holds sway over much of that conversation, including his tale of the firm who recently had an ERM/Business Strategy-inspired "Aha" moment.

That session contains a fair bit of contention, such as;

• Asking the questions "What's the purpose of risk management" or indeed the "purpose of your ERM Program" in the Q&A - if these had been directed to the respondents themselves, it would have contextualised a number of the seemingly negative responses i.e. If the purpose of your ERM Program is "don't get shut down", you are probably less bothered about being a "strategic partner"!
• That the business should "...challenge the risk group to create reports that help them make decisions" - Excel Jockey is hardly the work of a strategic partner...
• In a similar vein, that insurers are "drowning in data, drowning in metrics" - hardly a new phenomenon, and doesn't give any credit to the critical faculties of employees to filter what they do have.
• "...many [internal capital] models have matured" - a sharp intake of breath can be heard down at Moorgate!
• That "...an ERM Program can't properly be assessed until it has been in place for a while" - pretty sure the S&P crowd wouldn't hold off assessing you while you "embed"

Mike in particular does manage to keep a good focus throughout the Q&A on maximising trade-offs between risk and return being the big differentiator between Risk functions who are capable of influencing strategic decision making, and those who are perhaps more likely to be tabling red-amber-green reports tracking the outcomes of decisions which have already been made.

Other strong points include;

• In the context of Risk Tolerance, how to cater for the discretion required by an insurer's asset managers in handling investment portfolios.
• Touches on a couple of pieces which stood out in the CRO Forum's Risk Appetite publication last month, namely around the increasing number of measures being used to run businesses other than capital, allowance of movement within risk tolerance levels, and whether firms have effectively articulated their organisation-wide Risk Appetite and Risk Tolerance limits down into its subsidiaries/departments.

One aspect which gnawed at me throughout this reading is the constant referrals to "ERM Programs" - I don't think I am bathing in semantics to suggest that Programs normally start and end, whilst ERM would surely constitute a Framework. You might choose to redecorate the Framework periodically with a Program (Solvency II a prime example), but you wouldn't expect a Program to "mature" or "evolve", you expect it to conclude!

Nitpicking?

Central Bank of Ireland speeches - "and there's more"...

Solvency II-ready?
"It's the way I tell them"...

I rejoiced on Friday at the sight of more speech material emerging from the Central Bank of Ireland directorate, if only due to the Frank Carson* gag I could wheel out due to the volume of their recent speech-giving...

As an industry we should always be happy to hear the regulator on lead vocals, so I gave the pair of speeches released a once-over to see what Irish concerns have justified the recent bounty of public addresses.

Deputy Governor Cyril Roux was very targeted in his speech, delivered to PwC's Annual CEO Dinner. It apparently gave him "great pleasure" to be in PwC's offices, which presumably means they weren't on the meter...

Some of the statistics and comments served to highlight that Ireland is something of a special case in the context of Solvency II, in that two-thirds of Irish gross premiums are to cover 'foreign risks', and that many insurers under their auspices will not have proximity to or oversight of much of their distribution network.

A few messages jumped out from the rest of the speech;

• A lot of positive messages had a caveat implicitly wrapped with them - "...we are in the main satisfied with your engagement with the Central Bank"; "On the whole international firms generally file returns on time..."; "I also commend your general adherence to our Corporate Governance Code..."
• Goes as far as using the IMF's recent review findings to tell firms to stop poaching regulatory staff while simultaneously complaining about turnaround time!
• Nice point about keeping focused on current risks through the PRISM framework, rather than drifting into Solvency II mode before 2016.
• Having recently been complimented by Sr. Bernadino on Ireland's reserving governance (p12), he reinforced that assumptions pertaining to reserves are expected to be "critically debated".
• On ORSA, that the CBoI "...expects to see Boards actively directing the use of risk management tools...such s stress or scenario testing"
• On Internal Modelling, he not only expects Boards to "...have sufficient knowledge and skill to challenge the model outputs", but adds that they "...like to see a Board direct the modellers in their firms to run specific stresses and scenarios prior to an item being discussed at the Board" - a big advance on previous murmurings on use test from supervisory bodies.
• Pulls up firms who are seemingly not tailoring their model's parameters for the Irish-specific business.
• Similarly a message of insisting that cross-border distributors tailor Group-driven materials and processes for the Irish market such as "...group policies and output, such as the ORSA, and internal model...".
• A cute but important distinction that "embedding" Solvency II, rather than complying with it on paper, is still going to take considerable effort.

