Solvency II Updates and Corporate Governance in Financials - PRA "Back for Good"?

A few releases of note out of the UK regulator over the last working week or so means I had some catching up to do - sometimes it feels like "All I do each night is PRA"...

They started off with a Director's Letter just before the bank holiday weekend. A general unwillingness to crack whips was present throughout this doc, even at this late stage, with a few references to "inform your supervisor" as opposed to "just do it".

The letter states that the PRA were due to publish some of their findings from their balance sheet review work by the end of the month - not done as yet, hopefully turns out to be money well spent

Regarding Standard Formula appropriateness:

• They stress that firms must identify deviations from Standard Formula from their risk profiles, and include an assessment of the significance of that deviation in their ORSAs (emphasised in their October industry presentation from p6)- is the implication here that firms are not doing this at all at the moment, or just not reporting it in ORSA?
• Highlight that "supplementary information" used to explain such deviations will also be assessed by the PRA. Does this add significance to one's qualitative commentary around Standard Formula/Risk Profile deviations? Can a good explanation be the difference between having to IM/PIM at the earliest opportunity against being given a couple of years of capital add-on breathing room?
• The PRA note that, "...where a firm's conclusion on this question is not appropriate", it will intervene. It is not clear how a firm's conclusions about its deviation between SF and its Risk Profile could be considered "not appropriate", but I imagine that anything which attempts to dodge USPs/PIM/IM ONCE the divergence hits the limits in the Delegated Acts (276-287) would be frowned upon. There is certainly no appetite at the PRA for renewing capital add-ons in perpetuity (slide 13), which given the UK's familiarity with ICA and ICG, might be a desperado's first chance saloon.
• The PRA are planning "specific interventions" on this front (detailed here), but not necessarily in time to correct before 2016.

Regarding Internal Models

• Not happy with "wide variation in quality of IM Change policies. Sounds like firms are doing their best to avoid change criteria that results in frequent submissions for reapproval, which one would expect!



IMAP Submissions
- Everything Changes

• PRA seemingly expecting firms to have not only taken on board their feedback, but also had their IMs revalidated, before submitting their IM application. Given that validation will be chalked down as a 'once-a-year' job at the moment (despite the IRM's efforts), that seems highly unlikely. They give themselves a get-out-of-jail-free card though by stating that firms must be confident that any changes in their IMs both address PRA feedback and meet the tests and standards for model approval.
• They appear to advise against submitting applications if you have a material change in the pipeline.
• Heavily critical of Board involvement in validation. Here they look for evidence of Boards "overseeing and influencing" the validation process, whereas previous PRA presentation slides  did not have such expectations of Boards (slide 8 here), or indeed expected more (slide 9 here)!
• The expression "internal management loadings" appeared in my life for the first time, which sounds to a non-technical person like myself that firms are effectively "dumbing-up" the capital requirement currently delivered by their IM in order to plaster over mathematical or data weaknesses. PRA certainly not impressed by industry suggestions to date.
• Given the number of firms who must have dropped out of looking for Day 1 approval, they still shake the pineapple tree here in order to remind applicants that contingency plans should be ready in the case of application failures. "Many firms still have a considerable amount of work to do" sounds to me like some applicants are being pre-warned of their imminent failure!

The PRA also released a consultation paper entitled Corporate Governance: Board Responsibilities, which has the rather light ambition of identifying "key aspects of good board governance to which the PRA attaches particular importance in the conduct of its supervision".

A few straggler items in it;

• That failures in governance and/or risk management have been a key factor in "many" financial sector failures - as opposed to "all"
• That they consider the FRC's Corporate Governance Code, amongst others, a "comprehensive guide to good corporate governance" - given the firms experiencing the financial sector failures were most probably complying with it, not a great advert!
• "Culture is the collective responsibility of the Board" - a bit of a nowhere comment, but instinctively, I don't see how this can be right. They can be accountable to both supervisors and shareholders/members for cultural failings, but where could such a responsibility materialise into demonstrable actions? 
• "...the Board is responsible for the oversight of, but not for managing the business" - in relation to my comment directly above, can both statement be correct?
• "The Risk Control Framework should flow from the Board's Risk Appetite" - I'll work on the premise that this is missing the word "statement" at the end of the line
• Section 11 on remuneration expects that incentives are aligned with "prudent risk taking" - what if prudence is too conservative for one's risk appetite?

Into some of the expected themes;

• Strategy to be "owned by the Board as a whole"
• They wed Culture and Remuneration "...to encourage and enforce the kind of behaviours the Board wished to see"
• They want a "well articulated and measurable" Risk Appetite Statement which can also be "...readily understood by employees throughout the business". Doesn't seem feasible, given the metrics commonly used in risk appetite statements are not exactly Finance 101 (Solvency/Liquidity/Earnings-related),
• "It is the responsibility of the Board to ensure that the effectiveness of the Risk Control framework is kept actively under review" - has at least an air of COSO about it, don't think it was deliberate
• Big section (6) on responsibilities and accountabilities of exec and non-exec directors.
• Followed in 7.1 with "...non-executives should not simply delegate responsibility for major decisions to individuals among them who are considered specialist in the area" - this has internal models written all over it (p5-6)!

Happy to see this second document, though I don't know what it adds to firms' understanding about what is "good and bad".




Central Bank of Ireland speeches - "and there's more"...

Solvency II-ready?
"It's the way I tell them"...

I rejoiced on Friday at the sight of more speech material emerging from the Central Bank of Ireland directorate, if only due to the Frank Carson* gag I could wheel out due to the volume of their recent speech-giving...

As an industry we should always be happy to hear the regulator on lead vocals, so I gave the pair of speeches released a once-over to see what Irish concerns have justified the recent bounty of public addresses.

Deputy Governor Cyril Roux was very targeted in his speech, delivered to PwC's Annual CEO Dinner. It apparently gave him "great pleasure" to be in PwC's offices, which presumably means they weren't on the meter...

Some of the statistics and comments served to highlight that Ireland is something of a special case in the context of Solvency II, in that two-thirds of Irish gross premiums are to cover 'foreign risks', and that many insurers under their auspices will not have proximity to or oversight of much of their distribution network.

