2015 FTSE Interim Reporting and Solvency II costs - forewarned and forearmed?

Solvency II costs - impressed?

I always liked to keep an eye on the FTSE lads’ Interim and Full Year pronouncements on the Solvency II front back in the day, but given the legslative delays and sporadic cost reporting over the last couple of years, plus the internal model hokey-cokey, disclosures on the topic have been “Slim Pickens” to say the least.

For those interested, the sweep I did last year is here, and while a few of the firms featured have attempted to expand out, they have largely disclosed the same information as last year (Boiler-plate disclosures? Never!).

However, a few of the great and good have chirped up some extras about Solvency II on the home straight, none more revealing than the Canary-supporting egg-chasers at Aviva. They dished up the basics as a matter of  course;

• Solvency II costs of £46m for the half year (£39m for last half year)

• Submitted Solvency II internal model in June and expect approval in December. – must be a good one, Hannover Re-style!

• Currently operating within our expected Solvency II target range, regardless of any changes in economic capital surplus quantum and composition driven by Solvency II

The InsuranceERM lads expanded on that, having presumably dialled in to associated conference call! In a suit-and-tie version of Surprise Surprise (R.I.P Cilla), the CEO shocked listeners with the following statements;

• "[Solvency II] has taken an inordinate amount of management time and I'd really like that time back"
• "It has cost us in the region of £400m [$620m]. This figure does not impress me one little bit…” – to my shame I did do the countback on published costs, as if a CEO couldn’t count to £400m, and it does add up!

RSA, in between flirting sessions with the watchmaking fraternity, were similarly revealing, confirming;

• Solvency II costs of £14m for the half year (same as last half-year)

• “…application for Internal Model approval under Solvency II has been submitted and we target a positive outcome by year end”

• "…current Internal Model for Solvency II shows higher coverage ratios than our ECA model.”

Old Mutual does its best to treat the SAM/Solvency II imposters the same in its reporting, but in recent times has been light on our side. There was a bit more in the bag this time round though, particularly;

• "Based on the current underlying timetable and regulation of Solvency II, we estimate the total cost of completion will be up to £20 million, of which £10 million will be incurred in H2 2015, and the balance running into H1 2016".

• "The Solvency II regime will introduce a different lens through which to look at Group capital. It will use a more conservative 1 in 200 stress scenario in determining capital requirements and apply a more rules-based determination of capital fungibility and transferability"

• Given their tone on the “inherent conservatism” of Solvency II and their loving gazes at the existing FGD treatment of capital fungibility, can we read some indifference to their current treatment as a Group by the PRA, perhaps?

• "During July 2015, we completed our initial reporting to regulators under the interim arrangements of Solvency II"

I suppose the biggest surprises continue to be the (potential) absence of compulsion to internally model for entities such as Old Mutual (confirmed as “out” of IMAP on p82 here). Given the PRA’s pronouncements on Standard Formula appropriateness and capital add-ons, you might expect them to be marched down the aisle before too long.

Standard Life,perhaps betraying where their strategic priorities lie (nicely covered here), did little more than state that they will “remain strong” on the capital front – nothing on costs, nothing on implications, and nothing on modelling (though they confirm here that they are “in” apparently!). “In”, but on the naughty step perhaps, or is the topic just unworthy of comment?

L&G were happy to talk technical, rather than cry about hundreds and millions of pounds of spilt milk – their release touched on the following;

• Implementing a ‘capital-lite’ model for bulk annuity new business, by reinsuring out some of the risk (light detail here and here, more detail on p5 of the interims).

• Solvency II internal model is being reviewed by the PRA, and “…It is anticipated that our Solvency II internal model will be approved in Q4 2015, ready for use on the Solvency II go live date - 1 January 2016”

• Also have applications in for the use of transitionals, matching adjustments and using deduction and aggregation for its American business

• “We expect the final outcome of Solvency II to result in a lower Group capital surplus and solvency ratio than the Economic Capital basis. Our Economic Capital model has not been reviewed by the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), nor will it be.”

• "We note recent clarification from the PRA to the effect that transitional capital will count as Tier One capital, including for assessments of dividend-paying capacity". This is particularly piquant given Sam Woods’ coverage of the “dividend” issue a few weeks ago when trying to reassure a room full of analysts that the insurance sector isn’t a busted flush from an investment perspective!

A busy reporting week for sure, with seemingly no horror stories come at the top-end of the UK Insurance Industry...Including a post-script from the Pru today.

They have revealed a miniscule spend of £17m on Solvency II costs in the year-to-date (against £28m for all of last year), as well as a few nuggets in the same vein as the competition;

• "...we submitted our Solvency II internal model applications to the Prudential Regulation Authority in June 2015"
• "We continue to seek opportunities to transfer longevity risk to reinsurers or to the capital markets and have transacted when terms are sufficiently attractive and aligned with our risk management framework."
• "We also noted at the time that certain aspects of our economic capital methodology are different to those required under Solvency II and that the outcome under Solvency II would be lower than our reported economic capital level. This remains the case." - same issue as Old Mutual, one presumes?

They even dropped a Solvency II slide into this morning's presentation pack (slide 28). Interesting that they go to the trouble of highlighting that the transitionals and risk margin "broadly offset" on the UK Life book, as well as their distinct gripes in their Asian and US businesses. 

...and another post-script from Royal London (so I have everything on one page!)

• Royal London will use the Solvency II standard formula approach initially and will consider seeking approval for its internal capital model in due course

• We expect to meet the new Capital requirements without material adverse impact on policyholders but there are significant details which remain to be clarified about the new regime. It is possible the outcome from Solvency II will require insurance companies to hold more regulatory capital than is currently required. If Royal London was required to hold significantly increased capital, then the levels of Royal London Profit Share we are able to allocate to our participating members may need to be restricted

...and two more post scripts: firstly Admiral

• "Admiral is developing an internal economic capital model which will be used to calculate regulatory capital requirements following approvals from the Group's regulators in the UK and Gibraltar. Such approval is not likely to be sought or granted before 2017."
• "The Group's regulatory capital from January 2016 will, therefore, be based on the Solvency II Standard Formula, with a capital add-on agreed by the PRA to reflect recognised limitations in the Standard Formula with regards to Admiral Group's business (predominantly in respect of profit commission arrangements in co- and reinsurance agreements and risks arising from actual and potential Periodic Payment Order (PPO) claims)."
• "The level of capital add-on and resulting Group capital requirement from January 2016 is expected to be confirmed by the PRA in the final quarter of 2015."

