ORSA's Head? International Actuarial Association on ORSA Value

Unknown unknowns
- just say it one more time...

A rather verbose piece from the International Actuarial Association, or AAI if you are inclined comme ça, on Delivering Value From ORSA. Always worth a glance over these at this stage of proceedings, regardless of which side of the Atlantic you are currently rocking (with both Canada and the States keeping noisy on the topic in recent weeks).

As one might expect from a publication from an actuarial representative body (and one which aims to cover all IAIS bases, rather than the specificities of US/Canada/EU ORSA), it struggles for semblance once it needs to cover non-quant, and is therefore heavily flannelized.


The definition used by the IAA is:

ORSA provides a declaration of the company’s assessment of its position in terms of profit, risk and capital, both now and in the future, under different scenarios and relative to the company’s appetite to risk.

The purpose of the paper is to provide Board members with "insight into the value of the ORSA Process", which is a noble aim in itself, and a few nice touches can be found throughout, in particular:

• The word “profit” features on virtually every page, almost unheard of in the EIOPA Guideline world where being able to “enhance the management of the undertaking” is King. Heaven forbid anyone makes a quid or two out of it!
• The coverage of how insurance companies tend to profile risk is clean and rational (p3).
• The concept of mitigation through company policies, overseen by good governance structures, as opposed to either holding capital or purchasing mitigation, is also expressed with clarity.
• “A company’s risk appetite, once determined by management and approved by the board, can be treated as a budget”. Lovely concept, though it needs more flesh to provide the 'insight on ORSA Process value' that the paper is intended to.

A few contradictions emerge in the document;

• ORSA “needs to consider and be consistent with an insurance company’s business strategy” – does the process not need to as good as set it? Indeed, they go on to say on page 2 “The true value of ORSA can only be realized when ORSA becomes integral to management’s strategic decision making”!
• Does ORSA “help build/maintain risk awareness throughout the company” – it would be a struggle to say it could do that any further than the relevant staff which EIOPA ultimately allude to. 
• Concept of “Solvency Risk Profile” is borderline unintelligible (p3)
• Terminologically, the section on risk appetite and risk profile on p3 is heavily quant-based, and feels country miles away from similar materials published by the CRO Forum a few weeks back. Specifically, it talks of “acceptable levels” of solvency risk, “minimum and maximum bands”, and that in aggregate across risk categories “This band of acceptable risk is referred to as the risk appetite”. Given it doesn't appear to veer to far away from the FSB's take on Risk Appetite, perhaps this is more of a step forward than EIOPA's 2013 back pass to the AMSB on the matter (p59-60)
• That models used should be “subject to independent validation” – is it that important if you are not using your model for regulatory capital purposes (i.e. just for ORSA)?
• The residue of Rumsfeld, which I had hoped had been resigned to the Noughties dustbin, reappears on pages 7 & 8, specifically “A complete ORSA would include the assessment of unknown unknowns”. Pacino said it best in Godfather III…

NAIC's ORSA Manual for US Insurers - a helping hand?

"Tired and Emotional" - European
Insurance industry in 2013 

After the self-inflicted Solvency II transformational pressures of 2011 and 2012 resulted in more wobbly legs than a teenage disco at midnight, the relative calm of 2013 (to date) will have come as a blessed relief for European regulators and industry alike. Not so over in the States though, as they crack on with their take on the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment, releasing their industry guidance manual a few weeks back, in preparation for a proper crack at implementation in 2015, the driver of course being IAIS ICP obeisance rather than Solvency II equivalence.

They have kindly summarised the changes made since their 2011 version of the same manual on p9, which focus on accounting basis, scope (for groups) and ensuring certain year-on-year changes are appropriately flagged. 

Generic ORSA content - what
regulators "really really want"?

Unlike in the UK where there has been a marked reluctance to offer anything in the way of meaningful assistance to smaller insurers, such as a report template or checklist of suitable content/processes, the NAIC, just like the Spice Girls before them, are happy to "tell ya what I want", regardless of the potential for genericism.

That said, a recent Towers Watson survey suggested that there is still plenty of work to be done and staff to be hired in order to get with their ORSA programme.

The NAIC clarify that the US ORSAs are expected to be conducted no less than annually, with insurers documenting the process and results. After that, a high level "ORSA Summary Report" is to be submitted to the lead/state regulator once a year, which "should contain";

1. Description of the Risk Management Framework
2. Assessment of Risk Exposure (we would read as "risk profile" from what I can see)
3. Assessment of Risk Capital and prospective solvency

The Manual states that "[it] is intended to provide guidance for completing each section of the ORSA Summary Report", which should therefore make the job a doodle!