A few messages jumped out from the rest of the speech;

• A lot of positive messages had a caveat implicitly wrapped with them - "...we are in the main satisfied with your engagement with the Central Bank"; "On the whole international firms generally file returns on time..."; "I also commend your general adherence to our Corporate Governance Code..."
• Goes as far as using the IMF's recent review findings to tell firms to stop poaching regulatory staff while simultaneously complaining about turnaround time!
• Nice point about keeping focused on current risks through the PRISM framework, rather than drifting into Solvency II mode before 2016.
• Having recently been complimented by Sr. Bernadino on Ireland's reserving governance (p12), he reinforced that assumptions pertaining to reserves are expected to be "critically debated".
• On ORSA, that the CBoI "...expects to see Boards actively directing the use of risk management tools...such s stress or scenario testing"
• On Internal Modelling, he not only expects Boards to "...have sufficient knowledge and skill to challenge the model outputs", but adds that they "...like to see a Board direct the modellers in their firms to run specific stresses and scenarios prior to an item being discussed at the Board" - a big advance on previous murmurings on use test from supervisory bodies.
• Pulls up firms who are seemingly not tailoring their model's parameters for the Irish-specific business.
• Similarly a message of insisting that cross-border distributors tailor Group-driven materials and processes for the Irish market such as "...group policies and output, such as the ORSA, and internal model...".
• A cute but important distinction that "embedding" Solvency II, rather than complying with it on paper, is still going to take considerable effort.

Sylvia Cronin's speech (well, the Solvency II aspect of it) stayed along the same lines as she pursued at the Industry event in late April, where she was harsh on a number of specific elements in preparatory phase ORSA Reports which had been observed.

In a section of the speech covering "challenges to be overcome", a number of pieces of insistent ORSA direction are given, for example;

• "Your Board must use the ORSA to more fully align business strategy and capital"
• "You also need to use it as a lever to discharge your core responsibility not to take on risks and exposures which the capital base does not support".
•  "...there is a lot of work yet to do by firms to get this element of the new regime embedded to the extent we required" - I add here that, given they will have only reviewed 2014's preparatory phase ORSA Reports and Processes, is this not a given, particularly after CBoI sponsored a template-filling approach for the smaller firms?

On the wider world, the speech covers;

• That Solvency II sets out "clear standards and expectations around your internal control and risk management" - agree on the latter, but the former?
• Believes that the "scope for subjective judgement" may open up regulatory arbitrage opportunities, and that "a number of iterations" will be required before EU-wide consistency is achieved, in a sly dig at, errrr, everyone in mainland Europe! 
• Similarly, the volume of cross border business HQd in Dublin poses a problem due to the geographical boundary of CBoI's "prudential remit"
• Reinforces the message fro April that Pillar 3 readiness is a growing concern
• A large suite of views on Conduct Risk, where "culture" and "conduct" are hogtied together as the grimmest twins since DeVito and Schwarzenegger - that message won't be changing in a hurry, so I strongly recommend your work in that area caters to the supervisor's tastes.

Useful insight from what appears to be a supervisor with their sleeves rolled-up - keep up the good work.

* PS I know the connection is tenuous as he's a Belfast man, but give me a chance!

Myners briefing on Governance at the Co-op - working class barred from the Board?

Wolf - step away from the door...

A corporate governance story that will echo in the eternity of MBA classes for years to come, the unravelling of the UK's Co-operative Group from the benign grocer-cum-divvy machine into a ying and yang shotgun conglomerate of opposites is proving to be a watershed moment for UK plc, with stakeholders attempting to balance myriad legal, political and ideological considerations in order to both keep the wolf from the door, and preserve the principle of mutuality for its membership.

There are no surprises that the crux of the Group's issues lies in its banking arm, nor that being acquisitive during the financial crisis (here, here and here) has proven to be poor strategy. Keeping the wolf from the door has therefore largely been delivered through the tried and tested combination of begging and borrowing, which the recently departed CEO appears to have delivered with some aplomb.

Governance structures
- choices choices...

However, the Group's hiring of Paul Myners back in December, a man with an extensive collection of t-shirts and hats, to independently review its governance arrangements, seems likely to deliver to the membership a menu of choices as unpalatable as a Sunday skip-dip.

Lord Myners has hurriedly delivered a briefing on his findings to-date, as well as performed some mainstream media duties (here and here), following the Group CEO's resignation last week. This early sighter was seemingly unscheduled, but the manner of the CEO's departure ("a tragedy" in Myners' words) meant that his findings to-date could not wait until May for its full publication date.

Myners has therefore naturally delivered a ruthless and scathing take-down of the governance structure and processes within the Co-operative, while calling out the Board member who are clearly well schooled in how to game the system, as well as the playground tactics/rabbit-in-a-hat tricks that turn "one-man-one-vote" into "one hundred men-all votes"!

Killer quotes

• The group endures a significant "democratic deficit"
• The future of my recommendations lies in the hands of around 100 elected individuals on the current Group and Regional boards, few of whom have any serious business experience and many of whom are drawing material financial benefits from their positions
• There is a phrase frequently used in Co-operative Group circles that the Executive should be "on tap but not on top"
• ...the Group Board has spent far too much time on transactions such as Somerfield and Britannia which have been breathtakingly value-destructive

Observations

• The "exceptional skill and tireless efforts" of the Executive team are cited as the reason for the Group's survival in its current form
• The current governance framework is variously referred to as "flawed", suffering from "acute systemic weaknesses" and having "consistently produced governors without the necessary qualifications and experience to provide effective Board leadership". Ouch...
• That the Groups social goals are not aligned with its strategic and commercial objectives. This is of course less of a worry for its financial services competitors.
• The the Group's "massive scale and complexity" means that a man-off-the-street approach to electing Board members, which may be sufficient for a farmer/grocer co-op, is not suitable.
• Shatters the "myth" that the Group has always been run by lay members, as opposed to those with commercial experience.
• The thought of creating a board of INEDs and lay members is disregarded due to the potential for creating "second-class citizenship"
• Highlights that Co-op's core business of groceries is savagely competitive at the moment (just look at Morrison's and Sainsbury's), so continued ineffective governance could be devastating
• Notes that there have been previously (disregarded) reviews of its governance architecture, which is "long known for its labyrinthine complexity and its disfunctionality"
• Stresses that, due to the current voting structure, acceptance of  his recommendations "...potentially lie[s] in the hands of fewer than 50 elected members". It sounds like they haven't been shy to remind him of that either!

Recommendations

• Halve the size of the Group Board, which will be subject to annual re-election
• Independent Chair, with no previous association with Co-op
• 6-7 INEDs and 2 Executive Directors
• All with qualifications of a similar ilk to its (listed) competitors
• Create a National Membership Council (NMC), with a 12-person executive committee to effectively represent the membership and co-operative principles and values
• The Board to be subject to scrutiny by the NMC, who have the right to be consulted on "key strategic and operational intiatives"
• "Arrangements" to be made to safeguard the confidentiality of information shared between the Board and the NMC (certainly not the case with current arrangements!)

The entire document feels drenched in class warfare and spectrum politics. That rather hideous take from the existing Board on their executive team ("on tap, but not on top") feels like the inspiration of Myners' recommendation for a professionalised, appointed Board, rather than the beer and sandwich brigade which currently exists.