...and secondly Phoenix

• "...submitted its application for regulatory approval of its Internal Model in June 2015"
• "...Group capital position under Solvency II expected to be in excess [of current surplus]
• "Over 2015, clarity on Solvency II regulations has improved but uncertainties remain in relation to the Group's IMAP and other Solvency II-related applications"

PRA's Countdown to Solvency II Implementation Event - When I Need U(SPs)

PRA Implementation countdown
- "Feel like dancing" now?

So along with the entire UK Solvency II sticky-beak brigade, I had the unbridled pleasure of attending the PRA's 'Leo Sayer' on Friday, confidently titled Countdown to Implementation, despite going on to list a range of matters which have probably given both Internal Model and Standard Formula firms plenty of enthusiasm to try and turn the clock backwards rapidly!

Paul Fisher, Julian Adams' replacement as Executive Director of Insurance at the PRA, kicked off with a set of Solvency II vox-pops;

• Solvency II is the "main game in town"
• "The end is in sight"
• The PRA are "not gold-plating the Directive"

A nice bit of reassurance at kick-off time then - unfortunately, the clarity which was to follow from the technical specialists on a range of topics was probably not what everyone wanted to hear, given the tone of some of the audience questioning that followed! In particular (and with everything in full quotation marks below having been said by a PRA rep on the day);

• That the PRA will "have to prioritise" if everyone in the IMAP queue for 'from 2016' approval drops their applications in at the end of June, and that applicants should be "striving to submit" sooner. Suggests to me that the smaller firms in IMAP may get bumped to squeeze in the big boys.
• The reinforcement of Mark Carney's message from the other week that they will have no problem refusing permission to use models, though this was couched by Fisher in the more appropriate context of failure to meet any of the TSIMs simply "cannot be allowed".
• That, although over 90% of the UK industry was down for using Standard Formula, the PRA will be equally aggressive when challenging their preparedness as they will for IM firms.

I didn't hang around for the afternoon sessions as I had a hot date with BA, so pull whatever you can out of the Other Approvals and Regulatory Reporting slideshows. However, I would draw attention to the following from the earlier sessions:

Implementation and Policy overview

• The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street protested through multiple speakers about how they recognise that bank and insurance internal models are different, and how Insurance Supervision is now "embedded into the Bank" - I would assume to justify the credit crunch-influenced aggression now being taken by the PRA on assessing capital models (visible from Adams's speech around the time of BOE/FSA merger right through to Bailey's speech at Mansion House on Thursday night).
• An interesting slide 3 about how much more work Solvency II will generate for the PRA from go-live!
• Referred to FLAOR only once before switching to ORSA, suggesting that this disposable acronym is as much of a pain in the neck for the supervisor as it is for firms!
• Highlight what "Good" and "Bad" ORSAs have contained to-date. Clearly some firms are box-ticking, leaving an unusable report which is only skin-deep compliant as output. They were particularly scathing on Stress and Scenario Testing efforts, and implored that Reports should not be written for the PRA's benefit (though naturally must cover what the DAs and EIOPA have already set out).
• A nice piece was discussed around the expected depth of director-level knowledge of their internal models. Andrew Bulley made a useful distinction between "conceptual" and "technical" knowledge, where your dithering 80 year-old INED from the fishing industry might not be expected to understand correlation matrices, but should probably know their significance, and alternatives to them.
• For model applications to date, far too big ("encyclopedic" in cases), with too much process description, and not enough on assumptions and expert judgements.
• That it is a firm's responsibility to "ensure compliance" with the Delegated Acts, and given their lessening proximity to the legislators, the PRA flag in advance that they will not be able to give "concrete advice" to firms in future.

Standard Formula

A particularly good ground-setter, given the dearth of work published previously on Standard Formula firms and the PRA's expectations. Calendar included on the slide pack, which will be of massive use to your PM/PMO staff!

• PRA will review ALL firms ahead of 2016 for SF appropriateness - "priority" firms assessed by Q1 2015, everyone else by end of 2015.
• While SF SCR is apparently close to current ICG numbers for GENERAL insurers in the UK, it is noticeably larger in LIFE firms 
• PRA is "not promoting" SF ahead of internal models
• Vigorously directed all attendees to EIOPA's Underlying Assumptions of SF Paper - expectation that some firms won't read it, and just expect SF plus any add-ons?
• Very vocal on the "significance of the deviation" between SF SCR and one's own Risk Profile - as we know, the Delegated Acts quantify what 'significant' is in the context of capital add-ons
• An expectation that ORSAs will be used in the assessment of SF appropriateness - qualitative for sure, possibly quant elements as well?
• Range of examples of where significant divergences are being found, by Risk Category, and by Life vs General Insurer.
• A lot of emphasis on Capital Add-ons being used "only as a temporary measure", which will ultimately allow firms to PIM/IM or de-risk. They are however "patient and realistic" on how quickly that change can be done, so it sounds on the face of it like 2016 and 2017 will be targeted for Capital Add-on elimination.
• In the following session on models, a piece came up on Capital Add-ons, where the PRA confirmed that their process for handling these in future is "still developing", though they expect them to be "a lot, lot rarer" than the existing regime of ICG.

Internal Models

Calendar also provided for IM firms (slide 4), showing how tight their schedule is, and explaining why they threw the earlier curveball about all firms expecting to drop their applications in on 30th June 2015. They also touched on the following:

• Highlighting weak areas identified to-date such as over-optimistic (new?) business plans being used in capital calculations; ENIDs; omission of certain "Key Risks", and suspiciously low correlations
• That Use Test is "fundamentally important", and is an opportunity for firms to "put their money where their mouth is". They do not expect to see either end of the use spectrum i.e. no use, or blind use!
• Too much technical actuarial validation seen. Usefully suggested that validation questions may be better posed as "where might this model be inadequate", rather than "why is it OK".
• Confirmed that the PRA's SAT has now been replaced by EIOPA's CAT, which won't arrive until the back end of this year - surprisingly, no-one laughed when they said this "might create some work" for existing IMAP programmes!
• Importantly, they stressed that their powers are to Approve or Reject applications, with no "conditional" powers whatsoever. Attendees were therefore encouraged to delay applications which were thought to be unlikely to succeed, both now and in future.

