EIOPA's Bernadino with keynote speech - D'ohs and Don'ts...

Solvency II implementation
- Homer called it...

The latest pit stop on the Solvency II Last Legs tour was in the picturesque, almost-an-anagram, Slovenia, where EIOPA's gaffer joined a throng of hearty souls to deliver a keynote speech last week.

Given that the outside world is seemingly becoming more sensititve to the ensuing changes (at least from a capital adequacy perspective), it has been noticeable that EIOPA's speeches have become heavier in practical tone rather than the flabbier ethereal tones of yesteryear. In particular, conduct risks, conflicts of interest and the importance of an effective second pillar to counter the aggression and self interest of distribution arms/firms have all become prominent features of what is being touted as the Solvency II benefits package. Given what it has cost, we'd better deliver it!

Back to the speech, a few basic soundbites are littered throughout, which might benefit your training packs for the home stretch;

• Solvency II is "EIOPA's top priority", 
• It is a "pretty good starting point", rather than perfect, is "...a must and a true game changer", and "brings a new risk culture"
• It is "a tool to foster a true risk culture in the organisation"
• "It is clear that Solvency II will bring more awareness and transparency on the true risk profile of certain business models"
• It will deliver "intelligent and effective regulation which does not stifle innovation"

A couple of open-ended questions emerge from the text itself;

• Does Solvency II only "encourage" firms to define their risk profiles and risk appetites, as opposed to compel it?
• Is the Solvency II take on ORSA really "best practice at international level" - seems fair, but does anyone else want a shot at the title!
• Why is "overall solvency needs" constantly accompanied by bunny ears - if these guys aren't convinced by the term, what hope does the industry have of driving it into the glossary!
• Is it just executives who need to know that ORSA is a "cultural change", as opposed to NEDs, non C-suite senior management and wider stakeholders. Institutional investors would surely benefit a 101 class, given their demonstrable views on what SCR coverage ratios mean for the plausibility of some firm's strategies, and while Sr. Bernadino comments that "...effort needs to be made" to explain SCR volatility on p8, a dawn chorus with Karel van Hulle on how "ridiculous" the outside world's expectations are doesn't even qualify as an hors d'ouevre.
• That risk culture provides "...an appropriate balance with the natural sales driven culture" - EIOPA have alluded to this before, but never quite as explicitly as this. If the Risk function's job is predominantly to counter sales activity, can it ever be seen as value adding?

And a couple of specific themes are given special treatment for everyone's benefit;

Prudent Person Principle and the investment strategy of insurers

• PPP emphasised as not giving insurers a freebie to hit the roulette tables with their asset book, and will be "...closely monitored".
• Current environment encourages aggressive monitoring, with the "search for yield" quote now ubiquitous in supervisory speeches which touch on macro matters.
• "Asset risk calibration in Solvency II should not be used to privilege or incentive any specific asset class" - not convinced on this front, given the remit of your friendly local CIO must contain an element of maximising gains within appetite, and the calibration can surely influence that.

Product availability

• "Solvency II does not intend to unduly penalise specific products" - evidently does though, hence the sprint to the door from Ergo et al in the guaranteed interest rate product space (not unduly though to be fair, given the Teutonic pleas for transitional mercy!)

ORSA and Risk Culture

• The section somewhat labours the point on coverage of all risks, assessment of all mitigation techniques, and the role of the Board in driving the associated cultural changes, but I guess given the geographical location of the speech, some of the nearby countries may benefit from the encore un foi approach - no names naturally...
• "Capital will never cover up for the lack of proper governance"
• "ORSA is based on the companies' DNA - their strategy"
• "The key role in the implementation of ORSA belongs to the top management"
• "It is up to the Boards to set, communicate and enforce a strong risk culture..."

Insurers and Supervisors in general

• Talks of Risk Functions needing the correct skills to assess risks in asset classes - is there an implication here that functions will be light on quantitative skills post-2016?
• Squares the circle of prudential and conduct risks on p7, talking of mitigating conduct risks "since inception" in one's product development, design and marketing processes.
• That Solvency II "...requires an increased degree of supervisory judgement" in order to intervene at the right time, and the new supervisory requirements represent "...an upgrade in the quality of supervision". I'm sure some countries might take that as something of a slight, given the maturity of their existing processes, but probably fair for the majority.

Plenty of fuel for your respective Board and Senior Management briefing fires, so go forth and propogate!

CRO Forum on Risk Culture - comin' from the body heat?

Risk Culture
- need another hero?

A subject which is gathering more steam than Tina Turner's windows, Risk Culture has been given the kid gloves treatment by the CRO Forum in their paper, Sound Risk Culture in the Insurance Industry.

They say at the start that the topic has become "prominent in regulatory circles", which given EIOPA appear to be wining and dining the subject (here and here in the last couple of weeks alone), is something of an understatement. Their increased interest has no doubt been fuelled by the FSB's work on the subject from a year ago. In addition, the Financial Reporting Council took a shine to the topic in its last update of guidelines in late 2014 (point 27 in particular), while cultural failings have turned the FCA into a modern day Robin Hood (speech from inception time here).