That said, there is thought on the left-wing (here and here) who feel that mutuality and co-operation should remain unsullied by the commercial world, who remain unable to affect much in the way of democratic change in Boardrooms even after the raft of FRC-sponsored guidance released over the last couple of years (though PIRC are trying!). Is one failed attempt to democratise stakeholders best replaced by cherry-picking from a similarly deficient model?

On the basis that I have banged the drum for background diversity in Boardrooms (not just gender or race), and the existing Co-op Board is "diverse" in that respect, I'm left to wonder if I've been barking up the wrong tree. The Board delivered by their existing process is neither fit nor proper, and are able to outmanouevre their executive compatriots armed with little more than a working knowledge of provincial politics and a polyester suit.

Should we therefore use the grey-area of "fit and proper" regulation to ban the contract plasterers, nurses and retired publishers of the world from financial service provider Boardrooms on the basis that they don't have an MBA, and count with their fingers? Or can one make a valid contribution to a financial services Board of directors regardless of the colour of their collar?

Corporate Governance and the Co-op - Never too much?

Another day another maelstrom for the UK's Co-operative Group, with their Chief Executive having his resignation accepted by the Board of Directors, this following on from a truly extraordinary story from late last year, where the Chair of its banking arm was caught in a drugs and prostitutes 'sting', which in itself followed an earlier uncovering of a £1.5bn capital hole in the banking operation!

The Group CEO, Euan Sutherland, said in a statement that without "professional and commercial governance" it would be "impossible" for him to execute the changes he had planned. A 55 page rulebook, for a Group that has six million members, doesn't feel like too much on the face of it for a man with his CV, so I was interested to see what the story behind the story was.

"Professional and commercial governance"
- Say it twice, say it thrice...

The boiling point appears to have been the leaking of details around the CEO's proposed pay packet over the weekend, which materialised publicly in a stroppy posting by him on the Co-op Employee Facebook page, pointing fingers at colleagues trying to "undermine me personally". His only-recently-active Twitter went quiet after a bout of February activity, so perhaps his attentions have been on this matter a little earlier...

The Co-op has been as leaky as a porcupine's waterbed recently, with this snippet regarding outcomes of their "top secret" self-commissioned Board review, supplementing other sensitive leaks over the last year reported here and here, so clearly there are plenty of disgruntled paper-handlers in this unique organisation.

Regardless of the well-connected source though, a quick glance across the numbers leaked to the Guardian would be enough to sponsor a sharp intake of breath for anyone in financial services (a £2m pay-off for a HR head leaving after a year? Will Hutton breaks it out in this post, and the mind boggles!). That said, take a look at these terms of reference for the Co-op Remuneration Committee and tell me where you have seen self-perpetuating pay-puffer terminologies before: every other financial services provider perhaps?

The knives were out from early on with regards to the financial arrangements of Sutherland's new team though, with the spectacularly generous relocation package for one of his lieutenants drawn out by the press soon after his hiring. Perhaps he put some noses out of joint with his remarkable show of sartorial disdain on his first day - "...I came in, walked into this brand-new building, and I was not wearing a tie" - but he did say a few other things in that early-days Telegraph interview which appear to have turned around and bitten his kitten, such as;

• “It’s very valuable to have customers in the boardroom. And for the first time I think the group board felt they were involved in strategy.”
• “There have been some very big issues that we’ve worked through [with the board.] Not bank issues, other issues”

The thread that appears to be emerging for this Group is that its uniquely assembled Board is ill-equipped to deal with such manners in a technically professional and rigorous format, whether that be rolling over for the previous leadership while they made a string of horrendous strategic decisions, or the huffy, juvenile leaking of sensitive data when the new team has come in.

This is not to say that using mutual-style democracy to elect a functional Board of Directors can't work, but perhaps it doesn't work in financial services, where the stakes are higher, the jargon is less penetrable, and failure is catastrophic. I could certainly pick through the list of values and principles and find a number of institutionally-appropriate excuses for leaking confidential paperwork

From a pure decision making perspective though, should the shop-floor proles be allowed to mix with the MBA-laden executive class of the 21st Century corporate world in a way that affords this particular entity the luxury of competing against their more cut-throat rivals, while sticking to those core values and principles while paying off their massive debts?

If Lord Myners pulls a solution out of the bag for a quid (and he doesn't sound like he's shrinking to the task), they'll surely have to promote him to Marquis!

Board Diversity - should gender and ethnicity have a quota?

Having seen a few snippets in quick succession on the matter, I figured it was as good a time as any to revisit Board Diversity, the gift that keeps on giving...headaches to Legal, Compliance and Company Secretarial departments all over Europe!

My initial interest in the matter was piqued by the potential dichotomy between having a Board that was "Fit and Proper" in the context of Solvency II or indeed the myriad Corporate Governance Codes within Europe, and the simultaneous push within the EU for setting quotas for a minimum percentage of female representatives on Boards.

Certainly a couple of years back, it looked like companies may be faced with a choice of meeting any gender quota (but with a Board that was not "Fit and Proper", if only due to lack of Board-level exposure and experience), or simply thumbing their noses at the quotas. The UK's current informal approach recommended by Lord Davies suggests that, while progress is being made on the gender front specifically, there is no danger of radical positive discrimination in order to meet a quota, regardless of who sets it.

I have therefore rather caustically covered the topic on previous posts (here, here and here) due to the hijacking of the word "diversity" as actually meaning "gender diversity" - seulement! There is evidently nowhere near enough working class (or working class origin) representation on plc Boards, not to mention ethnicity, disabilities and people who have served coal-face time in not-for-profit or charitable sectors - do they get a quota too?

All levity aside, there are rumblings from the UK Labour party that perhaps gender isn't the only quota worth talking about, floating the idea of ethnic quotas should they be elected next year. Bearing in mind the shamefully unrepresentative gender and ethnic make-up of the British members of parliament, and the triteness of his leader's behaviour when white-bloke hunting at PMQs the other week, he may wish to turn his attentions closer to home. That said, if the diversity debate has broken out of its gender-soaked malaise, it is cause to celebrate.

Dude? You're barred...

InsuranceERM have (unwittingly?) helped to perpetuate the idea of "diversity" being a debate that is overwhelmingly about gender in a recent round-table centred on how the Insurance industry "...can become more reflective of society" - which had no dudes in attendance!

While I certainly wouldn't argue that Insurance was, is, and will continue to be the "domain of the white male" for the foreseeable future, can that be remedied by excluding said males from a conversation on inclusivity of all things?

While the conventional pros and cons were discussed about Golden Skirt-style quotas, mandatory shortlisting of women for senior positions and mentoring, the child-rearing-sized elephant in the room was also tabled. The prevailing opinion seemed to be that it is encumbent on both employers and women to do a bit more during that phase of life to maintain career progression.