Though they instinctively feel like they could have been supplied sooner, the clarifications provided in the presentations I witnesses will be hugely welcome by programme directors and PM's alike. I would venture a guess that they will be less welcome by executive committees, who may have hoped for more flexibility on the risk quantification front post-2016.

The PRA and Insurer Business Model Analysis - emerging risks into capital add-ons?

A rather revealing "topical article" was pushed out by our pals at the PRA this week, mouthwateringly titled "The role of business model analysis in the supervision of insurers".

I obviously threw my Woman's Weekly professional reading materials to one side in order to see how much juice there was in this particular fruit, and it is certainly worth a glance for anyone in the risk management game, if only for the idiot's guide to Life and General insurer business models it provides!

Ironically, in the Life Insurer case (where they have chosen 'non-standard annuities' as a paradigm-changing product offering), they weren't able to forecast yesterday's scuppering of the UK annuities market in its entirety in their business model analysis!

It actually reads as quite a good case study in how we should be conducting emerging risk assessment against one's prevailing strategy, walking through specific changes in the operating environments of Life and General Insurers driven by both exogenous and endogenous factors.

With the price comparison website example, it is a good example of how a strategic risk filters down into second order risks which require reconsideration. The annuity example shows how the impact of competitors can impact both existing new business streams and the risk profile of one's existing book.

There is evidently an enormous emphasis being paid in the regulator's BMA activity to those grim business school concepts no doubt already permeating your emerging risk assessment processes such as SWOT and PESTLE analysis, as well as what (in future) will be supplied under Solvency II, most notably Profit and Loss Attributions and ORSA supervisory reports. I'm sure we will see over the next couple of years how the PRA's demand for these very sensitive in-house outputs materialises into supervisory action!

What perhaps Risk and Capital Management functions should be particularly cautious of is the leitmotif of the PRA "responding pre-emptively" where they feel that profits are not aligned with the risks insurance firms are taking. The following quote is of particular concern, as I can't see how this and the ORSA supervisory report aren't sharing the same womb (my emphasis)!;

"...the results of a BMA exercise help to inform the PRA's expectations of a firm's financial and non-financial resources. For example, the PRA might raise capital requirements, or require a firm to improve its governance process, to address weaknesses identified by BMA"

Bearing in mind we are months away from the first glut of ORSA material being delivered to Moorgate's finest, is the industry about to fertilise an expensive new world of capital add-ons via supplementary business model disclosure?

I appreciate that it has been emphasised by the PRA (p8) that ORSAs, and their supervisory reports, simply cannot be used to set regulatory capital, but in the context of what is being stated by the BMA team here, would they really be ignored?

Standard and Poors on European ERM - momentum lost after Solvency II delays?

S&P released these pearls of wisdom regarding ERM within European insurers, specifically whether the additional breathing space offered to Solvency II may put the brakes on developments.

There's certainly no sitting on the fence with them - they start with the following as a statement of fact;

...the delayed start date of Solvency II has prompted some insurers in the region to reduce their efforts in developing ERM

Unsupported, but probably fair! They are also overwhelmingly positive on Solvency II on the whole, for example;

Solvency II remains a major driver of ERM improvements in Europe

the Directive has firmed up insurers' approaches to risk appetite, risk governance, and risk reporting

The introduction of the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) process...has helped to embed risk appetite in insurers' operations

Solvency II has brought risk management to the fore in insurers' strategic planning 

Easy to take any of those comments to task in the UK and Ireland, where national corporate governance code revisions, listing requirements, IAIS considerations and developments in both the actuarial and  nascent Risk professions are all taken very seriously by the respective industries, all the while cognisant of the shadow cast by Solvency II. In addition, the disciplines espoused by S&P's ERM assessments are practiced to a decent extent in existing ICA/FCR processes/reports, regardless of how 'ORSA-fied' they have become over the last couple of years.

This potential slight to the Western world is remedied on p7 however, where the research acknowledges that Western Europe effectively leads the way on ERM, and in the appendix (p8-12) where the league tables sit Germany and the UK firmly at the top of the ratings class.

They ultimately get to the real crux of their fears with this;

We would view negatively any evidence of a reduced role for economic capital in insurers' capital management arising from the delay

They are also gunning for insurers who continue to sell uneconomical products in the face of sustained low interest rates (p4), and validation standards in internal modelling (p5).

One would hope that, certainly in the UK with ICA, ICA+, and a supervisor who is continuing to staff pre-application for internal models adequately, that momentum around using economic capital in decision making will not be lost during 2014, particularly now that the PRA have as good as said that they accept EIOPA's preparatory guidance.

So give this a read if you want to know where your firm lies in the S&P ERM rating table, and if their opinion matters to your bottom line, be sure to quote this material when your Programme sponsors try to take the pace of 2014 Solvency II activity!

 

 

The PRA Consultation on EIOPA's Preparatory Guidance - priorities for 2014 and 2015

After 10 years, it's finally getting interesting - the PRA today have dropped out a consultation paper on applying EIOPA's preparatory guidelines to PRA-authorised firms (CP 9/13). You can get at the EIOPA materials through this post for convenience.

The content will, subject to any intense lobbying by industry, be adopted as a supervisory statement (section 233) to cover the 2014 and 2015 calendar years, with the expectation remaining that 2016 is our "go-live" date. It covers the following aspects of the preparatory phase;

• The PRA's expectations of firms as they prepare for Solvency II;
• The PRA's approach to implementing the guidelines; and
• The PRA's interpretation of aspects of the guidelines.

They are at pains to highlight that these are "preparatory" guidelines, and provide the traditional spiel on "nature, scale and complexity", so incremental progress is to be expected during the period in question. What that means in practice is perhaps another thing - can you show measurable 'incremental progress' for materials which are only on an annual review cycle, for example? - but that aside, it's worth picking the bones out for your respective programmes, and perhaps most importantly, getting your feedback in by November 15th if you don't like it!

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this CP is that in no way is it suggestive of the PRA rejecting any of EIOPA's guidance (remember, they have until the end of November to voice any protest). That of course makes preparatory work much easier to plan for, as the UK will seemingly be doing it all!