Sylvia Cronin's speech (well, the Solvency II aspect of it) stayed along the same lines as she pursued at the Industry event in late April, where she was harsh on a number of specific elements in preparatory phase ORSA Reports which had been observed.

In a section of the speech covering "challenges to be overcome", a number of pieces of insistent ORSA direction are given, for example;

• "Your Board must use the ORSA to more fully align business strategy and capital"
• "You also need to use it as a lever to discharge your core responsibility not to take on risks and exposures which the capital base does not support".
•  "...there is a lot of work yet to do by firms to get this element of the new regime embedded to the extent we required" - I add here that, given they will have only reviewed 2014's preparatory phase ORSA Reports and Processes, is this not a given, particularly after CBoI sponsored a template-filling approach for the smaller firms?

On the wider world, the speech covers;

• That Solvency II sets out "clear standards and expectations around your internal control and risk management" - agree on the latter, but the former?
• Believes that the "scope for subjective judgement" may open up regulatory arbitrage opportunities, and that "a number of iterations" will be required before EU-wide consistency is achieved, in a sly dig at, errrr, everyone in mainland Europe! 
• Similarly, the volume of cross border business HQd in Dublin poses a problem due to the geographical boundary of CBoI's "prudential remit"
• Reinforces the message fro April that Pillar 3 readiness is a growing concern
• A large suite of views on Conduct Risk, where "culture" and "conduct" are hogtied together as the grimmest twins since DeVito and Schwarzenegger - that message won't be changing in a hurry, so I strongly recommend your work in that area caters to the supervisor's tastes.

Useful insight from what appears to be a supervisor with their sleeves rolled-up - keep up the good work.

* PS I know the connection is tenuous as he's a Belfast man, but give me a chance!

Solvency II Industry Forum in Ireland - Clint and Chocolate

Having treated the speech by EIOPA's Chair as the main course a few days ago, I'd better take a look at the hors d'ouevres and pudding. At the CBoI's industry event in late April, a couple of their biggest hitters delivered speeches of their own, with a similar tone to the PRA's effort in October (i.e. a considered yet firm rollicking).


Solvency II Marathon
- no Snickering...

Sylvia Cronin's speech, in which she referred to Solvency II as the "Marathon of Marathons", shone some light on how Ireland plc has dealt with ORSA during the preparatory phase. If you remember, the CBoI kindly provided ORSA templates for the entities lower down the PRISM spectrum, which I felt at the time was fully justifiable, and a tactic other NSAs should have adopted.

It wouldn't appear that the industry has performed exceptionally in their 2014 efforts, with Ms Cronin drawing attention to the following flaws in execution

• Variances in ORSA Report content between firms in similar sectors  "cause for concern" - a slightly worrying comment, given that some firms will be over-elaborating with content with the help of their friendly consultancy firm.
• Boards were aggressively called out on the "ownership" front. If your Boards have been ambivalent to-date with regards to participation in the ORSA process, they will seemingly get a hard time from now on.
• ORSA Process "...as important as the document itself" - music to my ears, and still a surprisingly difficult concept to convey
• The "so called use test" is referenced around ORSA, and not in the context of internal model applicants - no idea what that is about, so will assume it was a clumsy turn of phrase, rather than a new element of legislation
• Stress testing seen to be "too benign", with firms ignoring key risks and hard-to-quantify risks. Given that the UK firms received similar feedback on their 2014 ORSA stress testing efforts, it doesn't appear to be a country-specific failing.
• 'Local' (i.e. Irish) ORSAs which filter into wider Group ORSAs have not been adapted to fit the business model of the Irish entity. Good issue to pull firms up on, if they are relying Head Office to provide them with process and reports in template format 
• Business plan and forward looking time horizons not considered plausible, possibly a by-product of the lack of Board involvement in the ORSA Process