As well as fiddling around the edges of definition, the paper expands on a few examples of where cultural change can be driven from, stealing from a few other industries (aviation in particular) and a couple of insurers (Zurich receiving particular attention).

They fundamental base they work from is pretty fair:

• No "good" or "bad" culture, hence they talk about practices that encourage a "sound" risk culture throughout. Given that ropey culture does not necessarily prevent the achievement of strategic goals, this smart.
• No "one-size-fits-all" concept of Risk Culture (i.e. don't look for one in this paper!)

That said, the definition used for the purposes of the paper from the NN Group CRO is actually a pretty good one - "shared philosophy of managing uncertainty" etc - though it does suggest that a failure in risk culture might simply be someone not sharing the philosophy, which I suspect is where a lot of your more pragmatic colleagues sit!

There are a number of sound inclusions throughout;

• Emphasising the links between risk culture and conduct risk currently being force-fed to the industry by EIOPA (p3)
• The chart on p6 showing survey results of essential elements of risk culture - senior management and Boards leading by example is evidently seen as more important than risk-based remuneration, despite the legislative attention the latter receives (including this week in the UK).
• Zurich's internal 10 question survey on culture assessment - contains the gorgeous expression "organisational humility", as well as bringing some of the granular risk culture elements onto the table, such as treatment of whistleblowers.
• Highlighting the "common phenomenon" of management teams containing people with the same personal attitudes - could benefit the creation of a "shared philosophy" without necessarily any of the benefits.
• The illustration of NN Group's "Risk Culture Dashboard" (p11) - I don't have preference for it either way, but it does illustrate how much effort one can direct towards risk cultural identification, assessment and monitoring, which begs the question "is there that much value in it?" They seem to like it as a way of covenying the concept in the business in any case.
• Pages 13-14 provide some good brain candy for those who have ambitions to educate or brief their colleagues on risk cultural matters. Zurich's "we are all risk managers" campaign looks like it probably has legs (more on it here).

There are a couple of mildly objectionable parts within;

• Concepts of "Risk Vision" and "holistic" dropped in early doors and littered throughout, as well as a few extras such as "risk perspective" - the kind of obtuse terminologies which serve to divorce Risk functions from their colleagues
• That firms should have a "clear vision" for their risk culture - why would something as opaque as culture be expected to be "clear". They don't even define it as a term in the paper!
• Concerned that risk culture is "...only practiced by risk specialists" currently - how can this be if risk culture is "...an element that influences and is influence by various forces"?
• Tha an organisation's corporate culture and risk culture "must be linked" - how are they not one and the same thing?
• That Risk Appetite Statements are "effectively part of the business strategy" - as opposed to "actually"?
• Use of the term Risk Profile as if it is unquantifiable, specifically that a firms who learn from their mistakes rather than chastise those who make them "tend to have a better risk profile". Not clever.

Myners briefing on Governance at the Co-op - working class barred from the Board?

Wolf - step away from the door...

A corporate governance story that will echo in the eternity of MBA classes for years to come, the unravelling of the UK's Co-operative Group from the benign grocer-cum-divvy machine into a ying and yang shotgun conglomerate of opposites is proving to be a watershed moment for UK plc, with stakeholders attempting to balance myriad legal, political and ideological considerations in order to both keep the wolf from the door, and preserve the principle of mutuality for its membership.

There are no surprises that the crux of the Group's issues lies in its banking arm, nor that being acquisitive during the financial crisis (here, here and here) has proven to be poor strategy. Keeping the wolf from the door has therefore largely been delivered through the tried and tested combination of begging and borrowing, which the recently departed CEO appears to have delivered with some aplomb.

Governance structures
- choices choices...

However, the Group's hiring of Paul Myners back in December, a man with an extensive collection of t-shirts and hats, to independently review its governance arrangements, seems likely to deliver to the membership a menu of choices as unpalatable as a Sunday skip-dip.

Lord Myners has hurriedly delivered a briefing on his findings to-date, as well as performed some mainstream media duties (here and here), following the Group CEO's resignation last week. This early sighter was seemingly unscheduled, but the manner of the CEO's departure ("a tragedy" in Myners' words) meant that his findings to-date could not wait until May for its full publication date.

Myners has therefore naturally delivered a ruthless and scathing take-down of the governance structure and processes within the Co-operative, while calling out the Board member who are clearly well schooled in how to game the system, as well as the playground tactics/rabbit-in-a-hat tricks that turn "one-man-one-vote" into "one hundred men-all votes"!