My thoughts on the specifics were as follows;

System of Governance (SOG)

• Emphasise that the SFCR requirements around SOG are also catered for in EIOPA's work (3.7), so a smart move would be to factor that into your drafting plans during 2014
• General governance requirements "largely consistent with SYSC", though individuals holding key functions might expect a personal visit in the next two years (3.10)
• Similar position for Risk Management Systems (3.12), stressing the commonality of requirements with existing PRA obligations, but stressing in particular that firms should be "...including suitable mechanisms and methodology for connecting to their ORSAs and for carrying out regular stress and scenario tests" during the preparatory phase.
• That Prudent Person Principle is not a new concept to the PRA, but firms would be expected to review investment strategies in line with PPP over the next couple of years. A concession is seemingly made regarding the provision and review of third-party data by investment functions for smaller firms. 
• On the (new) requirement for a Capital Management Policy/Medium Term Capital Plan (3.16), they are not moving, despite the howls of protestation - "The PRA regards the development and implementation of such policies and plans as an integral part of sound risk and capital management for all firms, especially as their management and Boards assess the implications of the forthcoming Solvency II own funds and capital requirements"
• On internal controls, they appear to be fishing for firms to analyse whether their existing framework is Solvency-II ready, and then piggy-back of that self-assessment (3.17)
• Same for Internal Audit function readiness! (3.18)
• Actuarial function get a more bespoke treatment (3.19), with all firms asked to "carefully consider" the functional structure to avoid conflicts of interest. They also reserve the right to "...review firms’ analysis of the areas required for improvement, and understand the actions the firm is taking to resolve these".
• Outsourcing similarly gets additional treatment by the PRA (3.22), who are "particularly interested" in changes made specifically with Solvency II readiness in mind

Useful quotes

...the PRA articulates its expectations of firms in the preparatory period, including that firms should read, assess and implement the substantive provisions of the guidelines in order to achieve the intended outcomes (2.5)

The guidelines and this statement are designed to work towards a consistent and convergent approach in preparations for Solvency II and not its early implementation (2.6)

 The PRA expects firms, when asked, to be able to explain what governance changes they need to make to satisfy the guidelines, how they plan to make those changes, what progress there has been to date and any particular difficulties they face (3.4)

The PRA expects firms to be able to document their overall approach to outsourcing, including contingency plans in the event of a service provider failure, to ensure that the efficiency of the service remains unimpaired and uninterrupted. (3.22)

During the preparatory period, the work of the actuarial function will now focus on co-ordinating the calculation of technical provisions, providing an opinion on the underwriting policy and reinsurance arrangements and contributing to the development and performance of the internal model in the pre-application stage where relevant (3.19)

During the preparatory period, the PRA encourages firms to consider how to manage the transition to the new regime and to assess the impact on existing asset portfolios of Solvency II requirements. This need not necessarily mean that changes have to be made to firms’ investment strategies or portfolios but firms are encouraged to work on an incremental basis towards demonstrating that they meet the requirements of the PPP (3.14)

During the preparatory period firms should review their existing policy for assessing fitness and propriety and whether it needs updating in advance of Solvency II (3.11)

FLAOR/ORSA

• PRA only planning to review assessments "...on a proportionate basis" during preparatory phase - they elaborate further by stating "Due to the high number of ORSAs which will be submitted, the PRA expects that it may have to stagger its review of these during the preparatory period in a way that is risk based and proportionate". Does that mean "Top Ten & Lloyds & IMAP" get the works, with everyone else getting a lite-touch?
• Expectation that improvements are identifiable between the 2014 and 2015 FLAORs - the PRA will contact firms individually if they are within the threshold limits which enact guidelines 14-16.
• On ORSA documentation, "...firms should recognise the need for effective documentation and record keeping", for both Policy and Report (4.7)
• Note that the Board's involvement in ORSA is "...far more extensive than setting risk appetites and tolerances", and leave an open threat to go through Board packs/agendas to ensure this is the case (4.8)
• Smaller firms get permission to use their internal ORSA Report as the ORSA Supervisory Report, provided it has enough detail. Larger/riskier firms may conversely be asked to supplement whatever they submit. (4.10)
• PRA actually considering issuing a "summary sheet" to firms in order to help gather information consistently (4.11). Here comes the ORSA Template!
• Expectation that 2014 projection work is done on existing basis, and 2015 (ideally) on Solvency II basis (4.15)

Useful quotes

The preparatory period is a time of development for firms in designing, compiling and trialling these assessments (4.3)

To help capture [ORSA] data and information in a consistent way from firms and facilitate review the PRA is considering whether it may be beneficial to provide a summary sheet to firms (4.11)

The PRA does not intend to prescribe when firms should submit their ORSA...Firms should inform the PRA when their ORSA will be submitted well in advance of the submission date (4.19)

The PRA expects the Board to play an active part at various stages, providing initial steering on how the ORSA should be designed and documented, challenging on risk identification and mitigation along the way and culminating in the Board approving and communicating the finished product. (4.8)

The PRA expects all firms to develop a qualitative process to develop an ORSA which can be documented and reviewed by the PRA in line with its overall proportionate approach.(4.6)

Submission of Information

• Confirms that XBRL is required prior to 2016 as submission format for QRTs (5.7)
• Suggest that policies and procedures around reporting in firms may need "potentially significant revision" in light of Solvency II. (5.15)
• Rather obscurely, they write, "The PRA does not expect that preparatory reporting will be subject to a requirement for external audit but it may draw upon audited inputs" - as I recall the participation of external auditors in QRT-type reporting has been a massive bone of contention in Brussels (indicated within these IRSG comments from last year, but I'm sure there's a more recent story), but potentially not a welcome development.

Internal Model Pre-Application

• They isolate the Model Change policy as an example of something which should already be tested for its appropriateness (6.5)
• Still expect firms to come forward and brief them on "significant" changes during pre-application.
• Surprisingly, very little else,

Useful quotes

...it is important that where models are sufficiently stable, firms are beginning to demonstrate their use and continue to refine their models with the benefits of experience (6.5)

I may fire some feedback in, but ultimately I suspect this lady is not for changing...

PRA and Early Warning Indicators - Knowing me, knowing EWI...