Had my two cents been sought (heaven forbid!), I would have added the "H" bomb into the mix. As a husband who works in another country from my family home, I personally offer an additional constraint to my wife's career every single working day, and one thing which won't change between generations is that one partner generally has to "take one for the team". Do the significant others of UK plc realistically provide more of a constraint on career development than any of the factors discussed by the InsuranceERM panel?

I would also have referenced Britain's blue-rinsed demographic timebomb, caring for infirm relatives, in this context, a job that most men manage to avoid, even when it's their parents! I have no first hand experience on the matter, so am reluctant to do more than float the idea, particularly when high-achieving female talent may have the means to outsource such activity.

Progress on the diversity issue therefore remains clunky, piecemeal and gender-obsessed. With every Lloyds (voluntarily?) taking the initiative, there is a Glencore or LSE who manages to clear the decks!

I certainly hope to see some progress on the gender percentage front soon, if only to hit a target so that we may switch the debate back to genuine diversity. With the topic gaining traction across the pond, maybe we won't have to wait too long.

ICAEW on "overarching principles of corporate governance" - how much is too much?

I hadn't got around to this thought-leadership document from the ICAEW on corporate governance, despite their kind tweet asking for my thoughts, due to the welter of Solvency II activity that started from September.

The premise behind their document seems to be that corporate governance codes are perhaps a touch unwieldy these days, and might benefit from some Google-style "Do No Evil" overarching principles which even the sneakiest, mealiest-mouthed Board member would struggle to justify their (mis)conduct in the context of.

In general, the word 'overarching' makes me want to pull my thinning tufts out. I'm not much of a compliance-ferret, but the thought of Board conduct being so misguided by the corporate governance codes in place in developed countries that we need to refine it another notch is one I couldn't entertain. Certainly, given the importance of holding these people to account, and the level of education and experience a great many of them will have attained, I am inclined to think that 'more is more' rather than 'less'.

The ICAEW paper comes up with 5 overaching principles of corporate governance, centred around;

1. Leadership
2. Capability
3. Accountability
4. Sustainability 
5. Integrity

The following parts jumped out at me;

• That overarching principles should be "aspirational and credible" - feels counter-intuitive.
• That overarching principles should "think beyond the letter of laws and regulations" - why should they? Laws and regulations, regardless of how badly drafted, capture the kind of corporate recklessness that we would all gladly see consigned to history. Punishment seems to be a bigger issue (i.e. why aren't white collar criminals thrown to the dogs, or captains of industry who are hoist by their own petard immediately banned for life?)
• The thought of companies explaining links (or gaps) between overarching principles and their actual actions is almost too grubby to contemplate, giving leaders an undeserved shade of grey to support bad governance ("...well, in principle...")
• That overarching principles should be "...easy for boards and stakeholders to understand". Why should a Board job be easy? Why do people of such talent, education, breeding (?), etc. need to have the words "Don't be an idiot" written for them in crayon? Briefing onesself on the requirements of a national corporate governance code is only beyond a Board member who cannot be ar bothered.
• That the current UK code, at 18 principles and 28 supporting principles is "...too detailed for most people to remember". That would include me! However, it's only a click away, and is certainly not justification for further refinement.

I definitely sympathise with anyone who has to keep on top of corporate governance code development, particularly in the EU, where pan-European angles bubble up with regularity (here and here for example). That said, just do your job and comply with them!

Given that certain organisational bodies cannot be held to similar standards, yet may be equally significant in the case of UK/Planet Earth plc (Government departments, Private Equity firms, Mutuals/Friendly Societies), I would certainly find it hard to transplant such a layer onto existing requirements for listed entities. If anything, these overrarching principles could be targeted towards the general public in order to help laymen and women understand what areas our current codes are focused on, and why.

I certainly don't see the overarching principles as aiding leaders of business in any other respect that providing another layer of excuse confetti when they need to explain away the next slew of avaricious corporate conduct. I wonder who it's going to be next?

Fit and Proper Persons in financial services - judge not, lest ye be judged

A quick note on the high-profile leadership-related crises which have reared their heads over the last couple of weeks, and whether the risk management professionals of the world can learn from them.

Two stories related to the flip-side of the kind of driven, charismatic figures that can progress rapidly through their chosen careers while coping with some rather spectacular character flaws. One being the ex-Chair of the UK's Co-operative Bank (already in financial turmoil), caught in a drugs and prostitutes sting this week, which has followed on from the city mayor of Toronto, who has been drawn into a similar web of videotaped misbehaviours.

Sticking with the financial services example, we have a number of issues which should interest the risk pros;

• A Chair with no financial services experience or qualifications (Northern Rock encore un fois!) ...
• In an organisation undergoing a massive transformation after acquisition...
• With a previous (if expired) criminal conviction...
• Who had resigned from public office while in the role due to pornography-related misuse of office equipment (reported at the time as due to "increasing responsibilities" at Co-op!)
• Who then (allegedly) used his work e-mail to solicit prostitutes (bottom of article)
• And all of this post-dating the nadir of the financial crisis, when one would have naturally thought that both institutions and the regulator would have been on point on such a matter.

Some elements of the story are dominating the headlines, such as the gender of the prostitutes, the type of drugs used, or the fact that the Co-operative movement, purporting to have a higher calling than the soul-hoovering plcs, should perhaps be impervious to such matters. 

For me, we have a straigthtforward case of significant internal control failings across departments, a failure to hold senior management to account when breaching internal policies, and a very strong working example of a reverse stress test, combining a number of risk factors which in concert deliver a failed business model. On that basis, I would think that the business-as-usual risk teams across the country will be analysing this one until the cows come home.

How much of a bum-paddling the FSA/PRA deserve on this is another matter. Whether light-touch or prescriptive, I think regulators in many countries will wince at the details of the approval of Rev. Flowers' appointment once this one plays out at Treasury Select Committee over the coming weeks (I have no insider information, but let's face it, we'll be watching through our fingers!). 

For context however, in 2009 the FSA (as it was then) made a formal submission to the TSC addressing many of the failings uncovered by the retreating tide post-Lehmans/Bear Stearns/Northern Rock, and what Hector Sants & Co had planned to make up the shortfall. 

The TSC made a number of comments (sandwiched within the FSA's submission) which are worth highlighting today - I have emphasised the parts which should now echo in eternity;

The FSA's assessment of whether senior bankers were fit and proper for their posts appears to have been little more than a tick-box formality, unless the applicant had a criminal record or gave some other evidence of a shady past. That bar was demonstrably set too low. We welcome the acknowledgement from the FSA that a candidate's competence, as well as their probity, will now be thoroughly reviewed before taking up a senior post in a bank. We recognise that there may be some dangers in the FSA assessing competence, not least because the FSA will become exposed to accusations of incompetence itself, if it makes a wrong judgement

We recommend that the FSA assess whether bank executives should possess relevant qualifications. We would like to see banking qualifications become one of the core indicators against which the FSA can assess a candidate's competence. If a candidate has no relevant qualifications, the onus should be on them to prove to the FSA that they have relevant compensatory experience

And from the PRA themselves...