Some interesting bits jump out, not necessarily in contrast to reported/observable differences from the EU approach, more the fact that they are specified in the manual rather than taken as given;

GENERAL

• Chief Risk Officer/executive head of ERM Framework must sign the ORSA Summary Report
• Timing of supervisory reporting may move to match up to strategic planning cycle of an insurer
• Internal documentation expectations seemingly not as exhaustive as EU "repeatable by independent knowledgeable third party", simply to allow a more in-depth look at a given are at supervisor's request

DESCRIPTION OF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

• Specifies in principle what an "effective ERM Framework" comprises of (p18) - includes our old friends 'risk appetite', 'risk tolerance' and 'risk limits' in this, though they are isolated and defined in a passable manner on p25!
• Asks for various descriptive texts around processes
• Specifies that weaknesses/omissions found in the report here may change the supervisor's approach to the insurer!

ASSESSMENT OF RISK EXPOSURE

• Quantitative and/or qualitative assessments of risk exposure, in normal and stressed environments, for each "material" risk. Noticeably don't list Strategic/Frictional risks in the examples of "material" risk, though do mention Reputational risk as one for which "quantitative methods may not be well established"
• "Simple stress tests or more complex stochastic analyses" may be used in assessing the stressed environment
• Potential for supervisory intervention in the levels of stress assessed (in deterministic scenarios) or  even parameters in the ESG (for firms with stochastic capability)
• On risk correlation, "History may provide some empirical evidence of relationships, but the future is not always best estimated by historical data" - not sure where that leaves everyone!

ASSESSMENT OF RISK CAPITAL AND PROSPECTIVE SOLVENCY

• Provide a non-exhaustive list of considerations that an insurer/group will need to cover when assessing the adequacy of capital over its business planning period, which touches on many of the areas prominent in the EU's work (time horizon of assessment, valuation basis, definitions of "Solvency")
• Defines that this part of the assessment should identify "...the capital needed within a holding company system to achieve its business objectives"

Is this the type of demi-prescription that the smaller EU insurers are looking for? Is it too much to ask for national regulators (Ireland a notable exception) to take a similar stab at communicating what they want to see?

Financial Stability Board - Thematic review and recommendation on risk governance

The Financial Stability Board (FSB) have been sticky-beaking around systematically important financial institutions (SIFIs) with a relative unchecked remit ever since the financial crisis first reared its head. This week they have emerged with a very significant document for Risk practitioners across the globe, with a thematic review of Risk Governance (press release also available here). The participants were 36 banking and broker/dealer institutions of interest, as well as major supervisory bodies and NGOs.

On the basis that there isn't a single accepted global standard on the matter, the thematic review compares prevailing practices against an amalgamation of content from exising standards from the IAIS, OECD and other bodies. Of major interest to risk practitioners is the document's focus on areas which the IRM have covered recently, namely risk appetite/tolerance/limts/capacity and risk culture.

Bearing in mind the great and good from the prudential regulatory world are active participants in the FSB, the likelihood of their findings emerging in the regulatory principles of tomorrow are pretty high. Of course this research has been based on Non-Insurance SIFIs, and so insurers large and small who have been endeavouring to meet Solvency II Pillar II requirements will find themselves in a decent spot already.

On that basis, I noted the following;

General recommendations to supervisory bodies (p4)

1. Formal requirements on the independence and skillsets of Boards
2. Hold Boards directly accountable for risk governance, and whether or not their existing suite of risk MI is sufficient
3. Formally elevate the stature, authority and independence of the CRO role
4. Require an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the risk governance framework to be performed on an annual basis (a list of what Internal Audit would generally review in this context follows on page 24)
5. Engage "more frequently" with Boards and management to assess risk culture

Sound practices list p30-34 - highlighted below are elements which may be new to the UK in particular, were they to be introduced

• Boards - annual reviews of member qualifications, skills and time commitments; meet quarterly with regulators; "effectively inculcate" an appropriate risk culture
• Risk Committee - annual approval of risk management policies
• Risk Management function - CRO to have direct reporting lines to Board/Risk Committee as well as CEO; public disclosure of CRO firing/hiring; be "actively involved" in strategic decision making processes; meet quarterly with supervisors; stress testing "on demand" at the behest of the business