On the Pillar 3 front, she noted the following

• Pillar 3 is now a "cause for concern" - decisions by firms on architecture and expenditure "now overdue".
• Only half of High or Medium PRISM firms have participated in external user testing on Pillar 3. This still feels proportionally more than the PRA have tested out, though it is still viewed as a negative by the Bank.

"Problematic Applicant"?

Cyril Roux on the other hand wanted to reflect on "the good the bad and the ugly of Solvency II" in his address. While most executives paying for Solvency II programmes in EU insurance entities would suggest that "A Few Dollars More" is a more apt Clint Eastwood hook, he took a more macro view during which he;

• Patted the Irish regulator for its "good work" putting the house back in order after the laissez-faire approach at the start of this century. 
• Also reiterated that Pillar 3 preparations are light in the country, urging firms to "...devote the resources necessary"
• Dwelled heavily on the subjects of investment risk appetite and prudent person principle
• Pointed at "problematic applicants" who can now seek approvals to do business in the EU regardless of the supervisor's thoughts about their business models
• Called Solvency II's quantitative requirements "ill conceived" and "overboard" and "clearly too complex"
• Commented that SCR is "unlikely, unreliable tool to manage capital" - "...certainly the supervisor will not be using it for more than its worth".
• Gave short shrift to the abolition of prudential reserving under Solvency II, and indeed Bernadino referred glowingly to the Irish approach to reserving governance (presumably to counteract this grievance?) in his keynote speech.

A lot to be taken from these speeches if you have any dealings with Irish insurers, and with the clock ticking, I can't imagine there will be better steers than these during the preparatory phase.

EIOPA Chair's speech in Ireland - Nothing Compares to U2...

The huff has concluded it would appear – EIOPA’s gaffer has returned to the speaking circuit after a few weeks where the institution’s communications had been reduced to Post-It notes on the fridge after the EU butchered their budget.

Bernadino - dodgy stand-up

 

A recent Solvency II industry event was held in sunny Dublin, with Sr. Bernadino providing the keynote address. He chose to start and conclude with U2 jokes, which were as lame as a constipated flamingo (I would have thought Ben Folds Five or Lulu would be top of his playlist right now…)

That aside, the meat in this musical sandwich was pertinent to the whole industry, so I've picked out a few highlights;

General

• Wants to outline EIOPA’s move “from regulation to supervision” (p2), though goes on to say that “…EIOPA does not replace NSAs. The responsibility of the day-to-day supervision…rests with the NSAs” (p10). I think this subject warrants clarification from NSAs and EIOPA in concert, given we can see how having a remit-less overseer is putting the PRA on the back foot
• Acknowledges that the result of the mathematical squabbles is “…perhaps a too complex SCR formulation” (p3)

ORSA

• ORSA considered to be “…best practice at international level” (p4) – not sure if he means ORSA in general IAIS terms, or the ORSA concept he has curated within the EU!
• While he drops some of the usual ORSA bluster in about it being a “game changer”, he beefs up on the Board’s obligations, citing their "fundamental role to play", and stating in particular that "they need to set, communicate and enforce a risk culture".
• Of particular significance to his Irish audience was his emphasis on risk culture as "..an appropriate balance with the natural sales driven culture". This is perhaps the first instance where I have seen insurers' distribution arms formally considered by a supervisory body to be the enemy of 'risk culture', and for EIOPA's chair to choose Ireland, a country which has for years marketed itself as a cross-border sales centre on the right side of General Good provisions, is shown at the end speech to be a pre-emptive strike.