We strongly agree that it is important for bank executives to have the right level of skills and experience. As noted above, we have recently written to all CEOs of relationship-managed firms reminding them that it remains the firm's responsibility to ensure that the candidates they put forward are fit and proper to perform the role in question, and that firms should, therefore, have robust recruitment, referencing and due diligence processes in place

It was only three years ago - at what point do we (grim pun intended) practice what we preach on corporate governance in financial services?

System of Governance - EIOPA's FINAL preparatory guidance for national supervisors

Based on feedback received since their initial consultation paper was released, EIOPA make the following generic clarifications/statements in the preamble of their guidance doc for System of Governance preparations;

• That proportionality will not be defined or presented as examples in the guideline text (p5-6)
• That NCAs are "expected to...review and evaluate the quality of the information provided to them" - bad news for the PRA, who were clinically uninterested in reviewing Solvency II reporting attempts according to one blogger (p6)
• The emergence of a new ORSA acronym, "FLAOR", which looks more like something an amused teenager would write on Facebook (p6)
• The expectation that 2015 will see submissions of (2014) ORSAs to NCAs (p7)
• While there is no generic take on what enforcement action should take place in this interim period, firms are expected to (a) Discuss any negative findings from their ORSA/Governance systems with their supervisor, and (b) To produce SCRs using information of appropriate quality. Enforcement action in the absence of this WILL NOT consist of capital add-ons, apparently (p7)
• That the submission date calendar for all of the information expected will be reviewed at the end of this year, so that EIOPA can take Omnibus II progress into account (p8)
• That the explanatory text in each set of guidance is NOT part of "Comply or Explain" (p9)
• That the reasons behind a negative "Comply or Explain" decision from any country will be kept secret as standard (p10, and disgraceful, frankly).

They then go on to focus on some of the larger bones of contention within the 52 guidelines provided. The following generic points stand out for me as a practitioner;

1. There is almost no discernible movement in EIOPA's position, even after a volumous lobbying effort;
2. That explanations for the inclusion of contentious content are generally forthcoming, though on a number of occasions, flimsy;
3. That planning for 2014 full-year mothballing of Solvency II programmes is not an option, particularly for ICAS+ candidates - some may get away with a few months of inertia, depending on the quality of their paperwork (strategies, policies, process guides/maps, terms of reference, charters etc).

The following supporting arguments for EIOPA's final view were, in my mind at least, poorly formulated, regardless of whether the end result is still agreeable;

3.48 (Guideline 6)

- Refused to add more definition around what constitutes a "significant decision", which is poor form.

3.58 (All of Chapter III)

- That the expectations of Risk Management in insurers  "...comprise risk management standards which are considered to be matter-of-course and wide spread activities" - extraordinarily loose, considering the lack of a majority-accepted global, or indeed pan-European standard on the subject (IRM/ISO/COSO/FERMA/FSB's efforts notwithstanding)

3.65 (Guideline 19)

- That, while it is "not an easy task", Operational Risks should be quantifiable, and therefore subject to tolerance limits - I don't think it would have hurt to suggest (or even compel the use of) a method if it is that difficult.

3.68 (Guideline 25)

- That firms should maintain Investment Risk-related KRIs outside of what might be provided by normal parties (for example, ratings agencies), which would help "...increase overall risk management" - not entirely convinced that a generic "increase" is any kind of worthy ambition. 

3.74 (Guideline 31)

- That a capital management policy and capital management plan is both necessary (though for not entirely convincing reasons when tying back to the Directive)

3.78 (Chapter VI [Internal Control])

- That there is already plenty of clarification on what the Compliance function is charged with. I would agree in principle, but have heard evidence to the contrary in practice.

3.81 (Chapter VII [Internal Audit])

- That they neither wish to mandate or discourage rotation of Internal Audit staff or whistleblowing direct to NCAs - in which case, why mention it!

3.110
- A bizarre comment in response to a suggestion that a public statement should be released by the AMSB annually regarding the discharge of responsibilities around the system of governance that the Directive "...only deals with internal governance, not corporate governance" - think I know what they are fishing at, but terribly worded.

3.144
- Justify their decision not to define risk appetite and risk tolerance in the context of these guidelines

They have however provided some more defendable clarifications, for example;

3.51 (Guideline 11)

- Clarified that the gold-plated "Fit and Proper" requirements apply to AMSB/Control Function staff only, as well as specify what is expected from Outsourcers.

3.57 (Chapter III [Risk Management])

- That in the context of separating the duties of the Risk and Actuarial functions, the Directive is abundantly clear and that undertakings "...cannot deviate from [the Directive's] distribution of tasks"

3.62 (All "Policy"-related guidelines)

- That efforts should be targeted towards drafting the required documents during the preparatory phase. I would imagine this would be "re-working" in the UK, where such activity is most probably long done.

3.67 (Guideline 19)

- That there is no compulsion for firms to operate an electronic database to store operational risk events

3.85 (Chapter VIII [Actuarial])

- That, regardless of the absence of a valuation framework for TPs, the processes behind their co-ordination and calculation justify early activity, rather than "wait and see" on Pillar 1.

3.124
- Regarding Op Risk, activity will have to include "...identifying all operational risks that have crystallised and their near misses" (my emphasis)

Relatively easy in summary then - if it was a gap/issue in your system of governance in March, it probably still is, so go and fix it!

Central Bank of Ireland - Corporate Governance Code refresh

The Irish approach to corporate governance in financial services, at least up until the onset of the financial crisis in 2006/07, resembled something of an all-you-can-grasp buffet for a select number of executive golf club pals and octogenarian ex-politico Non-Executive Directors (NEDs), having their voting arms operated a la Weekend at Bernies.

Ireland pre-2007 - Waking NED?

The new FSA-flavoured approach brought in by Matthew Elderfield in 2009 (elaborated on here) fortified by the findings of a devastating 2011 report summarising the truly horrid governance practices in the Irish banking industry, has led to a change of regulatory tack at the Central Bank of Ireland that represents the biggest volte-face in Europe since the Macarena.

Alongside PRISM, a piece of revolutionary work in the assessment of financial institutions by supervisory bodies, the CBoI also made substantial changes in areas such as Annual Compliance Statements, Fitness and Probity of directors, Risk Appetite Statements.