Killer quotes

• The group endures a significant "democratic deficit"
• The future of my recommendations lies in the hands of around 100 elected individuals on the current Group and Regional boards, few of whom have any serious business experience and many of whom are drawing material financial benefits from their positions
• There is a phrase frequently used in Co-operative Group circles that the Executive should be "on tap but not on top"
• ...the Group Board has spent far too much time on transactions such as Somerfield and Britannia which have been breathtakingly value-destructive

Observations

• The "exceptional skill and tireless efforts" of the Executive team are cited as the reason for the Group's survival in its current form
• The current governance framework is variously referred to as "flawed", suffering from "acute systemic weaknesses" and having "consistently produced governors without the necessary qualifications and experience to provide effective Board leadership". Ouch...
• That the Groups social goals are not aligned with its strategic and commercial objectives. This is of course less of a worry for its financial services competitors.
• The the Group's "massive scale and complexity" means that a man-off-the-street approach to electing Board members, which may be sufficient for a farmer/grocer co-op, is not suitable.
• Shatters the "myth" that the Group has always been run by lay members, as opposed to those with commercial experience.
• The thought of creating a board of INEDs and lay members is disregarded due to the potential for creating "second-class citizenship"
• Highlights that Co-op's core business of groceries is savagely competitive at the moment (just look at Morrison's and Sainsbury's), so continued ineffective governance could be devastating
• Notes that there have been previously (disregarded) reviews of its governance architecture, which is "long known for its labyrinthine complexity and its disfunctionality"
• Stresses that, due to the current voting structure, acceptance of  his recommendations "...potentially lie[s] in the hands of fewer than 50 elected members". It sounds like they haven't been shy to remind him of that either!

Recommendations

• Halve the size of the Group Board, which will be subject to annual re-election
• Independent Chair, with no previous association with Co-op
• 6-7 INEDs and 2 Executive Directors
• All with qualifications of a similar ilk to its (listed) competitors
• Create a National Membership Council (NMC), with a 12-person executive committee to effectively represent the membership and co-operative principles and values
• The Board to be subject to scrutiny by the NMC, who have the right to be consulted on "key strategic and operational intiatives"
• "Arrangements" to be made to safeguard the confidentiality of information shared between the Board and the NMC (certainly not the case with current arrangements!)

The entire document feels drenched in class warfare and spectrum politics. That rather hideous take from the existing Board on their executive team ("on tap, but not on top") feels like the inspiration of Myners' recommendation for a professionalised, appointed Board, rather than the beer and sandwich brigade which currently exists.

That said, there is thought on the left-wing (here and here) who feel that mutuality and co-operation should remain unsullied by the commercial world, who remain unable to affect much in the way of democratic change in Boardrooms even after the raft of FRC-sponsored guidance released over the last couple of years (though PIRC are trying!). Is one failed attempt to democratise stakeholders best replaced by cherry-picking from a similarly deficient model?

On the basis that I have banged the drum for background diversity in Boardrooms (not just gender or race), and the existing Co-op Board is "diverse" in that respect, I'm left to wonder if I've been barking up the wrong tree. The Board delivered by their existing process is neither fit nor proper, and are able to outmanouevre their executive compatriots armed with little more than a working knowledge of provincial politics and a polyester suit.

Should we therefore use the grey-area of "fit and proper" regulation to ban the contract plasterers, nurses and retired publishers of the world from financial service provider Boardrooms on the basis that they don't have an MBA, and count with their fingers? Or can one make a valid contribution to a financial services Board of directors regardless of the colour of their collar?

Corporate Governance and the Co-op - Never too much?

Another day another maelstrom for the UK's Co-operative Group, with their Chief Executive having his resignation accepted by the Board of Directors, this following on from a truly extraordinary story from late last year, where the Chair of its banking arm was caught in a drugs and prostitutes 'sting', which in itself followed an earlier uncovering of a £1.5bn capital hole in the banking operation!

The Group CEO, Euan Sutherland, said in a statement that without "professional and commercial governance" it would be "impossible" for him to execute the changes he had planned. A 55 page rulebook, for a Group that has six million members, doesn't feel like too much on the face of it for a man with his CV, so I was interested to see what the story behind the story was.

"Professional and commercial governance"
- Say it twice, say it thrice...

The boiling point appears to have been the leaking of details around the CEO's proposed pay packet over the weekend, which materialised publicly in a stroppy posting by him on the Co-op Employee Facebook page, pointing fingers at colleagues trying to "undermine me personally". His only-recently-active Twitter went quiet after a bout of February activity, so perhaps his attentions have been on this matter a little earlier...

The Co-op has been as leaky as a porcupine's waterbed recently, with this snippet regarding outcomes of their "top secret" self-commissioned Board review, supplementing other sensitive leaks over the last year reported here and here, so clearly there are plenty of disgruntled paper-handlers in this unique organisation.

Regardless of the well-connected source though, a quick glance across the numbers leaked to the Guardian would be enough to sponsor a sharp intake of breath for anyone in financial services (a £2m pay-off for a HR head leaving after a year? Will Hutton breaks it out in this post, and the mind boggles!). That said, take a look at these terms of reference for the Co-op Remuneration Committee and tell me where you have seen self-perpetuating pay-puffer terminologies before: every other financial services provider perhaps?