Internal Models

• Like his associates at the PRA, he notes that the use of internal models on the banking side "has been subject to increasing scepticism" in justifying the rigour of the Solvency II approach to modelling
• Worried that models will become a "capital optimization tool" - the PRA's NED briefing (slide 8) paints a similar picture if you read between the lines regarding missing risks and experience not reflected in parameter setting.

EIOPA's workload

• "Current different supervisory cultures" in the EU are creating work for EIOPA, noting that "our feedback can sometimes be challenging". Wonder who they're getting at there, France!
• They appear to be developing a Supervisory Handbook of good Solvency II practices. Chapters are already written on Risk Assessment, Boards and Governance, PPP and proportionality in Key Functions to name a few. Something to look forward to no doubt

Ireland-specific

• Go out of their way to applaud the onerous reserving governance in Ireland (here?), considering it practice which other countries should emulate.
• On the other hand, "...in the specific case of the Irish insurance market" he targets the country from a conduct risk/General Good perspective as one of the main cross-border players in the Union.

One can't help but feel the latter part of the speech was deliberately laid at the feet of the Irish, rather than aired in a more generic manner, given the country's continued corporation tax-related appeal to cross-border distributors. I guess when it comes to identifying the perfect audience to sketch out EIOPA's inevitable foray into Conduct Risk regulation, Sr. Bernadino found what he was looking for...

Pillar 3 implementation phase - "I can change, I can change"...

There has been a bit of noteworthy activity on the Pillar 3 side over the last few weeks, which I will cover below if I can keep awake long enough.

Pillar 3 Deadlines - "take it easy fella"

Pillar 3 was shouldered in to the NED briefing at the end of March (slide 19), and in a style similar to South Park's Saddam Hussein charicature, they effectively told the audience to "relax guy"...

Were those calming words justifiable? Given the PRA's admin function was seemingly on a "no uploading" break for Lent, we have in the last couple of days seen a whopping 3 months worth of minutes from their Regulatory Reporting Industry Working Group (or "Pillar 3 whingepit" as it more commonly known) made public. Interesting snippets include;

Jan 2015 - PRA full working group

• Publication of example reporting schedules for anyone without a December year-end
• "Early May" appears to be the starting point for any Category 1-3 firms who need to test out the PRA's QRT recepticle handiwork
• Firms "must submit data in XBRL" from July of this year, in case there were any chancers out there
• No additional information about the spectre of external auditors poring through your reporting efforts until Q2 2015 (i.e. now!). This will be in the form of EIOPA Guidelines, from which the PRA will "determine its position".
• About 20% of firms responded to the PRA's readiness survey that they are behind the curve
• Sourcing asset data still noted as an "issue", as well as vendor limitations, which would be of some concern for anyone who has splashed out on a software solution.

Feb 2015 - PRA testing sub-group

•  Problems around compatability of firms' earlier efforts appear to emerge every time EIOPA apply a hotfix to their taxonomy
• EIOPA filing rules and guidance were scheduled for Q1 2015 release - I can't seem to see them (though I haven't looked hard), so their timeliness maybe a victim of the EIOPA budget cuts?
• Firms are directed to the draft ITS to distinguish between preparatory requirements on Reporting and "live" requirements. This seems to be a repeated message, so presumably firms are not reading this document properly. 
• First testing cycle kicked off on 27th Feb, with (9) firms down at the PRA's offices. Second cycle scheduled for soon/now in April, performed externally to "test connectivity"
• Firms were effectively encouraged to sent in any old tat in XBRL, which the PRA would feedback on.

March 2015 - PRA testing sub-group

• Initial testing of the PRA's facilities doesn't appear to have been discouraging
• Less that half a dozen firms will be kicking the tyres in the second test phase
• EIOPA effectively overrule the PRA by allowing old and new taxonomies to be used in the preparatory phase.
• The PRA's (unpublished?) validation rules will not be applied during the preparatory phase, which will be light relief to some firms.