Risk culture and risk governance supervisory assessment

• Notes that supervisors need to strengthen their ability to assess a firm's risk governance "...and more specifically its risk culture"
• "More work is needed" on regulatory assessment of risk appetite frameworks
• "Risk culture plays a critical role in ensuring effective risk governance practices through changing environments"
• FSB have a working group exploring the potential for formal risk culture assessments, who are  reporting in September 2013

Risk management functions and CROs

• Acknowledges that there have been "[raised] supervisory expectations for the risk management function" since the financial crisis
• Highlights that "most firms note that the CRO has a direct reporting line to the CEO", though "access to the Board" apparently remains more of an expression than a vivid reality
• "Good progress" has been made on enhancing the stature, authority, and independence of the CRO position
• Rather non-descript comment that "the Chief Risk Officer and the risk management function are responsible for the firm's risk management across the entire organisation" - responsible for what element, not conduct surely?

Risk appetite/tolerance/limts/capacity

• Acknowledge a "lack of common terminology for risk appetite, risk profile and risk capacity...within firms, across firms and across national authorities"
• Definitions of appetite and capacity used by FSB largely line up with IRM's definitions (though the IRM use 'tolerance' rather than 'capacity')
• "Key features of a Risk Appetite Framework" are listed on p22 - however even those firms considered best in breed commented that there are ongoing "operationalising" problems with RAF rollout
• Suggest that breaches of 'risk limits' should lead to reductions in exposures (piii) - not sure why the alternative of increasing appetite is not acknowledged

Deloitte with more on the US-of-ORSA

Billed as a "regulatory guidepost to the future", Deloitte in the States have published their thoughts on ORSA developments, following on from recent activity in the space, most notably the NAIC's adoption of the RMORSA Act a few weeks back.

Hard to tell whether Deloitte have borrowed much from their European counterparts, who ponied up with the EIOPA-compliant equivalent document last week, but both documents ultimately point at the same end goal, namely getting the ORSA Process and ORSA Report content right.

Confidently declaring the first regulatory filing of an ORSA Report to be precisely, errr, "Sometime in 2015", the stateside plans are anchored more to ERM and, I guess by association, ratings agency implications. The document does help identify a couple elements which, with the Solvency II hat on, are easy to forget;

• IAIS ICP 16 is bringing ORSA to the table of all signatories at some future juncture (which means I may get a job back home one day!)
• Existing techniques for monitoring solvency, even in a jurisdiction of this size, are seemingly past their sell-by-date in terms of both content and turnaround time (p2) - holds true for many of the Solvency II-covered countries as well (plenty on that topic in here).

The rest of the document draws out the preparatory work which firms should be undertaking, despite the relative lack of certainty at this point in time, such as increasing real-time data availability and changes in reporting, management and governance structures. It also touches on suggested content, process implementation (more like formalisation from experience), and a checklist of operational considerations, resourcing (or even briefing/coaching) being highest priority in my mind in 2012.

Good document for you statesiders to pass round your friendly non-executive directors anyway, as an early socialising of the concept in this format goes a long way when you have tiny windows to educate them on the topic over the next 3 years - looks like you will be filing ORSA Reports before we are!

Interesting footnote is that AIG have been labelled as a potential SIFI today - ORSA may be 5 years too late to have saved the behemoth it once was, but let's hope it can help its slimmed down current-day version.

Clear Path Analysis - Solvency II "The Global Dimension"

This piece of research from the guys at Clear Path Analysis (sign up required) has been in the offing for a while, and as I covered their last impressive release on this blog (and I don't have a life :-( ), I've been looking forward to it...

There is certainly plenty in here to keep those of every persuasion entertained (with the sponsors as omnipresent as their funding permits!), but I've sectioned out highlights for my own benefit;

Foreword

• Solvency II "...clearly a step in the right direction" - oddly, not followed by a punchline...
• On the likelihood of Sol II remaining ahead of the IAIS approach to solvency regulation - "Asia no longer looks to the west for regulatory best practice", going on to cheekily recommend a cherry-picking approach

Barbara Ridpath - think tank CEO, on short-termism and regulation

• Highlights one (widely acknowledged) consequence of Solvency II being a disincentive to invest in long term and/or non-Sovereign debt instruments, which is not in the mandate of the regulations, or indeed the regulators.