Couple of interesting bits have popped up in the last week on the PRA's Early Warning Indicator (EWI) initiative, which I had touched on earlier in the year. At that time it was a little hard to establish the lie of the land, other than the PRA approach to preventing potential 'gaming' of internal model capital requirements was markedly different to that of their European NCA counterparts, and that EIOPA fancied their chances of doing the job on the NCA's collective behalf.

Julian Adams gave a speech at the Insurance Institute of London last week where he commenced with a rather familiar lament about how, at the outset of the FSA/BoE splice, "...we knew that there was some concern in the insurance industry that the Bank didn’t understand insurance". After collecting the award for 'understatement of the year', he then waxed lyrical about the five lessons learned by the BoE from the financial crisis, and how these are being applied currently to insurance supervision in the UK;

1. "...the need for a prudential supervisor to focus on the risks that might materialise for firms in the future"
2. "...not enough to focus on static point-in-time assessments of firms’ solvency positions"
3. "...for some issues it is not enough to just look at the risks within individual firms and address them at an individual firm level. Instead, we need to supplement this analysis with work across the system as a whole"
4. "...the need for clarity about the objectives of prudential regulation"
5. "...the need to have multiple reference points when assessing firms’ capital positions. Simple crude measures are not sufficient in themselves, but neither are complex models"

The last one is of course our context setter for comments later in the speech justifying the EWI approach, which for me reads as a laundry list of why existing model validation activity, assumption setting processes and expert judgements must be considered ineffective by default, rather than after PRA review.

One brush - two industries?

Most significantly from a strategic perspective is the confirmation that the PRA "...wouldn’t expect firms who fall beneath [the EWI limits] to release capital until we, and they, have reviewed the appropriateness of the modelled calibration".

Alongside this speech, Chris Finney has published a scathing article on the PRA's approach to EWIs, focusing on its legality at both national and EU level, its unwillingness to consult on the matter, and ultimately how the PRA's experiences with banks a few years back (well. the FSA/BoE, but let's not split hairs) have seemingly allowed the insurance industry to be smeared with the same tarry brush.

With the PRA seemingly using their "lessons learned" rationale alongside the equally informal "interest" of the IAIS and EIOPA in non-modelled capital backstops, is that really enough to fend off (current) UK statute and (pending) EU law if the industry fights back?

System of Governance - EIOPA's FINAL preparatory guidance for national supervisors

Based on feedback received since their initial consultation paper was released, EIOPA make the following generic clarifications/statements in the preamble of their guidance doc for System of Governance preparations;

• That proportionality will not be defined or presented as examples in the guideline text (p5-6)
• That NCAs are "expected to...review and evaluate the quality of the information provided to them" - bad news for the PRA, who were clinically uninterested in reviewing Solvency II reporting attempts according to one blogger (p6)
• The emergence of a new ORSA acronym, "FLAOR", which looks more like something an amused teenager would write on Facebook (p6)
• The expectation that 2015 will see submissions of (2014) ORSAs to NCAs (p7)
• While there is no generic take on what enforcement action should take place in this interim period, firms are expected to (a) Discuss any negative findings from their ORSA/Governance systems with their supervisor, and (b) To produce SCRs using information of appropriate quality. Enforcement action in the absence of this WILL NOT consist of capital add-ons, apparently (p7)
• That the submission date calendar for all of the information expected will be reviewed at the end of this year, so that EIOPA can take Omnibus II progress into account (p8)
• That the explanatory text in each set of guidance is NOT part of "Comply or Explain" (p9)
• That the reasons behind a negative "Comply or Explain" decision from any country will be kept secret as standard (p10, and disgraceful, frankly).

They then go on to focus on some of the larger bones of contention within the 52 guidelines provided. The following generic points stand out for me as a practitioner;

1. There is almost no discernible movement in EIOPA's position, even after a volumous lobbying effort;
2. That explanations for the inclusion of contentious content are generally forthcoming, though on a number of occasions, flimsy;
3. That planning for 2014 full-year mothballing of Solvency II programmes is not an option, particularly for ICAS+ candidates - some may get away with a few months of inertia, depending on the quality of their paperwork (strategies, policies, process guides/maps, terms of reference, charters etc).

The following supporting arguments for EIOPA's final view were, in my mind at least, poorly formulated, regardless of whether the end result is still agreeable;

3.48 (Guideline 6)

- Refused to add more definition around what constitutes a "significant decision", which is poor form.

3.58 (All of Chapter III)

- That the expectations of Risk Management in insurers  "...comprise risk management standards which are considered to be matter-of-course and wide spread activities" - extraordinarily loose, considering the lack of a majority-accepted global, or indeed pan-European standard on the subject (IRM/ISO/COSO/FERMA/FSB's efforts notwithstanding)

3.65 (Guideline 19)

- That, while it is "not an easy task", Operational Risks should be quantifiable, and therefore subject to tolerance limits - I don't think it would have hurt to suggest (or even compel the use of) a method if it is that difficult.

3.68 (Guideline 25)

- That firms should maintain Investment Risk-related KRIs outside of what might be provided by normal parties (for example, ratings agencies), which would help "...increase overall risk management" - not entirely convinced that a generic "increase" is any kind of worthy ambition. 

3.74 (Guideline 31)

- That a capital management policy and capital management plan is both necessary (though for not entirely convincing reasons when tying back to the Directive)

3.78 (Chapter VI [Internal Control])

- That there is already plenty of clarification on what the Compliance function is charged with. I would agree in principle, but have heard evidence to the contrary in practice.

3.81 (Chapter VII [Internal Audit])

- That they neither wish to mandate or discourage rotation of Internal Audit staff or whistleblowing direct to NCAs - in which case, why mention it!

3.110
- A bizarre comment in response to a suggestion that a public statement should be released by the AMSB annually regarding the discharge of responsibilities around the system of governance that the Directive "...only deals with internal governance, not corporate governance" - think I know what they are fishing at, but terribly worded.

3.144
- Justify their decision not to define risk appetite and risk tolerance in the context of these guidelines

They have however provided some more defendable clarifications, for example;

3.51 (Guideline 11)

- Clarified that the gold-plated "Fit and Proper" requirements apply to AMSB/Control Function staff only, as well as specify what is expected from Outsourcers.