This information seems to support rather than contradict the more general yet widely reported Grant Thornton survey which suggests there will be a good number of firms who will struggle with their 2016 obligations, let alone 2017's. They made the following points;

• GI and composite firms seemingly the most worried
• Half of firms are planning to create their own reporting solution (based on T4U?), mostly Lloyds and GI firms. Are these "have-a-go heroes" the hidden issue for the PRA, given their restricted testing group.
• Around 20% are behind schedule on QRTs
• A third have done little if anything on the SFCR/RSR front – the PRA have stated that these are required "in year 1" (Q17, and yes, both of them!)
• Compared against an earlier survey they conducted, the one topic which hasn’t alleviated any concerns is the ability to extract data from internal IT systems.
• Majority of firms are having a single dry run for quarterly and annual QRTs

Should anyone be worried given the granular information above, or is Pillar 3 still tomorrow's problem?

Jurassic Talk - enhanced NED challenges during Solvency II preparations?

 Britain's youngest NED

Given that there won’t be a heck of a lot more briefing done on the Non-Executive Director front, I’ve given the PRA Industry Event slide pack published the other week a bit more of a going over to see if the left and right hands are pushing the Solvency II wheelie bin in the right direction. I haven’t gone as far as watching the 1h 30m video of the event yet – if I wanted to watch a room full of fidgeting old men in ill-fitting suits I’d just go to Bridge Night at the bowling club…

I can’t say I was massively enthused by the read of the slides as an individual who is frequently delivering material to the very audience the presentation was aimed at. I would highlight the following oddities;

Internal Model-specific (slides 6-12)

• That Solvency II “sets a high bar” for model approval – that feels a little disingenuous given that the PRA has had the whip hand in the IRSG’s internal model committee for years, and has evidently driven their CAT. Fair to say that the PRA set the "high bar" on behalf of the rest of Europe.
• From the “lessons learned” section they suggest that some IMAP/CAT firms have used assumptions which are not matching their experience. Is that not bravado bordering on criminality? Doesn’t feel like small beer, so unless the PRA are splitting hairs with that comment, I trust the protagonists had a strip torn from them.
• Some models ignoring “Key Risks” faced by a firm – how can this be? If this is about cheeky risk selection (i.e. let’s use SF, but model Market Risk as we get a good number from it) all well and good, but to say that firms are ignoring them is not a good steer, and if they are, then how is punishment not already being dispensed?
• For Use Test purposes, NEDS told to have “belief” but not “blind faith” – this feels like Bank Creep, given that the PRA  have been vocal (here and here) on firms blindly following models after the banks got caught with their trolleys down a few years back (nice PRA summary here). Doesn’t feel especially fair to tar insurers with exactly the same brush in advance, even if it is smart!
• “Boards need to own validation design” – just sounds meaningless when you read it back. If you want them to “do” the design (which Andrew Marshall’s later slides deriding the efforts of the validation contracting community suggest also support), then just say it.
• The “Key Questions” slides contain some very ropey gear. “Does the output of the model give a credible answer”? “Can the firm survive on the Standard Formula”? The terms used are so flimsy that one could spend hours arguing the toss about their definition – “so what is survival – EC+, SCR+, MCR+ with recovery plan” etc.

ORSA and SoG (slides 14-18)
Starts with a bit of good news – some generic industry feedback is seemingly due within the next couple of months (pertaining to our 2014 ORSA efforts?). The slide summarising findings to date is also a useful yardstick for those who can’t wait that long.

For System of Governance, the executive world should prepare themselves for NED questions regarding whether or not they (as opposed to their underlings and contractors) are reading EIOPA's Guidelines. Let's hope they have!