All of this ran off the back of Mr Elderfield's first major gig in 2010, a full revamp of the Corporate Governance Code, which could hitch a ride off the back of the work of the FSA and CEIOPS (at the time!) and deliver a more substantial suite of obligations to a cabal of directors who, after feasting on carrots for years, desperately needed the stick.

This makes the release of yesterday's consultation on the Corporate Governance code a touch baffling, as the ink is barely dry on 2010's effort - it perhaps reflects that the regulator has reached optimum staffing levels if they can review it so regularly! Having said that, the level of divergence from accepted CG practices in the UK was flagged by Grant Thornton back in 2011 as being substantial, so a point-in-time revamp should not be so unwelcome, regardless of the proximity to the last one, and of course, all of this activity was too late to prevent Quinn Insurance from going down.

They emphasise that this review takes into account developments in the Solvency II space, as well as on-the-ground experience and publications from other parties of interest. Of particular note was their emphasis that, where national regulations are not as stringent as relevant EU or international one (or indeed vice versa?), the most onerous one should be complied with. In a number of instances around corporate governance, this will mean the CBoI outranking Solvency II as the more onerous of the two!

While these are proposals rather than stitched-on changes at this point, the CBoI doesn't have a great track record for backtracking these days. Highlights for me were;

Risk Committees

• Require a majority of NEDs on Risk Committees, and must be chaired by a NED

Committees in general

• Require the Risk Committee and Audit Committee chairs to sit on each other's committees
• Require the Remuneration Committee chair to sit on the Risk Committee
• In High Impact firms, the Risk Committee and Audit Committee Chair may not be the same person
• Must be at least 3 members of Risk Committees and Audit Committees

Chief Risk Officers

• They note that it is "Generally accepted best practice" to have a CRO who, amongst other tasks, is charged with "...facilitating risk appetite setting by the Board". In addition;
• All "High Impact" firms will be required to appoint a specialist CRO
• Firms with a lower PRISM rating may have a CRO who is shared with another control function, "...provided that there is no conflict of interest between the two roles". Can't help but feel that this might rule out CRO/Chief Actuary dual roles, but allows for CRO/Head of Compliance and CRO/Head of Internal Audit, which would be to the chagrin of the Society of Actuaries in Ireland!
• CRO to have direct access to the Chairman of the Board

Board Meeting frequency

• Seem to acknowledge that the compulsory 11 meetings per year for High Impact firms may be a touch much, so are looking for comments
• Also acknowledge that compulsory 1 meeting per calendar quarter is a bit constrictive for the smaller firms, so may relieve this to be pragmatic

Chairman and CEO

• Some of the restrictions around number of roles held at any one time to be relieved for smaller firms, but seemingly only to populate inter-Group roles.

Board Diversity

• Acknowledges that, while the debate in the EU is gender-centric, that diversity of all types is a worthy target for Boards, but falls short of compelling firms to do anything at national level, choosing to seek comments and wait for the supra-national activity to drive any compulsion. This seems to fit with the thinking of Irish directors published back in 2011 i.e. no "Golden Skirt" quotas.

Random

• "...appropriate Risk Culture" makes its way in (6.3), perhaps cognisant of the FSB's proposals
• Built in a piece which allows for video-conferencing rather than physical attendance at meetings (7.5)
• Board responsibilities updated (13.1)
• Compulsory Board skills matrix (14.9)

Solvency II "Where are we now" - summaries from Milliman and PwC

Some useful "where are we now" materials have emerged over the last couple of weeks which you may find helpful, if only to validate your own interpretations of the current state of play:

PwC Ireland preparing for solvency II

Predominantly covers summaries of EIOPA's preparatory guidance, with some nice touches around;

• Differences between Irish Corporate Governance code and L3 system of governance demands (p15)
• Insisting that "an automated solution is required" for the reporting to NCAs, no doubt in the hope of drumming up some work out of such projects now that Pillar 2 work is largely done (p27)
• Comprehensive Use Test schematic (p39)
• General problems encountered meeting data requirements (p47)

In addition, PwC appear to be facilitating the set-up of a CRO Network over in Ireland, which will allow "all the different professional skills that feed into risk management" a place to swap Solvency II risk function-related war stories. First meeting at the end of the summer, can't wait to hear the outcomes.

Milliman - Solvency II Where are we now?

This very detailed slide package was released last week, and like the item above, covers all of the timeline-related activity around EIOPAs L3 work. It goes into updating readers on the latest position on;

• Economic Balance Sheet - noting similarities and differences in IFRS Phase II/Solvency II approaches to valuation, and a large amount of detail around technical provisions
• Data Management - retreads some of the FSA's findings from last year
• SCR - Covers latest standard formula position, as well as partial internal models and generic IMAP issues (again, retreading FSA letter content from last year). Particularly nice IM schematic on slide 21
• System of Governance - Basics on general requirements, function requirements and risk categories (which they have as 'risk management areas'). ORSA piece is fairly generic, but the schematic on Risk Appetite Frameworks (p35) is quite handy.
• Supervisory review - covers circumstances around capital add-ons and how they see the PRA identifying and assessing such instances.
• Supervisory disclosure - SFCR, RSR and QRT content and timetables for submission. Particularly useful to have this summarised, bearing in mind EIOPA's expectations for the interim period are for a subset of the full QRT suite previously published
• Insurance Groups and Equivalence are also covered at the end

Plenty of substance between the two (around 100 slides), so if you have an hour to kill, sers toi tout seul!

UK's "new" Prudential Regulatory Authority - Approach to Insurance Supervision

So a magical thing happened over the weekend: a venerable institution disappeared on Friday, only to come back reborn on Monday...

...that's right, the FSA is no more, being replaced by two more focused entities in the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) and Financial Conduct Authority (FSA). This is part of the UK-specific fallout from the financial crisis, where a perceived lack of focus from the former tripartite system which housed the FSA allowed for both systemic risk (Northern Rock, RBS) and conduct risks (PPI, Interest Rate swaps) to emerge largely unchecked.

Rather excitingly, this means a new website with some natty logos from the Bank of England (which

PRA - emperor's new clothes
or Solvency II aperatif?

has rehoused the PRA side of the FSA), as well as a statement on the new supervisory approach that the PRA will be taking.

For anyone in the ERM/Solvency II/Corporate Governance space, this gives us a chance to pick up on the kind of regulatory interrogation one might expect when writing/upgrading system of governance-related materials in preparation for both full Solvency II implementation in 20??, as well as how they are accommodating EIOPA's interim measures from 2014.