3.57 (Chapter III [Risk Management])

- That in the context of separating the duties of the Risk and Actuarial functions, the Directive is abundantly clear and that undertakings "...cannot deviate from [the Directive's] distribution of tasks"

3.62 (All "Policy"-related guidelines)

- That efforts should be targeted towards drafting the required documents during the preparatory phase. I would imagine this would be "re-working" in the UK, where such activity is most probably long done.

3.67 (Guideline 19)

- That there is no compulsion for firms to operate an electronic database to store operational risk events

3.85 (Chapter VIII [Actuarial])

- That, regardless of the absence of a valuation framework for TPs, the processes behind their co-ordination and calculation justify early activity, rather than "wait and see" on Pillar 1.

3.124
- Regarding Op Risk, activity will have to include "...identifying all operational risks that have crystallised and their near misses" (my emphasis)

Relatively easy in summary then - if it was a gap/issue in your system of governance in March, it probably still is, so go and fix it!

FTSE and European Insurers - Economic Capital and Solvency II trends - money pit filled?

Interim Results season - without question, the most exciting time of the summer for me (although to qualify that, I do live on the Isle of Man and blog in my spare time). As good an opportunity as any to peer review where the big boys are at in the UK and Europe, both on Solvency II preparations/costs and economic captial positions.

Solvency II project costs - on the wane?

As I had mentioned in an earlier post, the FTSE-listed insurers have gone noticeably quiet on both Solvency II and, in the UK's case, the havoc it was inevitably going to wreak in its 2012 form - while the 2013 silence "speaks volumes" as to the priority of the dossier, it is a smart idea to see what impact the threat of a 2014 start has had to EC positions of major insurers over the last 12 months (i.e. after last year's whingeing, did any of them actually do substantive capital-related activity!)

A few notes for each below;

Aviva

• Solvency II project costs of £44m - well down on £77m in 2012 year-to-June
• "...there is still significant uncertainty over the detailed requirements [of Solvency II]"
• Pro-forma economic capital surplus of 175%, up from 172% in December
• IGD coverage 1.8 times, up from 1.7 times in December

Axa

• Nothing on Solvency II at all or project costs
• Solvency ratio down to 218% (from 233%) since December - interest rated attributed
• Economic solvency ratio (calibrated to 1-in-200 VaR) down to 204% (from 206%) since December - dividend and market risk elements attributed

Allianz

• Nothing on project costs
• Solvency ratio (based on FCD) of 177%, down from 197% this time last year - change in accounting standards attributed
• "...Allianz continues to be exposed to two external forces that adversely affect our risk profile and would not normally be associated with our core operating activities: the European sovereign debt crisis and regulatory developments – especially the European solvency directive, Solvency II"
• No reference to economic capital or modelling

Legal and General

• "Investment projects and expenses" (which covered Solvency II last year) were £20m - £23m in 2012 year-to-June
• "...remains uncertainty both to the implementation timescales of Solvency II and the final calibrations that will be used for long term business"
• IGD surplus unchanged at £4.1bn, coverage ratio down to 226%

Old Mutual

• No mention of Solvency II project costs, same as last year
• EC coverage of "over 160%", calibrated to VaR 99.93%
• FGD surplus of 160%
• Dividend outweighed operational cash flows in the 6 month period, though this was due to the special dividend paid last year after a massive disposal

Resolution

• Solvency II project costs of £10m for the half year - well down on the £48m for 2012 comparable!
• "Proposals for Solvency II continue to be the subject of debate"
• EC Coverage of 192% - (194% in Dec - quantum increased by £200m though)
• IGCA coverage of 221% (222% in Dec) - sold a business unit, which helped cover dividend

Prudential

• £13m Solvency II project costs for the half year - £27m in 2012 year-to-June
• "...deferral until 1 January 2016 or beyond appears likely"
• "...we now know that it will not be implemented before 1 January 2016" - my emphasis
• "[potential for] optimising the Group’s domicile as a possible response to an adverse outcome on Solvency II" remains on the table, a copy/paste threat left in from last year.
• IGD coverage of 230% - quantum lower by over a billion since Dec, due to a change in requirements in their US business

Standard Life

• £36m Solvency II "and other programmes" costs for the half year - £42m in 2012 year-to-June
• Solvency II project "...continues to respond to changes in requirements"
• IGD down £500m since half year after accounting for a special dividend, and surplus generation down year-on-year (attributed to new business strain)
• IGD surplus of 185%, down from over 200% at YE2012, but up 11% from this time last year
• Not a single reference to "economic capital" in the document

Generali

• No mention of Solvency II
• Solvency I coverage at 139% - up from 130% this time last year
• Economic capital coverage of 167% - up from 159% this time last year

RSA

• Solvency II project costs down to £10m (was £16m  in 2012 year-to-June)
• "There remains continued uncertainty as delays in agreeing the rules have caused the planned implementation date of 2014 to be delayed."
• IGD covered 1.7 times - down from 1.9 times since December - dividends again cited in explaining the dip.
• Economic capital (calibrated to 1-in-200 VaR) £1.3bn, up from £1.2bn in December.

So a trend of steady Solvency I ratios, and no sign of any war chests being created by holding excess cash back - quite the opposite in some cases, with dividends (special or otherwise) on the high side. With project costs diminishing and barely a passing comment on the Omnibus II impasse, it looks very much like Solvency II is yesterday's news in the boardrooms of major insurers. 

That said, in just those insurers covered above there has been over £100m confirmed spend in the last 6 months on Solvency II preparations, during which time the implementation date has (informally) moved at least two years, IMAP has been elongated, and the LTGA panacea has turned out to be anything but. That's hardly chickenfeed, and the rest of this year can only get busier for the UK with ICAS+ and EIOPA Interim Guidelines to contend with.

I hope Finance Directors don't get too excited by the dwindling project spend though - we haven't started Pillar 3 yet, apparently!

PwC and CSFI's 2013 Insurance Banana Skins survey - "Conduct Risk" firmly a la mode

Following on from the 2011 version, PwC and the Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation have pumped out another version of their Insurance Banana Skins survey, identifying how well the insurance industry feels it is prepared to handle a list of pre-identified risks. The average response on a scale of 1 to 5 was 2.97, which rather unrevealingly suggests the industry is averagely prepared to manage its collective risk profile.

