Solvency II Updates and Corporate Governance in Financials - PRA "Back for Good"?

A few releases of note out of the UK regulator over the last working week or so means I had some catching up to do - sometimes it feels like "All I do each night is PRA"...

They started off with a Director's Letter just before the bank holiday weekend. A general unwillingness to crack whips was present throughout this doc, even at this late stage, with a few references to "inform your supervisor" as opposed to "just do it".

The letter states that the PRA were due to publish some of their findings from their balance sheet review work by the end of the month - not done as yet, hopefully turns out to be money well spent

Regarding Standard Formula appropriateness:

• They stress that firms must identify deviations from Standard Formula from their risk profiles, and include an assessment of the significance of that deviation in their ORSAs (emphasised in their October industry presentation from p6)- is the implication here that firms are not doing this at all at the moment, or just not reporting it in ORSA?
• Highlight that "supplementary information" used to explain such deviations will also be assessed by the PRA. Does this add significance to one's qualitative commentary around Standard Formula/Risk Profile deviations? Can a good explanation be the difference between having to IM/PIM at the earliest opportunity against being given a couple of years of capital add-on breathing room?
• The PRA note that, "...where a firm's conclusion on this question is not appropriate", it will intervene. It is not clear how a firm's conclusions about its deviation between SF and its Risk Profile could be considered "not appropriate", but I imagine that anything which attempts to dodge USPs/PIM/IM ONCE the divergence hits the limits in the Delegated Acts (276-287) would be frowned upon. There is certainly no appetite at the PRA for renewing capital add-ons in perpetuity (slide 13), which given the UK's familiarity with ICA and ICG, might be a desperado's first chance saloon.
• The PRA are planning "specific interventions" on this front (detailed here), but not necessarily in time to correct before 2016.

Regarding Internal Models

• Not happy with "wide variation in quality of IM Change policies. Sounds like firms are doing their best to avoid change criteria that results in frequent submissions for reapproval, which one would expect!



IMAP Submissions
- Everything Changes

• PRA seemingly expecting firms to have not only taken on board their feedback, but also had their IMs revalidated, before submitting their IM application. Given that validation will be chalked down as a 'once-a-year' job at the moment (despite the IRM's efforts), that seems highly unlikely. They give themselves a get-out-of-jail-free card though by stating that firms must be confident that any changes in their IMs both address PRA feedback and meet the tests and standards for model approval.
• They appear to advise against submitting applications if you have a material change in the pipeline.
• Heavily critical of Board involvement in validation. Here they look for evidence of Boards "overseeing and influencing" the validation process, whereas previous PRA presentation slides  did not have such expectations of Boards (slide 8 here), or indeed expected more (slide 9 here)!
• The expression "internal management loadings" appeared in my life for the first time, which sounds to a non-technical person like myself that firms are effectively "dumbing-up" the capital requirement currently delivered by their IM in order to plaster over mathematical or data weaknesses. PRA certainly not impressed by industry suggestions to date.
• Given the number of firms who must have dropped out of looking for Day 1 approval, they still shake the pineapple tree here in order to remind applicants that contingency plans should be ready in the case of application failures. "Many firms still have a considerable amount of work to do" sounds to me like some applicants are being pre-warned of their imminent failure!

The PRA also released a consultation paper entitled Corporate Governance: Board Responsibilities, which has the rather light ambition of identifying "key aspects of good board governance to which the PRA attaches particular importance in the conduct of its supervision".

A few straggler items in it;

• That failures in governance and/or risk management have been a key factor in "many" financial sector failures - as opposed to "all"
• That they consider the FRC's Corporate Governance Code, amongst others, a "comprehensive guide to good corporate governance" - given the firms experiencing the financial sector failures were most probably complying with it, not a great advert!
• "Culture is the collective responsibility of the Board" - a bit of a nowhere comment, but instinctively, I don't see how this can be right. They can be accountable to both supervisors and shareholders/members for cultural failings, but where could such a responsibility materialise into demonstrable actions? 
• "...the Board is responsible for the oversight of, but not for managing the business" - in relation to my comment directly above, can both statement be correct?
• "The Risk Control Framework should flow from the Board's Risk Appetite" - I'll work on the premise that this is missing the word "statement" at the end of the line
• Section 11 on remuneration expects that incentives are aligned with "prudent risk taking" - what if prudence is too conservative for one's risk appetite?