Remembering that the PRA's two statutory objectives are to promote safety and soundness of the firms it regulates, as well as specifically providing appropriate protection to insurance policyholders, I thought it wise to make some notes on how they have catered for Solvency II and deference (when due) to EIOPA, as well as the general content around expectations of governance systems. I found the following worthy of note;

Control function-specific

Section 82 - "[PRA] wants to be satisfies in particular that designated risk management and control functions carry real weight within insurers"

Section 117 - Should have separate risk management and individual control functions in place (dependent on nature scale and complexity etc)

Section 118 - the PRA "expects these functions to be independent of an insurer's revenue generating functions"

Section 120 - expectation of an "operationally independent Actuarial function", which the PRA consider to be "integral to the effective implementation of a firm's risk management framework"

Section 182 - "Actuaries can play an important part in supporting prudential supervision"

Section 119 - an effective Risk function on the other hand merely "ensures that material risk issues receive sufficient attention from the insurer's senior management and Board" - just because I'm paranoid, doesn't mean the Risk profession isn't being made something of a gooseberry here, particularly as the FSA/Actuarial profession love-in started some time ago!

On Risk Appetite

Section 110 - a firm's risk appetite "[is] to be integral to its strategy, and the foundation of its risk management framework"

Remuneration

Section 84 - "remuneration and incentive schemes should reward careful and prudent management" - just like Prudential's and Standard Life's did this week!

Section 194 - Hint at potentially restricting pay in firms if intervention is warranted

Stress/Reverse Stress Testing

Section 109 - the AMSB must have "...an explicit understanding of the circumstances in which their firm might fail"

Section 145 - with regards to Reverse Stress Testing, "...management should consider the reliability of the output of the internal model compared with the results of these tests"

Section 106 - "competent, and where appropriate, independent control functions" should oversee risk management and internal control frameworks

Internal Models

Section 116 - On Internal Models, the AMSB should understand;

• extent of reliance on models for managing risk;
• limitations of their structure and complexity;
• Data used;
• key underpinning assumptions

Section 140 - "PRA expects internal models to be appropriately prudent"

Section 144 - firms may not choose the lowest capital requirement to determine whether or not to model internally

Regulatory Capital

Section 135 - for capital adequacy, firms "...should not rely on regulatory minima", and also "...should not rely on aggressive interpretations of actuarial or accounting standards"

Proportionality

Sections 212-215 - touches on treatment of "low impact" firms - is this effectively where aggressive approaches to proportionality interpretation should be expected (combined control functions, limited documentation, passive acceptance of Standard Formula etc)?

p43 - table covering the allocation of supervisory staff - 10 staff to 1 firm for the 25 largest insurers, versus approaching 10 firms to 1 supervisor at the small end.

Solvency II-specific references

• In the PRA's view "[Solvency II technical detail should] leave scope for supervisors of individual insurers to make informed judgements around risks posed"
• Confirms that elements of the Directive such as Prudent Person Principle, ORSA, Control Function requirements and Pillar 1 are all aligned with the new Threshold Conditions
• Model approval will be dependent on "adequate" risk identification, measurement, management, monitoring and reporting throughout the modelling process
• Will impose capital add-ons when necessary "to ensure insurers meet the required standards"

Elderfield speech to Institute of Directors in Ireland - 'the Gene Genie'

With all the subtlety of an American industrialist in Paris, Mr. Elderfield delivered a speech to the Irish IoD this week focused on the Central Bank of Ireland's refresh of its 3-year strategic plan, as well as reinforcing what it expects financial services Boards to be focusing on in the near future.

This of course should sit in the context of what I covered last week on thematic enforcement work in 2013. Aside from his comments around board diversity, namely that the CBoI's 'fit and proper' activity to date is "...broadening the gene pool of corporate life" (eeeewwwww!), emphasis was given  to three particular areas:

Risk Appetite Statements

• CBoI expects "... [a] high quality risk appetite statement that is well understood and implemented throughout the firm in practice"
• "...clear articulation of the acceptable level of risk...at different confidence levels, is an important discipline and an essential compliment to a well-articulated business strategy"
• That, due to disappointments in the past, Risk Appetite statements are "...certainly an area of increasing interest on [the regulator's] part, and where we are debating the best approach for encouraging improvements"

System of Governance and Risk Culture

• Boards should "...provide broad, challenging scrutiny of your firm's culture regarding regulatory compliance and internal challenge"
• Ensure that there are "...appropriately resourced and well-qualified risk management and compliance functions"
• "Think more fundamentally and strategically about the culture in the institution that you oversee"

I would add that a lot of this sits nicely with the FSB's Risk Governance paper which was released last week.

Board composition

• Expect directors to take a "...hard nosed view on Board composition, with a view to improving performance"
• Endeavour to attain the "...right gender diversity...and international experience"

With Risk Appetite and Risk Culture both having featured on the IRM's hitlist recently, the practitioners over there will have some assistance to hand from an industry body, however there should be some other useful stuff available in the tag cloud at the bottom of this page on appetite, culture and diversity if you are struggling for inspiration.

Irish boards - the clean up commences

First sign of the wholesale changes demanded by the Financial Regulator over in Dublin, as Bank of Ireland get cracking with the boardroom changes.

Bearing in mind the size of the talent pool and the restrictions on number of directorships (anecdotally I have heard they have been particularly tardy in turning around NED applications) I suspect there will be a whiff of "new bottles for old beer" about this process, but it is important for the jurisdiction to at least practice the discipline.

Financial Reporting Council - Developments in corporate governance 2011

The FRC pushed this out today on progress in implementing the UK Corporate Governance Code (and of less interest to me, the Stewardship Code. Outside of the news of what is to come (more consultation in 2012 on Audit Committees, Risk Management and Internal Control elements of the code) some interesting trends are reported;

• Code requirements on board and board committee composition all above 80% on the "comply" front - strangely the requirement for having at least half NEDS on the board was the worst area of compliance for FTSE 350 firms.
• Still having "diversity" and "gender diversity" spoken of in the same breath - more to come on that subject from me another time
• FRC are attributing some of the gripes from the industry on independence criteria and difficulty in recruiting good quality NEDs on their inability to look beyond "the usual suspects", and by doing so, they will enhance diversity.
• 80% of boards put themselves up for re-election annually in their entirety (one of the more controversial elements of the last set of Code revisions).
• Discussions regarding the expanded nature of the Board's responsibility for Risk (to essentially include consideration and setting of Risk Appetite) has led the FRC to schedule a revision to the old Turnbull guidance in 2012.
• Still griping about "boiler plate" annual report text.
• Some of the "explanations" given for non-compliance still said to be lacking
• Chairman's Statement suggestions made by the FRC appear to be bearing fruit
• Lack of consistency around the application and reporting of Board evaluations
• Disclosure on business model, strategy and risk (massive for Solvency II disclosure policy/SFCR purposes) is, because of a lack of guidance, allowing companies to determine their own levels of disclosure. However, the FRC are expecting more from companies in this regard.
• Very critical of the extent of reporting from the Audit Committee, hence the consultation due in early 2012. Also goes on to be untopically lightly critical of remuneration committee reporting in the same regard!