EU Legislative process - not for vegans

This survey was conducted during March/April 2013, and elicited 662 responses from 54 countries, with two-thirds of respondents coming the insurance industry (the rest consultants/brokers etc). Almost half were European, so no surprises that the risks emerging from the regulatory environment were top of the pops for the second survey in a row. Solvency II gets a particularly flavoursome mention, with reference to its struggles to get through the "Brussels Sausage Machine"...

Bearing in mind the exquisite pressures being applied by the EU machinery to quantify risk, this publication is a welcome return to horizon scanning, qualitative assessment and emerging risk, all of which is handy for the ORSA posse, who according to recent surveys, should be all over this during 2013.

Some very interesting snippets emerge from the report, in particular;

• "Conduct Risk" - if ORSA was the new boy in 2012, then its 2013 counterpart is surely Conduct Risk, which I suspect didn't warrant a category of its own in many risk managers thinking until the return of twin peaks regulation in the UK. Conduct Risk has shot up the charts in its significance for insurers, now sitting 4th (from 18th last year)! Specifically, the suggestion that insurers are now "...looking beyond conduct risk as simply a compliance exercise" makes you wonder what some firms through were acceptable products in the last 10 years!
• "Guaranteed Products" - was not listed last time around, now jumps to number 6
• Actuarial Assumptions (which can easily mask the emergence of a number of the risks listed) unchanged at 12th
• Capital availability down from 2nd last time to 16th this year - interim period been spent squirrelling capital away, or happy that the onerous elements of Solvency II are (thanks to Germany) in the distant future?
• Reputational risk still in mid-table, at 14th

And sectoral/country specific;

• Surprisingly, the Life sector doesn't have actuarial assumptions in its top ten concerns
• Equally surprisingly, the non-life sector doesn't have regulation in its top ten concerns - clearly happy with their proposed Solvency II lot!
• That reputation doesn't feature in reinsurer's top ten - with customers likely to be eager yet more discerning  under Solvency II, one would think this is an area for enhancement in order to stand out from the similarly-rated crowd
• The quality of risk management appears to have spiked as a concern largely due to the emergence of emerging market firms into the space playing catch-up (on paper at least), as well as concerns that some firms are playing at risk management without making necessary adaptations to the prevailing risk culture.

Moody's survey on Solvency II compliance preparedness - the chilly third pillar

So from what I can gather it has been a terrible week for the Girondins, with a freak hailstorm wreaking havoc in a thin strip along the vineyards of Bordeaux's Entre-deux-Mers appellation - my in-laws were seemingly spared further down the river, noting that it was merely "un peux froid".

On Ice - Solvency II programmes
and this year's white Bordeaux?

And speaking of a great deal of hard work getting aimlessly destroyed by an unpredictable European storm, Solvency II (do you see what I did there?) appears to have at least enough juice in the tank to have encouraged Moodys to survey practitioners on the preparedness of the industry to achieve compliance before the deadlines currently on everyone's lips (i.e. 2014-2015 for EIOPA Guidelines, 2016 for "go-live").

That survey is available here (short sign-up required, but worth it), with a very short summary here. The media have touched on the survey (here), but only seem to have read the summary, so I've picked through the whole shooting match to see what else was worth knowing.

The sample is small at 45 contributors, but they have all been interviewed one-on-one in Q4 2012/Q1 2013, so the responses are not too dated, particularly as many Solvency II programmes have been running on meagre rations since January of this year. Coverage of 12 EU countries is included in the 45 people, with a decent split of size and insurance type. Majority of respondents were CRO/equivalent, with a few accountants, actuaries and programme managers thrown in for good measure, and just over half are on Standard Formula.

Talking points for me were;

• That 22% have frozen Pillar 3 activity, while 11% have frozen all Solvency II activity
• Half are using Standard Formula to curb costs!
• In addition to that, 20% say that the Use Test is a barrier to using models!
• 27% are approaching Pillar 1 and Pillar 3 with a tick-box mentality (i.e. happy to use multiple manual processes/excel-based tactical solutions to deliver the balance sheet and reporting template elements), while 44% have worked exclusively on Pillar 1 at the expense of Pillar 3
• Solvency II project investment levels are "considerably more" in the UK and France compared to Germany - makes you wonder why they have such a long face!
• 67% have increased their control function staffing by 10% or more - 31% have increased by 50% or more.
• Only 7% note "capital reduction" as a perceived benefit of Solvency II, with 33% selecting improved capital planning (regardless of quantum) as a benefit.
• Only 6.7% say they are receiving "high" levels of support from their national supervisory authority.

Seemingly the stats are a hostage to the sample - I'm sure the PRA would be apoplectic if this was the position of Insurers of Britain plc, but for me the big story is the indiscriminate swelling of Risk/control functions in smaller organisations that evidently are only ticking boxes. Feels a tad disingenuous to pump the staff numbers up to demonstrate compliance, but I suppose it's not me they need to satisfy!

NAIC's ORSA Manual for US Insurers - a helping hand?

"Tired and Emotional" - European
Insurance industry in 2013 

After the self-inflicted Solvency II transformational pressures of 2011 and 2012 resulted in more wobbly legs than a teenage disco at midnight, the relative calm of 2013 (to date) will have come as a blessed relief for European regulators and industry alike. Not so over in the States though, as they crack on with their take on the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment, releasing their industry guidance manual a few weeks back, in preparation for a proper crack at implementation in 2015, the driver of course being IAIS ICP obeisance rather than Solvency II equivalence.

They have kindly summarised the changes made since their 2011 version of the same manual on p9, which focus on accounting basis, scope (for groups) and ensuring certain year-on-year changes are appropriately flagged. 

Generic ORSA content - what
regulators "really really want"?

Unlike in the UK where there has been a marked reluctance to offer anything in the way of meaningful assistance to smaller insurers, such as a report template or checklist of suitable content/processes, the NAIC, just like the Spice Girls before them, are happy to "tell ya what I want", regardless of the potential for genericism.

That said, a recent Towers Watson survey suggested that there is still plenty of work to be done and staff to be hired in order to get with their ORSA programme.

The NAIC clarify that the US ORSAs are expected to be conducted no less than annually, with insurers documenting the process and results. After that, a high level "ORSA Summary Report" is to be submitted to the lead/state regulator once a year, which "should contain";

1. Description of the Risk Management Framework
2. Assessment of Risk Exposure (we would read as "risk profile" from what I can see)
3. Assessment of Risk Capital and prospective solvency

The Manual states that "[it] is intended to provide guidance for completing each section of the ORSA Summary Report", which should therefore make the job a doodle!