Into some of the expected themes;

• Strategy to be "owned by the Board as a whole"
• They wed Culture and Remuneration "...to encourage and enforce the kind of behaviours the Board wished to see"
• They want a "well articulated and measurable" Risk Appetite Statement which can also be "...readily understood by employees throughout the business". Doesn't seem feasible, given the metrics commonly used in risk appetite statements are not exactly Finance 101 (Solvency/Liquidity/Earnings-related),
• "It is the responsibility of the Board to ensure that the effectiveness of the Risk Control framework is kept actively under review" - has at least an air of COSO about it, don't think it was deliberate
• Big section (6) on responsibilities and accountabilities of exec and non-exec directors.
• Followed in 7.1 with "...non-executives should not simply delegate responsibility for major decisions to individuals among them who are considered specialist in the area" - this has internal models written all over it (p5-6)!

Happy to see this second document, though I don't know what it adds to firms' understanding about what is "good and bad".




InsuranceERM round table on Solvency II and Capital Management

Nice freebie from the InsuranceERM guys, covering a CRO/ERM Head roundtable touching on economic capital, internal models and Solvency II - the first of this double header is here. With representation from from all sides and sizes of the insurance industry spectrum, the views tabled should be useful for most practitioners in this space, even if some of it is not exactly new news.

They are relatively benign on controversial areas such as industry cost, and even positive when talking of Solvency II having provided an incentive to improve both risk and model governance in the here-and-now, regardless of the necessity from a pure compliance perspective.

Between the two, the following noteworthy views were tabled;

On Solvency II

• "...has to be considered now if, not necessarily when"
• "...from a non-life risk and capital perspective, Solvency II just does not work" - citing reserve risk specifically as inherently flawed 
• The UK's ICA+ regime "...pushes [Solvency II] back towards a more sensible view of capital"

On Internal Models

• "The main issue with the models is spurious accuracy and detail masking big assumptions, which is possibly a systemic risk"
• Regulators in some European countries think internal models are "unnecessarily complicated"
• In response to the suggestion that internal modellers could be "gaming the system" to reduce capital requirements regardless of risk profile, Aviva's ERM head noted that the FSA have identified through their own research that the ICA regime appeared to have done just that back in 2004
• It is "...inevitable that [the Bank of England wearing their PRA hat] is going to take a far more sceptical view of internal models", particularly where Internal Model SCR is lower than Standard Formula SCR
• On Use Test, "...potentially 3 or 4 years before the model is truly bedded in"

On Ratings Agencies and their capital requirements to maintain target ratings

• "...many people, especially in Bermuda, see ratings agencies as de facto regulators"
• "...may take internal models less seriously in the short term" off the back of Solvency II
• Ratings agencies capital requirements are "the worst common denominator" alongside SF SCR and IM SCR

I've personally been relatively well shielded from the extent of the discontent on the non-life side, but judging by the confidence intervals used by high profile insurers as their EC targets (frequently observed at 99.9-something/A or AA rating space), it's no surprise that ratings agency requirements are in many cases paramount - that business could potentially be dragging three or four capital measures to their respective Boards for the next 3 years (agency capital, IM SCR, ICA and SF SCR) is a grim prospect.

Perhaps of more immediate concern is the view that the FSA/PRA have the potential to be more cantankerous around internal models once they move into their new office - something to look forward to in 2013?

Legal and General - Counting the cost of Solvency II

Spotted by his Lordship John Walton this morning, L&G  appear to have broken the mould by dropping some substantive Solvency II comment into their Q3 IMS, notably that they have booked £129m of costs in project spend.

They also go on to plead unhappiness on the inability of the rules as they stand to encourage the provision of long-term capital to the wider economy, echoing DG Faull's rollocking letter to Sr Bernadino the other week on longer-duration debt instrument capital costs, though are clearly only interested in UK investment opportunities as opposed to loading up on fruity Eurozone government debt (good on you!).

Of course the Solvency II preparation costs of most of the big-boys have been covered on this blog before, and £129m feels suitably light for a UK-focused business in comparison to some of its more complicated competitors. That said, with the FSA offering some hope of a transition to "ICA+" rather than dual running ICA and IM SCR for the next x years, how much leverage does this sort of investment buy a firm down at Canary Wharf when it comes to meeting the transitional criteria?

Look forward to seeing a bit more of these disclosures over the next week or so now we are in IMS season, but not counting on it!

FSA - Solvency II speeches this week from the great (and greater!)

A couple of topical speeches delivered this week by Canary Wharf's finest, both of which are relevant to the Solvency II world.

First, a speech at the 2012 Risk and Investment conference run through The Actuarial Profession and featuring some multidisciplinary heavy hitters from TV and print as well as some C-suite presence from the UK's largest multinationals. The FSA's Kathryn Morgan delivered a speech which covered Pillar 2 and 3 trends in particular, which is covered in this subscription only article at Risk.net. For those who don't have the budget for that, a pruned down version of that content is available here.