Roundtable on un-level playing fields between EU and non-EU insurers - includes Standard Life Sol II lead

• Solvency II likely to weed out companies who can't handle the ongoing compliance cost from running EU operations
• Large piece on Canadian equivalence (of particular importance to Standard Life of course) and the practicalities of equivalence being neither sought nor at this point offered for a non-EEA wing of a EEA HQd insurer.
• Standard Life not happy with equivalence assessments running concurrently with IMAP, due (rightly) to the significance of a "yay" or a "nay" to the strategic thinking around non-EEA arms.
• Suggestion that Asia is looking harder at the IAIS approach as opposed to Solvency II for future direction

Data and Risk Reporting Interview - Dan Wilkinson, ERM head at Liberty Syndicates

• Increased formality around Data and Risk reporting, using both controls-focused and risk-focused approaches. Makes reference to a monthly management committee which takes reporting on data deficiency matters, which I have heard reference to on the circuit before, and certainly demonstrates that data inputs, whether for internal modelling or for strategic decision making, feature as a high priority, rather than taken as read.
• Notes that his employer is moving risk reporting away from the 1-in-200 VaR to "...more foreseeable points in the distribution", which we definitely like to hear in the ORSA world!
• Alludes to concerns around disclosing ORSA-related information to the outside world, which is an area yet to be adequately chewed over by regulators and industry quite yet, let alone ratings agencies, analysts etc
• "Sensible amount of proportionality" should be adopted when deciding what should be disclosed - is that a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron, or some other expression I can't quite lift off of Google!
• Sensibly stresses that an effective emerging risk policy should allow input and challenge at all levels of an organisation, when asked about internal models evolving with the risk profile of the business.
• "...biggest deliverable is cultural" - i.e. stripping back your long-since-gone consultancy friends' technical documentation (where required) in order to make it more accessible and free BAU staff to use the new facilities, be it a spruced up RMF or a full Internal Model - appreciate I may be doing myself a disservice by highlighting it!
• Didn't agree one bit with the comment that ORSA could "...inflate regulatory capital, based on rather speculative assumptions" - FSA have been pretty clear that ORSA has no bearing on required capital, appreciating the nuances around what they say and what actually transpires!
• Also wasn't massively sold on the comment that the ORSA "...should bring together information that is used within the business to allow analysis of medium term trends", unless of course he was cut off mid-sentence!

"Challenges of Pillar III" roundtable, focused seemingly on getting asset managers to pull their fingers out! Includes a CRO from an Italian insurer

• "Asset managers who are not willing or able to invest in appropriate data management and reporting systems will find it hard, if not impossible, to attract or retain insurance clients" - so there!
• Suggestion that "parts of the industry will have to get up to speed on" underlying assets which they are currently invested in for the look-through basis - I suspect that there are plenty of horror-stories to emerge once some CIOs and CFOs get a proper butchers at what some of their collectives are actually invested in, particularly with the advent of outsourcing investment management or just administration over the last decade or so...
• Note that ratings agency priorities over the near-term may focus more on differences between SF and IM-calculated SCRs and the impact of transitionals, rather than purely on SCR outcomes.
• Note that "Solvency II is effectively a lead in this area [transparency]", so no pre-conditions should be expected from ratings agencies
• Even bring up the old gripe that EEV/MCEV is still not understood well enough by agencies/analysts, so by implication there should be few worries about additional disclosures!

Considerations for Building a Diversified Investment Portfolio - Charles Pears from Insight Investment

Really accessible and well structured two-pager on portfolio diversification, of particular use to non-experts which covers

• Rationale for insurance companies looking for low risk returns;
• Risk drivers which make that difficult in today's environment, even if accepting minimal risk
• Why companies may look to seek excess returns, and the constraints around that
• Why decisions to accept more risk for enhanced rewards should be (but perhaps aren't always) knowledge based
• Basic options for enhancing portfolio returns without breaking the bank from a capital perspective.

Interesting is wrapped up with a comment that "...we expect insurers who adopt a Liability Driven Investment approach will secure a meaningful competitive advantage" - hard sell perhaps, but the rationale for it is well documented here.

FSA - Solvency II speeches this week from the great (and greater!)

A couple of topical speeches delivered this week by Canary Wharf's finest, both of which are relevant to the Solvency II world.

First, a speech at the 2012 Risk and Investment conference run through The Actuarial Profession and featuring some multidisciplinary heavy hitters from TV and print as well as some C-suite presence from the UK's largest multinationals. The FSA's Kathryn Morgan delivered a speech which covered Pillar 2 and 3 trends in particular, which is covered in this subscription only article at Risk.net. For those who don't have the budget for that, a pruned down version of that content is available here.