The knives were out from early on with regards to the financial arrangements of Sutherland's new team though, with the spectacularly generous relocation package for one of his lieutenants drawn out by the press soon after his hiring. Perhaps he put some noses out of joint with his remarkable show of sartorial disdain on his first day - "...I came in, walked into this brand-new building, and I was not wearing a tie" - but he did say a few other things in that early-days Telegraph interview which appear to have turned around and bitten his kitten, such as;

• “It’s very valuable to have customers in the boardroom. And for the first time I think the group board felt they were involved in strategy.”
• “There have been some very big issues that we’ve worked through [with the board.] Not bank issues, other issues”

The thread that appears to be emerging for this Group is that its uniquely assembled Board is ill-equipped to deal with such manners in a technically professional and rigorous format, whether that be rolling over for the previous leadership while they made a string of horrendous strategic decisions, or the huffy, juvenile leaking of sensitive data when the new team has come in.

This is not to say that using mutual-style democracy to elect a functional Board of Directors can't work, but perhaps it doesn't work in financial services, where the stakes are higher, the jargon is less penetrable, and failure is catastrophic. I could certainly pick through the list of values and principles and find a number of institutionally-appropriate excuses for leaking confidential paperwork

From a pure decision making perspective though, should the shop-floor proles be allowed to mix with the MBA-laden executive class of the 21st Century corporate world in a way that affords this particular entity the luxury of competing against their more cut-throat rivals, while sticking to those core values and principles while paying off their massive debts?

If Lord Myners pulls a solution out of the bag for a quid (and he doesn't sound like he's shrinking to the task), they'll surely have to promote him to Marquis!

Board Diversity - should gender and ethnicity have a quota?

Having seen a few snippets in quick succession on the matter, I figured it was as good a time as any to revisit Board Diversity, the gift that keeps on giving...headaches to Legal, Compliance and Company Secretarial departments all over Europe!

My initial interest in the matter was piqued by the potential dichotomy between having a Board that was "Fit and Proper" in the context of Solvency II or indeed the myriad Corporate Governance Codes within Europe, and the simultaneous push within the EU for setting quotas for a minimum percentage of female representatives on Boards.

Certainly a couple of years back, it looked like companies may be faced with a choice of meeting any gender quota (but with a Board that was not "Fit and Proper", if only due to lack of Board-level exposure and experience), or simply thumbing their noses at the quotas. The UK's current informal approach recommended by Lord Davies suggests that, while progress is being made on the gender front specifically, there is no danger of radical positive discrimination in order to meet a quota, regardless of who sets it.

I have therefore rather caustically covered the topic on previous posts (here, here and here) due to the hijacking of the word "diversity" as actually meaning "gender diversity" - seulement! There is evidently nowhere near enough working class (or working class origin) representation on plc Boards, not to mention ethnicity, disabilities and people who have served coal-face time in not-for-profit or charitable sectors - do they get a quota too?

All levity aside, there are rumblings from the UK Labour party that perhaps gender isn't the only quota worth talking about, floating the idea of ethnic quotas should they be elected next year. Bearing in mind the shamefully unrepresentative gender and ethnic make-up of the British members of parliament, and the triteness of his leader's behaviour when white-bloke hunting at PMQs the other week, he may wish to turn his attentions closer to home. That said, if the diversity debate has broken out of its gender-soaked malaise, it is cause to celebrate.

Dude? You're barred...

InsuranceERM have (unwittingly?) helped to perpetuate the idea of "diversity" being a debate that is overwhelmingly about gender in a recent round-table centred on how the Insurance industry "...can become more reflective of society" - which had no dudes in attendance!

While I certainly wouldn't argue that Insurance was, is, and will continue to be the "domain of the white male" for the foreseeable future, can that be remedied by excluding said males from a conversation on inclusivity of all things?

While the conventional pros and cons were discussed about Golden Skirt-style quotas, mandatory shortlisting of women for senior positions and mentoring, the child-rearing-sized elephant in the room was also tabled. The prevailing opinion seemed to be that it is encumbent on both employers and women to do a bit more during that phase of life to maintain career progression.

Had my two cents been sought (heaven forbid!), I would have added the "H" bomb into the mix. As a husband who works in another country from my family home, I personally offer an additional constraint to my wife's career every single working day, and one thing which won't change between generations is that one partner generally has to "take one for the team". Do the significant others of UK plc realistically provide more of a constraint on career development than any of the factors discussed by the InsuranceERM panel?

I would also have referenced Britain's blue-rinsed demographic timebomb, caring for infirm relatives, in this context, a job that most men manage to avoid, even when it's their parents! I have no first hand experience on the matter, so am reluctant to do more than float the idea, particularly when high-achieving female talent may have the means to outsource such activity.

Progress on the diversity issue therefore remains clunky, piecemeal and gender-obsessed. With every Lloyds (voluntarily?) taking the initiative, there is a Glencore or LSE who manages to clear the decks!

I certainly hope to see some progress on the gender percentage front soon, if only to hit a target so that we may switch the debate back to genuine diversity. With the topic gaining traction across the pond, maybe we won't have to wait too long.

"Comply or Explain" responses to EIOPA's preparatory guidance - UK oddities?