Ostensibly, the following points were made;

• Don't expect any more FSA guidance on conducting an ORSA - fair point at this juncture, if you don't know your onions by now, there's probably no hope for you!
• Approaching implementation consecutively in 3 pillars is a "worry" - I suspect that worry, misplaced or not, is applicable to most undertakings at this juncture
• "Risk management is the best mitigant of risk, not capital" - I would argue an effective Risk function rather than risk management per se is the best mitigant, but it is slightly more ethereal than a big bundle of cash!
• Perception that "...Risk and Capital are not talking to each other" - true out of necessity at this juncture perhaps (BAU for the balance sheet guys, model applicants or not, and the administrative burden of refreshing documentation suites has impeded comms for some time I would argue, but this will improve in the very near future).
• Number of references to Boards, centred around NEDs participating fully in decisions rather than counting the hours till their taxi arrives, as well as not relying on SMEs to make decisions for them (i.e. Actuarially-minded board members are not left to perform all balance sheet related challenge on their own!)
• With regards to the empire built on sand which is the legislative timeline, reiterates that while some key balance sheet-related issues are yet to flesh out, "...their is a lot of certainty in Pillar 2" - something I have banged on about since the draft Level 2 implementing measures were leaked in November.

While that speech has good insights for you Pillar 2 folk out there, a lecture from Julian Adams on "the impact of changing regulation on the insurance industry" is equally fascinating, if perhaps treading over some Solvency II ground already covered over the last couple of weeks - as a History graduate, I always like a cheeky overview, and the lecture covers legislative developments back to Victorian times.

That aside, a few Solvency II-relevant snippets were also included (or reiterated from prior speeches) such as;

• A definition of what "risk sensitive" regulation actually means (insurers' solvency positions matching their idiosyncratic risk profiles) - something as succinct as that is actually extremely useful for board training purposes at the very least, and I am glad he has communicated it in this manner.
• Also defines "proportionate" from the FSA's perspective on internal model approval - namely, if it is in the Directive or the Implementing measures, it is not negotiable.
• Notes that Solvency II is "influencing" the global regulatory framework - I would argue that strong-arming (in the case of first/second wave countries) and bickering (in the case of the States) is far from influencing, though with the IAIS Comframe draft now open for review, we may see something more resembling dialogue from our pals in Brussels
• Rather worrying comment that, in the context of reporting financial positions, that Solvency II reporting sits in the succession path of EEV and MCEV as "...if perhaps not the final, then the latest step" towards a more transparent and market consistent reporting regime. Anyone for SFCR 2.0?
• A rather ominous note that the standard formula calculation "...would certainly have a distorting effect when considering, say, the London Market subscription business or with-profits businesses" - I hope all you tiny mutuals have got your IMs, PIMs or USPs ready, as it sounds like the FSA may already think SF is not suitable for you!
• Acknowledges that Solvency II is about "maximum harmonisation", and therefore EIOPA will call more of the shots in future (just as soon as Omnibus II gets through...)
• Highlights that the academic modelling around (a lack of) correlation drove many of the banks models' into stupidity in 2006-2008 - an area I would expect fervent challenge around from both the regulator and indeed internal governance structures (and one which Matthew Elderfield at the Central Bank of Ireland has already picked up on as a main area of focus)

Useful stuff from both sources, so keep it up Wharfers!

PS I suspect I won't be posting tomorrow, so I will wish you shoh slaynt and a happy Tynwald Day one day early!

Internal Models - more "Hassel" than they are worth?

Pardon the dodgy David Hasselhoff pun (product of an idle mind!), but it looks like a storm is brewing with out German pals on the internal modelling front - hot on the heels of Hannover Re's threat to abandon ship via a Societas Europaea passport to an easier ride, Gothaer, a German mutual, has now apparently decided to give up altogether.

Whilst the knowledge that people are giving up part-way through is not new (the UK managed to slim down from 100+ expected to 70-odd pre-applications between 2010-11), I was under the impression that Bafin were not dealing with a huge number to start with (this seems to suggest no more than a dozen), so to see two teetering on the brink is newsworthy I guess. 

It could be that these guys have seen something in the Commission's draft Level 2 that they don't like, or indeed the outcome of the ECON lobbying didn't quite go there way, but anything which leads to insurers not measuring their overall solvency needs using their own experience analysis and calibrations is surely unwelcome.

Some good quotes on just how onerous Bafin may be are included in this article (subscriber only I'm afraid), the most telling perhaps being "So far we see very few small insurers building an internal model [or partial model],". Very few, minus one, it would appear...