Ostensibly, the following points were made;

• Don't expect any more FSA guidance on conducting an ORSA - fair point at this juncture, if you don't know your onions by now, there's probably no hope for you!
• Approaching implementation consecutively in 3 pillars is a "worry" - I suspect that worry, misplaced or not, is applicable to most undertakings at this juncture
• "Risk management is the best mitigant of risk, not capital" - I would argue an effective Risk function rather than risk management per se is the best mitigant, but it is slightly more ethereal than a big bundle of cash!
• Perception that "...Risk and Capital are not talking to each other" - true out of necessity at this juncture perhaps (BAU for the balance sheet guys, model applicants or not, and the administrative burden of refreshing documentation suites has impeded comms for some time I would argue, but this will improve in the very near future).
• Number of references to Boards, centred around NEDs participating fully in decisions rather than counting the hours till their taxi arrives, as well as not relying on SMEs to make decisions for them (i.e. Actuarially-minded board members are not left to perform all balance sheet related challenge on their own!)
• With regards to the empire built on sand which is the legislative timeline, reiterates that while some key balance sheet-related issues are yet to flesh out, "...their is a lot of certainty in Pillar 2" - something I have banged on about since the draft Level 2 implementing measures were leaked in November.

While that speech has good insights for you Pillar 2 folk out there, a lecture from Julian Adams on "the impact of changing regulation on the insurance industry" is equally fascinating, if perhaps treading over some Solvency II ground already covered over the last couple of weeks - as a History graduate, I always like a cheeky overview, and the lecture covers legislative developments back to Victorian times.

That aside, a few Solvency II-relevant snippets were also included (or reiterated from prior speeches) such as;

• A definition of what "risk sensitive" regulation actually means (insurers' solvency positions matching their idiosyncratic risk profiles) - something as succinct as that is actually extremely useful for board training purposes at the very least, and I am glad he has communicated it in this manner.
• Also defines "proportionate" from the FSA's perspective on internal model approval - namely, if it is in the Directive or the Implementing measures, it is not negotiable.
• Notes that Solvency II is "influencing" the global regulatory framework - I would argue that strong-arming (in the case of first/second wave countries) and bickering (in the case of the States) is far from influencing, though with the IAIS Comframe draft now open for review, we may see something more resembling dialogue from our pals in Brussels
• Rather worrying comment that, in the context of reporting financial positions, that Solvency II reporting sits in the succession path of EEV and MCEV as "...if perhaps not the final, then the latest step" towards a more transparent and market consistent reporting regime. Anyone for SFCR 2.0?
• A rather ominous note that the standard formula calculation "...would certainly have a distorting effect when considering, say, the London Market subscription business or with-profits businesses" - I hope all you tiny mutuals have got your IMs, PIMs or USPs ready, as it sounds like the FSA may already think SF is not suitable for you!
• Acknowledges that Solvency II is about "maximum harmonisation", and therefore EIOPA will call more of the shots in future (just as soon as Omnibus II gets through...)
• Highlights that the academic modelling around (a lack of) correlation drove many of the banks models' into stupidity in 2006-2008 - an area I would expect fervent challenge around from both the regulator and indeed internal governance structures (and one which Matthew Elderfield at the Central Bank of Ireland has already picked up on as a main area of focus)

Useful stuff from both sources, so keep it up Wharfers!

PS I suspect I won't be posting tomorrow, so I will wish you shoh slaynt and a happy Tynwald Day one day early!

ORSA guidance materials from CRO Forum and Lloyds - any help?

It is always nice to get a bit of friendly steer around ORSA when the powers that be stubbornly refuse to give us boxes to tick!

Released over the last week or so came two such documents, one from Lloyds of London and the other from the CRO Forum.

The Lloyds effort is of course tailored for their syndicates, but the areas they emphasise clearly have merit for any organisation which is embarking on the ORSA adventure, whether sponsored by Solvency II, IAIS ICPs, the NAIC, or indeed any other random acronym! In particular I liked;

• Clearly set out an explanation to cover difference between regulatory and economic capital measures
• That while the ORSA Report would be expected to set out the impact of shocks over the medium term, this does not imply that a multi-year model is required (anyone struggling to keep it stochastic after year 1 would be relieved to hear that!)
• Small set of simple questions which one might like to ask their Board after they review the report in order to establish use
• No specification on size!