Isle of Man - "Call that a flood"

Happy New Year (or Blein Vie Noa as we say on the relatively unflooded Isle of Man). I hope you all took the opportunity to fall ill and get fat like I did, so we can recommence battle in 2014 with overflowing sinuses and bursting belt buckles...

I managed to take a look at some of the responses that EIOPA have received regarding whether or not the 32 National Competent Authorities (NCA) currently invested in the Solvency II game are planning to follow EIOPA's Preparatory Guidance over the next 2 years. Please serve yourselves from this central location.

It became evident over December that there was likely to be some non-compliance (both the French and British put their heads above the parapet), though as this was a "comply or explain" exercise, this was not necessarily grave - we are after all in the business of 'preparing' at this juncture - but I was curious to see precisely how different countries "explained" themselves.

In response to each guideline within the 4 EIOPA documents, the options for each NCA were to respond;

1. Yes - we already comply
2. Yes - we intend to comply
3. No - we do not and will not comply
4. Not applicable (though I'm not certain why this is an option)

They were also given space to provide text/links to prove how they are compliant with each guideline, and som space to provide explanations (questionnaire template here).

I was therefore surprised to see the British approach (which was generally "yes") also involved;

• Not providing an explanation when they have said "No" to a guideline (which admittedly is only in one case!)
• Unnecessarily using a copy/paste piece of text as an explanation for a number of guidelines where they have said they "Intend to comply"
• Unexpectedly answering "Not Applicable" to no fewer than 10 articles within the System of Governance guidance, some of which definitely featured in the feedback on the PRA's recent Supervisory Statement as bones of contention (the actuarial function's responsibilities for example).

Obviously no surprises that the French will not be attempting to comply anything in the System of Governance world after their earlier warning, though their rationale is expanded upon in this Risk.net article. That the strict definition of "AMSB" is an issue for the French industry is surely old news at this juncture, and it is ludicrous that such a matter has yet to be dealt with by the Commission's draftsmen. It certainly hasn't posed an issue for Germany (who intend to comply with all of Sys Gov), who operate dual boards.

While more may emerge over the next few weeks on what has been submitted here across the countries, I am more immediately interested in why the UK have elected to respond "not applicable" to so many System of Governance guidelines. It seems to fly in the face of their Supervisory Statement, and I can't imagine EIOPA are satisfied with that response. 

ICAEW on "overarching principles of corporate governance" - how much is too much?

I hadn't got around to this thought-leadership document from the ICAEW on corporate governance, despite their kind tweet asking for my thoughts, due to the welter of Solvency II activity that started from September.

The premise behind their document seems to be that corporate governance codes are perhaps a touch unwieldy these days, and might benefit from some Google-style "Do No Evil" overarching principles which even the sneakiest, mealiest-mouthed Board member would struggle to justify their (mis)conduct in the context of.

In general, the word 'overarching' makes me want to pull my thinning tufts out. I'm not much of a compliance-ferret, but the thought of Board conduct being so misguided by the corporate governance codes in place in developed countries that we need to refine it another notch is one I couldn't entertain. Certainly, given the importance of holding these people to account, and the level of education and experience a great many of them will have attained, I am inclined to think that 'more is more' rather than 'less'.

The ICAEW paper comes up with 5 overaching principles of corporate governance, centred around;

1. Leadership
2. Capability
3. Accountability
4. Sustainability 
5. Integrity

The following parts jumped out at me;

• That overarching principles should be "aspirational and credible" - feels counter-intuitive.
• That overarching principles should "think beyond the letter of laws and regulations" - why should they? Laws and regulations, regardless of how badly drafted, capture the kind of corporate recklessness that we would all gladly see consigned to history. Punishment seems to be a bigger issue (i.e. why aren't white collar criminals thrown to the dogs, or captains of industry who are hoist by their own petard immediately banned for life?)
• The thought of companies explaining links (or gaps) between overarching principles and their actual actions is almost too grubby to contemplate, giving leaders an undeserved shade of grey to support bad governance ("...well, in principle...")
• That overarching principles should be "...easy for boards and stakeholders to understand". Why should a Board job be easy? Why do people of such talent, education, breeding (?), etc. need to have the words "Don't be an idiot" written for them in crayon? Briefing onesself on the requirements of a national corporate governance code is only beyond a Board member who cannot be ar bothered.
• That the current UK code, at 18 principles and 28 supporting principles is "...too detailed for most people to remember". That would include me! However, it's only a click away, and is certainly not justification for further refinement.

I definitely sympathise with anyone who has to keep on top of corporate governance code development, particularly in the EU, where pan-European angles bubble up with regularity (here and here for example). That said, just do your job and comply with them!

Given that certain organisational bodies cannot be held to similar standards, yet may be equally significant in the case of UK/Planet Earth plc (Government departments, Private Equity firms, Mutuals/Friendly Societies), I would certainly find it hard to transplant such a layer onto existing requirements for listed entities. If anything, these overrarching principles could be targeted towards the general public in order to help laymen and women understand what areas our current codes are focused on, and why.