FTSE results and spare capital - St James's Place

More results on the drip here, this time from St James's Place - pretty sterling effort on EV and IFRS front, however I was more interested in their 2012 year-end take on Solvency II. They are retaining their view that not only will there not be an adverse impact on their balance sheet, but there will be a reduction in capital required (p27).

Not sure whether this factors in any shenanighans around contract boundaries and recognition of future profits which still seem to be up in the air - bearing in mind their product base, I'm guessing changes in these would matter, but if the forecast is "less capital requried", good luck to them!

Solvency II and asset allocation - mixed messages

There seems to have been a suite of materials on Solvency II and predicted asset allocation impacts recently, from the great and good (Gideon on the Solvency II Wire has kept on top of these, and I took a look at the Oliver Wyman/IIF document last week - much of the materials pointed towards a drive towards short term EU government debt (capital-free, and no duration penalties) ahead of where an insurer may traditionally have invested for policyholder benefit, corporate (and specifically bank) debt.

There were some left-of-centre views that I spotted, one from a representative of Markit opining that, in the current climate, government debt was now being viewed as riskier than Western European corporate debt. Another covered the potential for Insurance Linked Securities demand to increase under Solvency II, thus necessitating more issuance to be EU-based (as opposed to traditional homes Bermuda or Cayman). The third came from Union Banque Privee, with research cited in the FT that, with appropriate asset selection (cheeky derivatives used as examples), asset arbitrage will allow insurers to obtain exposure and performance without necessarily holding onerous amounts of capital as prescribed under Solvency II.

The first then indicates that the weightings may need a genuine re-examination with the Eurozone debt issues as the backdrop, while the other two suggest there are investment options to counter the new requirements. Is the IIF research therefore much ado about nothing, or perhaps is the mighty banking lobby having one last "flex of the guns" before its emasculation over the next few years?

FTSE Insurers - last but not least...

Having tried on a number of occasions to complete the traipse through FTSE interims for Solvency II progress and mistakenly thought I was finished, Chesnara (a Resolution-style acquisition vehicle) dropped their results today - Reuters take on them is here, but I would highlight;

• On target for the current implementation date of 1 January 2013. "...the exact date is currently being reconsidered by the EU and may be deferred to 2014”
• [We] also believe that the current climate and the challenges of Solvency II will give rise to possible acquisition opportunities and [we] remain keen to progress these.
• Current planning indicates that [we] are well placed to meet the deadline and that there is not expected to be any increased capital requirements in the Group's UK businesses.

Irish Life and Permanent also got in on the act - I had spotted a few years ago (p21 of the document, p23/24 of the pdf) that they were massively ambitious to enjoy the capital savings expected under Solvency II (this was pre-crisis of course!) Their ambitions seem rather curtailed now, commenting only that "The group believes that the adoption of Solvency II will increase available capital resources." 

FT report on listed insurer's capital trends

Just in case anyone missed out on Monday, the FT provided a quality summary on perceived advance capital planning by UK and EU insurers ahead of Solvency II. I say quality despite the couched terminology (SCR referred to as the "softer capital requirement"!)

The suggested SCR coverage targets referenced are interesting (125-150% in the UK, and as much as 170% in continental Europe) – I have heard generalisations on target SCR surplus before (in the context of economic capital targets), but the guy from JP Morgan obviously thinks he’s onto something.

I had a quick look, and thought Generali may struggle on the European side (they had 168% as their Economic Solvency Coverage on p23), but everyone else was well covered.

The schematic also highlights the increase in surplus capital pre and post-credit crunch.

Basel experience - good reason for EIOPA?

I couldn't help feel when I read this in the FT that the inexorable wait for EIOPA's Omnibus II powers to get final clearance is actually an event worth waiting for, when contrasted with the Basel implementation experience for EU territories.

To hear a man of Mr Barnier's authority struggling to convince that the draft EC legislation doesn't play favourites, when evidently the bancassurers will hold the whip hand is very sad, particularly when coupled with the fact that there is no pan-European regulator which will police consistent application in any case.

The Tier 1 capital argument is of course the same debate that the insurance industry (indeed probably the same countries!) are having via the CEA et al with EIOPA - I suspect there will be a more equitable application of the final rules on instrument types and the transition length knowing that EIOPA will carry a pretty big stick...

Solvency II and the USA - start de-risking or close the door!

Very cute article citing Moody's research on how Solvency II is already driving asset selection (and even product viability) in the United States, a jurisdiction that still hasn't made too many steps towards jumping through the "equivalence" hoops!

It is of course a given that products with embedded options and guarantees are going to be pricey under the new regime, but to hear that it is already driving capital allocation away from a country which will no doubt get equivalence (thus avoiding extra capital charges) is quite something.