On the gnarlier side;

• Seems to be an obsession with assigning named individuals (as opposed to roles or teams)  to perform mitigating tasks relating to anything ropey uncovered during the ORSA
• “ORSA should be holistic” – at what point is that breathtakingly grim term going to be put to pasture? For a NED briefing, the use of plain English should be considered par for the course. It is followed two slides later by “top-down/bottom-up” which is equally non-specific.
• “ORSA is not a compliance exercise resulting in a report to the PRA” – I think you meant to say “not ONLY...”!

The final slides from Ian Marshall’s presentation are revealing more due to the clumsy terminology often used at the table with NEDs (“Key Drivers” and “Key Correlations” for example – if you mean “most money riding on it”, then say it!). Also, the idea that Risk Appetite is “no longer an aspiration” is worrying – I would have given the insurance industry credit that it ceased to be aspirational some time ago, and doesn’t need a 2015 ‘tick’, but then I am a trusting fellow.

Does anyone think, off the back of these slides, that their NEDs will be chomping at the bit at the next Risk Committee/Board meeting using the ammunition supplied here?

Maybe I’d better watch the video after all… 

Solvency II - things what happened in the last couple of months...

She might not be singing yet, but just like my nana at Pilates, the Solvency II fat lady is taking some deep breaths. As I have spent the last couple of months at home in au-pair mode, gladly leaving the rest of the world to waffle about ERM and Solvency II, I thought I would throw together a catch-up post, given that applications for some of the Solvency II goodies have been open since 1st April.

Starting at the top, the UK Government managed to stay sellotaped together long enough to get the fundamental Solvency II legislative work pushed through Parliament before they disbanded for the General Election. The documentation is available in full here, with synopsis here. Interestingly, this formally obliges the PRA to review capital add-ons "at least" once a year, as well as to provide specific reporting to EIOPA on the topic. There is also a little more meat around the sticky issue of firms who breach their MCR, then look unlikely to rectify the matter.

The Government also released the findings of their Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) in assessing whether Solvency II was going to be a blessing or a curse for Britain. This is actually a very handy drop-in document for your NEDs/peripheral programme figures, and is worth pushing on to them.

They do make the rather controversial statement that on top of the estimated £2.6bn cost to the industry of implementation (!!!!!), the ongoing costs of c.£200m a year will be due to reporting obligations (fair enough) as well as the need for a remuneration policy (hmmm?). Rather disparagingly, the Treasury merely estimate "un-quantified administrative benefits" off the back of improvements in risk management and governance arrangements.

The PRA have recently released the Policy Statement covering their final rules for Solvency II implementation, which on paper should contain no surprises (other associated materials available here). Generalist media chatter (here and here for example) was pretty underwhelming, and while Mark Carney emphasises in the statement that Insurers must be "robustly supervised", Andrew Bailey stated merely that while the "...new regime will not be perfect...it is a welcome step in the right direction"

On a lighter note, the European institutions got a bit beefy over the new year when the newly installed Commissioner Hill had his ears chewed by ECON's new Chair regarding a range of issues or unanswered questions regarding the Delegated Acts. Having given himself a couple of weeks to digest, he pinged out a reply thanking ECON for pointing out three typos, and otherwise defending his corner. Much of the background noise in this correspondence regarding infrastructure investment and EIOPA funding has had a life of its own for some time now - indeed, EIOPA's dummy was definitively spat on the matter last week when they "reprioritised" their 2015 work plan to account for budget cuts.

B-ABI - got back?

NEDs have recently been the beneficiaries of a webcast featuring the juicy double of Huw Evans and Paul Fisher discussing the implications of Solvency II's progression for NEDs. For anyone struggling to get their NEDs to read overinflated board packs these days, a diversion to this footge would be a smart idea (video 1 is more chatter, so start at video 2).

A parallel release for NEDs came from the PRA in the form of a slide pack and a monster 1hr 30m recording of the presentation which it accompanied. Clearly the PRA have seen enough gaps in the efforts of NEDs to date to go to these en-masse tutorial lengths, but the material on validation and ORSA in particular should be swallowed whole.