Some interesting bits jump out, not necessarily in contrast to reported/observable differences from the EU approach, more the fact that they are specified in the manual rather than taken as given;

GENERAL

• Chief Risk Officer/executive head of ERM Framework must sign the ORSA Summary Report
• Timing of supervisory reporting may move to match up to strategic planning cycle of an insurer
• Internal documentation expectations seemingly not as exhaustive as EU "repeatable by independent knowledgeable third party", simply to allow a more in-depth look at a given are at supervisor's request

DESCRIPTION OF RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

• Specifies in principle what an "effective ERM Framework" comprises of (p18) - includes our old friends 'risk appetite', 'risk tolerance' and 'risk limits' in this, though they are isolated and defined in a passable manner on p25!
• Asks for various descriptive texts around processes
• Specifies that weaknesses/omissions found in the report here may change the supervisor's approach to the insurer!

ASSESSMENT OF RISK EXPOSURE

• Quantitative and/or qualitative assessments of risk exposure, in normal and stressed environments, for each "material" risk. Noticeably don't list Strategic/Frictional risks in the examples of "material" risk, though do mention Reputational risk as one for which "quantitative methods may not be well established"
• "Simple stress tests or more complex stochastic analyses" may be used in assessing the stressed environment
• Potential for supervisory intervention in the levels of stress assessed (in deterministic scenarios) or  even parameters in the ESG (for firms with stochastic capability)
• On risk correlation, "History may provide some empirical evidence of relationships, but the future is not always best estimated by historical data" - not sure where that leaves everyone!

ASSESSMENT OF RISK CAPITAL AND PROSPECTIVE SOLVENCY

• Provide a non-exhaustive list of considerations that an insurer/group will need to cover when assessing the adequacy of capital over its business planning period, which touches on many of the areas prominent in the EU's work (time horizon of assessment, valuation basis, definitions of "Solvency")
• Defines that this part of the assessment should identify "...the capital needed within a holding company system to achieve its business objectives"

Is this the type of demi-prescription that the smaller EU insurers are looking for? Is it too much to ask for national regulators (Ireland a notable exception) to take a similar stab at communicating what they want to see?

EIOPA Preparatory Guidance - ORSA (or 'forward looking assessment of risks')

Forward-looking assessment of the undertakings own risks (based on ORSA principles) (plus explanatory text)

The ORSA preparatory guidelines* are not a massive burden for anyone busy rolling eggs down hills at the moment, coming in at 34 pages containing 25 guidelines, as well as 29 pages of explanatory text. In this instance, it is probably disappointing to any underprepared supervisors and insurers in that they may have preferred more!

More pointedly, the materials add little to what was already in existence from EIOPA in July 2012, and certainly will required little in the way of adaption in the UK's instance, who are already in a similar headspace and have been advising accordingly.

Of course the world and her husband have piped up with their opinion on what ORSA should cover and how it should be administered and documented (this post has a decent sweep at capturing most of them), so opinion on this matter is something we are not short on.

For me the headline points are:

• ORSAs (well, 'overall solvency needs assessments', but let's be serious!) expected from 2014
• Internal Models should be used by anyone in pre-application
• Likely that most standard formula firms will have to qualitatively assess deviations between SF and their own Risk Profile at this time
• Expectation of an internal ORSA report and a ORSA supervisory report
• Records of the assessment expected to be documented and kept which must be "appropriate" - no prescription of what that means
• ORSAs to be performed at least annually

The following points are either new, or worthy of reiteration for anyone whose preparations on this front are less than certain - for ease of reference I have used 'ORSA' where EIOPA use 'forward looking assessment of risk', and as with the other preparatory guidance papers I have looked at, I will assume there will be blanket application as written, with no dissent from industry or NCAs:

Guideline 3

• Overall Solvency Needs assessments will be expected from 2014 (i.e compliance with Article 45.1)
• Minimum of 80% of the market must also assess whether they would comply with the Articles 45 (b) and (c) from 2014 - regardless of any Pillar 1 uncertainty.
• Internal Models expected to be used in ORSAs if a company is in model approval pre-application
• IF the standard formula is 'provided' by 2014, expectation that SF firms will assess deviation between the SF assumptions and their own Risk Profile - this excludes anyone outside of the magic 80% catchment figure mentioned above.

Guideline 6 - Documentation generated by ORSAs must include:

• An ORSA Policy
• An ORSA Record
• An Internal ORSA Report
• AN ORSA Supervisory Report

Guideline 7 - The ORSA Policy must include

• Description of component ORSA processes and procedures
• Consideration of the linkages between Risk Profile, Risk Tolerances and Overall Solvency Needs (OSN)

As well as information on

• frequency on stress tests, scenario analyses and reverse stress tests; 
• data quality standards; and 
• the frequency of the assessment, justified in relation to Risk Profile, volatility of OSN relative to capital position, timing (from calendar perspective I guess) and circumstances for ad-hoc assessments

Guideline 8 - ORSA Record

• Firms expected to "appropriately evidence" the assessment - no prescription as to what that means (logs, working papers, meeting minutes, e-mails)

Guideline 9 - Internal ORSA Report

• AMSB must communicate results to "all relevant staff" post-approval, which includes the ORSA results and conclusions

Guideline 10 - ORSA Supervisory Report

• 2 weeks after concluding ORSA, ORSA supervisory report must be submitted, which must include;
• Quantitative and qualitative results, and conclusions drawn
• Methods and main assumptions
• Comparison between Own Funds, SCR and OSN

Guideline 11

• Must quantitatively estimate the impact of different valuation bases (if used) when assessing OSN

Guideline 12

• OSN must be quantified, supplemented by a qualitative description of all material risks
• Expectation that these items are all stress/scenario tested

Guideline 17 - ORSA output to be used at least for;

• Capital Management
• Business Planning
• Product Development

Guideline 18

• ORSA to be performed at least annually

* So let's end with something fundamental, EIOPA - it is NOT useful to replace 'ORSA', as an acronym or indeed in full, with the expression "Forward-looking assessment of risk (based on ORSA principles)" 5 years down the road - I'm sure there is a rationale, just as sure as I am not going to like it (even the GCAE agree with me, going with 'ORSA-like')!