I certainly don't see the overarching principles as aiding leaders of business in any other respect that providing another layer of excuse confetti when they need to explain away the next slew of avaricious corporate conduct. I wonder who it's going to be next?

Accenture Insurance Sector research - Global Risk Management survey

Flood Risk?

A nice generic risk management benchmarking piece from the guys and girls at Accenture came out this week, and after I spent last week at the Leicester rugby game, I was happy to see another 15 "tigers", albeit this time scattered throughout the survey paper itself, presumably as a subtle metaphor for "death by tiger" risk...

It is made up of 98 C-suite respondents (nicely spread across disciplines), is Insurance sector-specific, and Global in coverage (one-third Europe, half N.America), so should be useful to any reader for trend-spotting and Board briefing.

From the document itself, I've pulled out the following;

Risk Governance

• 98% have their "risk management owner" reporting to the CEO
• 96% have a senior executive (regardless of title) as "risk management owner"
• 80% have their "risk management owner" report regularly to the Board
• 55% had a titled CRO
• A number of those stats (whilst improved since their last survey) are a poor reflection on the Global insurance industry, but perhaps reflect where corporate culture is outside of the EU/US axis
• Of the governance bodies, I was surprised to see only 60% of Life companies have an operational risk committee

Solvency II/Non EU equivalent legislation-specific

• Over 80% of Life and P&C respondents seem happy that they are preparing well for their regulatory initiatives (Solvency II or local equivalent).
• Other than Internal Model development, the main outstanding issues for Life insurers to be prepared for Solvency II/equivalent is IT architecture and Data Management/Integration. For P&C, documenting risk processes and developing a meaningful Use Test are also worrying at least half of respondents.
• Issues such as training and education, risk culture and risk governance documentation are relatively low on the priority list.
• Conversely, when asked on a 1-5 scale about specific areas of risk governance, respondents were more positive about their Data preparations than their risk governance - go figure!
• Use Test preparation remains a laggard throughout.

Generic

• Top external pressure was Legal risk, and by a good distance. Regulatory risks relatively low on the list, perhaps reflecting Europe's low weighting in the quantum surveyed.
• Risk Management seemingly well integrated with strategic deployment, but not with product development or reward.
• Poor statistics around embedding risk management into core functions.
• Two thirds of Life respondents noting that a lack of "early warning capabilities" impedes emerging risk management.
• Over half of Life companies said investment benefits ("above and beyond" continued compliance with regulations) would come from better reporting and better integration of Risk and Finance.

There is some of the softer stuff on aspirational elements of risk management thinking at the back, but if you just want to check against your peers, you can save that for a rainy day.

Financial Stability Board - Principles for an Effective Risk Appetite

Christmas has come early everyone - the Financial Stability Board have released their Principles for an Effective Risk Appetite Framework today, and I'm greedily ripping in to it before JC's birthday like a spoilt, yet handsome child...

FSB's RAF Principles published- 

send the car back lads...

There has been a reasonable amount of traffic on Risk Appetite this year (here, here and here for a start), after the FSB but announced their consultation earlier in the year, I've been on tenterhooks. This was following of the back of a thematic review on Risk Governance as a whole by the FSB, which they published back in February.

So where do they take this deep dive into Risk Appetite? Other than awkwardly shoehorning in the soup de jour of "SIFIs", they stick to the hard areas which will get every risk practitioners' attention (namely, Risk Appetite Framework, Risk Appetite Statements, Risk Limits and Roles and Responsibilities), though "for clarity and simplicity", they jettison the use of Risk Tolerance. Definitions are supplied on p2-3, which you may find useful as anchor references.

They somehow make room for anodyne flannel in this very short document, for example;

Risk Appetite Frameworks

• Should "facilitate embedding risk appetite into the financial institution’s risk culture" 
• Development and establishment is an "...iterative and evolutionary process that requires ongoing dialogue throughout the financial institution to attain buy-in across the organisation" (groan)

Risk Appetite Statements

• "Risk appetite may not necessarily be expressed in a single document; however, the way it is expressed and the manner in which multiple documents form a “coherent whole” need to be carefully reviewed to ensure that the board obtains a holistic, but compact and easy to absorb, view of the financial institution’s risk appetite"

Risk Limits

• "Having risk limits that are measurable can prevent a financial institution from unknowingly exceeding its risk capacity as market conditions change and be an effective defence against excessive risk-taking" - tell that to Lehmans!