Irish Corporate Governance Code - updated FAQs

I'm guessing the "video conferencing" absentee-landlord insurance company directors have lobbied hard over in Ireland in the last few months, as the very extensive FAQs already issued have had to be supplemented.

Lexology do a nice summary of the main additions to the FAQ doc, which other than a couple of more genuine clarifications centre around the very important topic of attendance at meetings. Video and teleconferencing are now permissible, provided directors attend "wherever possible".

Troubling in some respects, particularly with Ireland likely to be used for hub and spoke purposes under Solvency II - I would ready myself for a series of "family issues", "plane delays" and "medical emergencies" that prevent a decent number of directors from fulfilling their physical attendance duties over 2012, followed by a themed inspection from the Central Bank!

Financial Reporting Council - new guidance on company stewardship and public reporting

Just in case you UK insurers don't have enough to factor in to your next annual report and accounts (least of all commencing the alignment piece between SFCR/ORSA content and the risk/strategy/capital aspects of your existing reporting releases) , the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) have dropped a couple of grenades into to mix with this release on Effective Company Stewardship, and perhaps more significantly for our kind, the expanded commentary regarding Boards and Risk which was gleaned through a range of interviews.

The stewardship document obviously has some "comply or explain" regulatory relevance for UK readers, whereas the second is a phenomenally useful benchmarking tool to match up against your own board/executive/committee considerations of risk regardless of your jurisdiction.

The stewardship document then focuses more on reporting obligations, in particular Audit, and the associated consultation was triggered in Jan 2011. I was drawn to their findings on reporting "Strategy, Risk and Going Concern" which touch on communication of risk appetite, namely;

• "differing views as to whether it is either necessary or possible for a board to apply a single, aggregated definition of its appetite for risk as a whole"
• "when developing [the] strategy however, it is important for boards to agree their appetite or tolerance for individual key risks"
• "reporting on the company's risk appetite was felt to be difficult, even if it could be defined, as risk appetite is not constant but varies depending on market conditions

The FRC's proposals were therefore (on the basis that the legal obligation is to report on "principle risks and uncertainties);

• Focus reporting primarily on strategic risks (as opposed to those which occur without company action) and 
• Disclose such risks to business model and the strategy for implementing said model
• Not to "scatter" descriptions of the risks faced by the company throughout the document

All of this is a little plus ca change for insurers, who are already pretty good at these aspects!

The second document carried additional interest for me, bearing in mind it collates genuine opinion of the decision making bodies on their existing risk management obligations (and therefore could provide insight into future issues with Use Test evidence, ORSA processes and SFCR/RSR sign-offs). They reiterate that this is not guidance!

Obvious headline from this work is that the Turnbull Guidance will get a brush up in 2012, but I also picked out the following aspects;

• Risk Committee should not be obligatory for all industries
• Boards need to focus on risks that undermine strategy or long-term viability (i.e Reverse Stress Testing)
• The "velocity of risk" meant that reputational risk requires greater attention
• Essential that boards should focus on "gross" as well as "net" risk (inherent and residual in our lexicon)
• Challenge of determining whether a particular risk should be brought to the board's attention remains one of the greatest challenges
• Risk and Internal Audit should have clear reporting lines to board committees
• Investors are seeking "more meaningful reporting on risk", much like that prescribed earlier
• Risk categorisation terminology used is relatively crude (operational and strategic risks being the main distinction made)

I suspect most insurers would rest pretty easy if they benchmark their ERM frameworks against the contents of this paper.

Leadership, psychos and moon faces

On the corporate governance front, please be on the look out for any psychopaths or wide faced execs who may be the causes of your strategic undoing...

Gender Diversity on Boards - the drive continues...

Lots on gender diversity this week, which I keep a watching brief on for obvious corporate governance purposes as well as impact on the post-Solvency II board, bearing in mind the Level 3 guidance on System of Governance in the area of "collective knowledge, competence and experience of the management body" (Guideline 12).

The Guardian highlighted progress towards Lord Davies recommendations (where the 6 month "ticker" has almost "tocked"), and flagged that there is some rather specious cramming of female non-execs since February to get the numbers up (only 1 executive appointment since Feb!). Interestingly, the responses sent to the FRC on adding a piece into the Corporate Governance Code on promoting diversity have been mostly in favour.

Looks like the 25% target could be a while away yet, and may be against the spirit of Lord Davies intent if completed by using the Non-Executive tactic.

The FT also flagged up a drive in Norway to extend the 40% female quota past listed entities and on to large unlisted companies (where it currently stands at 17% in the numbers quoted). The positive criteria cited made me chortle with my own inadequacy, namely that female board candidates;

• Are younger and better educated
• Are less risk prone (NB as a risk professional I have no idea what to think of this "trait")
• Are not as driven by high salaries and bonuses
• Generate deeper and broader discussion 

Evidence cited below this argues against, whilst highlighting that it is a fait accompli when considering the political persuasion of the current government.

Staying in Scandinavia, I checked out the recently revised corporate governance code in Denmark. Whilst they have a number of pieces on board "diversity", its benefits, and recommendations on regular reporting on diversity, they also slip in a clause (4.1.4) recommending the board discuss annually their activities to "ensure diversity at management levels, including equal opportunities for both sexes", as well as recommending that "measurable objectives" be set to this respect and publicly commented on.

Further comment gets to the heart of the recommendation by using the proportion of women at specific management levels as an example - they could just put the quota in and be done with it!

Irish Corporate Governance Code for captives

The Central Bank of Ireland pushed out the Corporate Governance Code for Captives this week, which is to all intents and purposes a lightly abridged version of the main event.

My particular interest was their approach to governance and risk appetite, and there is no let-up from the obligations on insurance undertakings in this regard.

• Full qualitative and quantitative documented Risk Appetite required - argued against by some in the industry on the basis of "natuire, scale and complexity"
• Material deviation from Risk Appetite to be reported CBoI within 5 days - regardless of whether parent company or captive manager identifies it
• "Where appropriate", the board may consider a risk committee
• Internal Audit function required, but may use Group resource, or indeed outsource

Handy FAQ document accompanied its release - unlike in the consultation for the main code (in which almost every suggestion was ignored save for tiering supervision between 'big' and 'little'), they have actually made a few tweaks in response to the industry, which is very healthy. They have increased the transitional period by an extra 3 months, dropped the requirement for a deputy chairman, and permitted non-directors to aid in the development of captive strategy.

I am by no means an expert in the area, but they seem like proportional, tailored solutions to retaining a presence in this market, and the Central Bank ought to be applauded for the effort, even if judging by the number of "no's" in the consultation, the industry wanted more!