The tables which make up the bulk of the document should be a useful reference point for anyone with an inferiority complex, as it highlights gaps which have been identified during their own QA work, as well as suggesting remediation. Appreciating ORSA is only required for IMAP from a use test evidence perspective (which they comment on in the Q&A in the appendix), any chance that these gaps contributed to the delay in their submission?

The CRO Forum paper on the other hand tries to cater for both the poachers and the gamekeepers by summarising observable best practices from regulatory-themed bodies (who I suppose will ultimately determine what's hot and what's not on the matter). From their doc, I noted the following;

• Potential divergence between what lobbyists said about ORSA supervisory report when feeding back on Level 3 (i.e shouldn't differ from that presented to the AMSB, otherwise what would supervisors be considering it against) and the CRO Forum (who expect it to be a "summary of the results of the ORSA assessment") - doesn't feel like semantics the more I read it, so worth highlighting
• Value of the ORSA Report for the AMSB is covered in a few paragraphs, which is always handy for board/senior management briefing
• Strange bit around internal approval of ORSA reports, stating that the AMSB should review but not approve the ORSA Report, and that this is as per Level 3 - worth some attention if you have structured your ORSA governance around Board sign-offs of the associated reporting
• An "illustrative purposes only" ORSA Report structure, which has no more or less merit than any others you may have seen, other than it is less granular than some which have emerged publicly from consultancies etc
• Tips the hat towards leveraging RSR and ORSA administrative efforts in order to reduce duplication.

Whether or not you gain something from reading these materials, it's always nice to know someone is having a go!

IAIS - Revised Insurance Core Principles

Only an optimist would think that, at 400 pages, the revised ICP document is a light read, but it has been approved after the IAIS meeting in Seoul (press release here). May be worth a quick cross-cast against Solvency II CEIOPS/EIOPA advice in the ERM, Capital Adequacy and Internal Model-related sections, but as these borrowed heavily on Solvency II at outset, the final revision is not likely to contradict.

In addition, the latest IAIS Annual Report and Accounts has also been published - some good commentary within this around the purpose and scope of the ICPs and ComFrame. The latter perhaps has more significance for anyone in the UK, on the basis that the FSA are citing groups as one of the reasons for extending the go-live date and IMAP approval process.

IAIS - Comframe is out!

Anyone currently working in an "Internationally Active Insurance Group" will want to get involved in the IAIS's Comframe consultation. I will give it the eyes soon enough, but at 150 awkwardly formatted pages, it may need to wait!

CEA Annual Report - Solvency II review

The CEA pushed out their annual report today – some very convenient Solvency II and other insurance undertaking-related progress summaries with regards to their lobbying progress.

Solvency II Points;

•  Commission reiterated that the industry should not need to raise additional capital for Solvency II (supporting their view on inclusion of EPIFP in Tier 1, contrary to EIOPA’s wishes
•  Impact assessment will be published when the Commission puts out the Level 2’s later this year 
• “Large part” of the CEA’s Level 3 lobbying work has been on Pillar 3 reporting templates (two rounds of consultation). For some issues they have argues for exclusions on the grounds of utility or cost, as opposed to confidentiality 
• Submitted responses for Level 3 ORSA, System of Governance, Own Funds and Internal Models sounds like these were priority 2. 
• CEA highlights its desire for transitional measures in; hybrid capital; internal models; equivalence and supervisory reporting 
• Commission aims to finalise technical work on L2 this month, CEA provide, in some detail, their lobbying views on; Long-term guarantees; Car Risk; Non-life premium and reserve risk; complexity; EPIFP; Contract boundaries

Other points

• Big reliance throughout the document on CEA’s preferred version of Solvency II application as the supporting excuse for opposing SIFI, Financial Services Tax, extension of Sol II to IORPs and Insurance Guarantee Scheme draft legislation
• Submitted comments to the IAIS on their ICP consultations for global supervisory convergence (they note that it is “moving in the same direction as Solvency II”, whereas I thought the ICPs were pretty much a photocopy!) 
• They note that, unfortunately, Life Insurance products will remain in the scope of EU Savings Directive legislation, as the current impasse is unrelated.
• Very non-committal on progress of the VAT directive, which doesn’t sound promising for “insourcing” of insurance administration 
• On FATCA, they give the impression that their best efforts will be to secure some exemptions for small and irrelevant lines of business, rather than to lobby the USA into submission on this incredibly onerous piece of draft legislation.
• Some constructive effort in the field of cross-border distribution via Insurance Mediation Directive 
• Potential for increased compliance risk off the back of Test Achats ruliing