However, the salient points for me were as follows;

Risk Appetite Frameworks

• RAF "...sets the financial institution’s risk profile" - not convinced on that one, but may be semantic issue
• "explicitly defines the boundaries within which management is expected to operate when pursuing the institution’s business strategy"
• Should "be adaptable to changing business and market conditions" to allow for limit increases where appropriate

Risk Appetite Statements

• "[should] address the institution’s material risks under both normal and stressed market and macroeconomic conditions"
• "...should establish quantitative measures of loss or negative outcomes that can be aggregated and disaggregated"
• "...include key background information and assumptions"
• "...include quantitative measures that can be translated into risk limits"
• "...be forward looking and, where applicable, subject to scenario and stress testing"

Risk Limits

• "[should] be set at a level to constrain risk-taking within risk appetite"
• "...should not be strictly based on comparison to peers or default to regulatory limits"
• "[should] not be overly complicated, ambiguous, or subjective"

Roles and Responsibilities

The Board

• ...must establish the institution-wide RAF and approve the risk appetite statement, which is developed in collaboration with the chief executive officer (CEO), chief risk officer (CRO) and chief financial officer (CFO)
• FSB specifically comment that Boards who "receive" or "note" Risk Appetite Statements have a lower understanding of risk appetite (so don't sponsor it!)
• " [should] regularly review and monitor the actual risk profile and risk limits against the agreed levels (e.g. by business line, legal entity, product, risk category), "including qualitative measures of conduct risk"
• " [should] ensure risk management is supported by adequate and robust IT and MIS to 
• enable identification, measurement, assessment and reporting of risk in a timely 
• and accurate manner."

CEO should

• "...be accountable, together with the CRO, CFO, and business lines for the integrity of the RAF"
• "...ensure that the institution-wide risk appetite statement is implemented by senior management"
• "...provide leadership in communicating risk appetite to internal and external stakeholders" 
• "...establish a policy for notifying the board and the supervisor of serious breaches of risk limits and unexpected material risk exposures"

While there are specific sections for the obligations of CRO, CFO, Internal Audit and Business Unit Management, they don't necessarily expand much further than what I consider to be normal functional expectations, so I haven't elaborated on them.

One should certainly therefore expect a much more aggressive approach from supervisors in future off the back of this - combing through strategy and board papers for evidence of Risk Appetite in application, and making sure that Risk Appetite Statements are not just 'rubber stamped', for example.

I certainly don't see much in this for stakeholders. Nothing particularly new is brought to the table here, and if this is the results of peer review and shared experiences, then clearly there is concurrence on how an RAF should be constructed, what a RAS looks like, and who should do what in regard to continuous monitoring.

The skill will be for risk practitioners to convince their CEOs/NEDs that, this is no longer a sidecar activity in the ERM best practice space, but a nascent global minimum standard which will invariably surface in national regulations in the forthcoming moths and years.

ORSA/Forward Looking Assessment of Risk - EIOPA's FINAL preparatory guidance for national supervisors

EIOPA reuse the preamble from the System of Governance guidance in their ORSA/FLAOR guidance, save for confirming that an assessment of overall solvency needs will be expected in 2014 and 2015 (more on that later). I will use ORSA rather than EIOPA's shiny new acronym for my own convenience throughout this post!

It ultimately reads in parts as a circuitous and convoluted piece due to the way that EIOPA have had to splice the ORSA requirements into three component parts, as per Article 45.1 of the Directive, to accommodate the postponement of some elements until 2015. An horrific example of this is point 3.112, which to paraphrase Chris Morris, reads like the ramblings of a drugged horse.

That said, they have clearly had to contend with a mountain of feedback since the initial consultation paper was released, and have done a better job of explaining why most comments were, in EIOPA's view at least, misguided.

Again from the practitioner's perspective I would highlight in general that;

1. There is almost no discernible movement in EIOPA's position, even after lobbying;
2. That explanations for the inclusion of contentious content are generally forthcoming, though for this subject are more forthright and pragmatic (perhaps naturally due to the lack of L1 and L2 substance);
3. That 2014 ORSA is a genuine piece of work which will require the attention of the most senior staff in insurance firms - it would be a brave company that play-acts at any elements of the documentation, processes and outputs of the assessment.

Supporting arguments for EIOPA's final views are listed below, along with any relevant commentary from my practitioner's angle; 

Clarification re Omnibus II
3.49 - If go-live in 2016 does not happen due to further Omnibus II delays, "...undertakings will still be expected to perform the [overall solvency needs] assessment from 2014 onwards"

Clarification re continuous compliance with SCR and Technical Provisions calculations requirements, and the deviation from SF SCR assumptions assessment
3.50 - Confirm that these elements are postponed until 2015, and that technical specifications will be forthcoming from EIOPA by year-end to aid in the conduct of some of this activity.

Parallel running Sol I/Sol II concerns
3.53 - basically, not EIOPA's problem!

Compulsion for model applicants to also use SF in the assessment
3.54 - clarify that this in NOT about benchmarking models, rather "taking into account contingencies" should a firm's model not get through IMAP. A thoroughly negative and unsympathetic approach from EIOPA on this one I'm afraid

Timing
3.58 - "EIOPA considers it necessary that all undertakings perform the assessment of overall solvency needs at least two times during the preparatory phase, once in 2014 and once in 2015...[and] at any time during 2014"
3.60 - Stress that "...it is for the undertaking to decide on the appropriate reference date for its FLAOR", though couched in an expectation that financial year-end is most likely.

Guideline 5 - Delegation of activity by the AMSB
3.73 - "not acceptable" to delegate full responsibility for ORSA to sub-committees of the AMSB

Guideline 7 - ORSA Policy
3.62 - "...it is necessary to develop a full policy during the preparatory phase"
3.63 - "...[The ORSA Policy] may be part of the policy on Risk Management", though must be clearly identifiable

Guideline 8 - Record of the ORSA
3.64 - Rather bizarrely suggest that the ORSA Record is "...no less, but maybe even more important during preparation that after the start of Solvency II", but either way the message is clear - maintain the records carefully

Guideline 9 - Sharing information internally
3.77 - "It is for the AMSB to decide which parts of the information will be distributed to whom" - clearly some panic amongst respondents that they may have to start telling the 'proles' about their future employemnt prospects!

Guideline 10 - Supervisory Report
3.66 - EIOPA "...does however not expect that the first report will necessarily already be perfect"
3.69 - AMSB sign-off, accepting the results of the ORSA is the trigger for the 2 week window in which to submit the Supervisory Report
3.70 and 3.71 - Some rather confused paragraphs which seem to indicate that, if there is enough resistance to the results internally, that extra time may be afforded to the firm

Guideline 11 - Valuation bases
3.79 - EIOPA scrutiny postponed until 2015, but justifications on bases used expected

Guideline 12 - Overall Solvency Needs assessment
3.83 - EIOPA expect "...it will take several years" before this assessment is good enough, hence they expect the preparatory phase to include practice!

Guideline 14/15 - Continuous compliance with SCR requirements and Technical Provisions calculation rules
3.85 - Postponed until 2015, and again justify activity prior to Solvency II going live by using a practice makes perfect mantra, noting that attempting to do this will "...intensify the learning experience"! I wonder if anyone ever used that phrase in their budgeting requests...

Guideline 16 - Deviation of one's Risk Profile from SF SCR assumptions 
3.89 - Postponed until 2015, and also note that quantifying one's deviation from the SF assumptions will not be necessary "...if there is no indication that the deviation is significant". I guess modellers will have to wind their necks in around Credit Risk assumptions in particular on this matter, bearing in mind the diversity of methods currently on display.

Ultimately, little opportunity for shortcuts then, but perhaps enough time to review what's already in place before resource planning your 2014 activities.

Deloitte on 'regulatory uncertainty in Europe' - embedding a new modus operandi (?)

In a wonderful example of predicting the present, Deloitte have released a white paper (sign-up required) giving their take on regulatory uncertainty in the European insurance industry, and how the volume of new regulations (and their inability to land on time) is driving emerging best practices in the consideration of regulatory risk at Board level.

New Modus Operandi - alloy wheels optional?

Of course, it is always best to wait for such matters to emerge before proselytising, and the current cup of omni-postponed over-elaborate regulations is running over (Sol II, IFRS 4 Phase II, FATCA, etc), naturally causing difficulties for all those responsible for preparing for them, as well as the execs who take the topics into the boardroom every quarter, only to say "it's been delayed again, can I have more money"...

From my perspective, it was particularly interesting to see that proactivity is recommended regardless of nature/scale/complexity, bearing in mind the first time I spoke to a Board of Directors at a tiny insurer regarding Solvency II preparations was in 2009 - only consultants could comfortably suggest that an new executive-level role is established, and Board agenda time is regularly set aside, only to explain the latest delays in multi-jurisdictional regulations (I certainly know what my old CEO would have said to that!)

That aside, they suggest that two major problems need to be overcome; that few insurers have a single view of regulatory risk; and that regulatory insight is poorly represented in the strategic workings of insurers, both of which are easy to agree with purely on circumstantial evidence.

Whilst this frequently reads like a paper written to justify bringing consultants in to compensate for failing in risk and compliance professionals' armoury, Deloitte make the following noteworthy assertions/recommendations in it;

Trends

• That most insurers prefer to 'wait and see' rather than be 'first mover' when it comes to regulatory preparations - after the Solvency II experience, does that surprise anyone?
• That "...Deloitte's view is that regulation can be regarded as a 'structural' driver of the insurance industry"
• That "...Deloitte's considers a regulatory dividend can and should be sought", which is not necessarily my experience of consultancies when on site, who (presumably for legal reasons) prefer to promote a gold-plated complaince approach to regulation-driven projects.
• Cost of compliance is now materially diluting return on equity in EU insurers
• That Conduct Risk is likely to become high profile across Europe over a longer period of time than its current flavour of the month feel, thanks to IMD2/PRIPS/MIFID
• National regulators are increasingly impeding on day-to-day running - examples given (all of which have a whiff of IMAP requirements about them), include documentation improvements and influencing risk appetite/capital allocation work.

Costs and volume

• Regulation prep cost the European insurance industry €4.2-€4.7bn in 2012 - they go on to expand that to €8.1-€9.2bn over the last 3 years.
• UK industry will be subject to 29 new pieces of legislation of the next 5 years (surprisingly lower than the French at 35, and the Germans at 32!)
• That the "cost of doing nothing" while waiting for regulatory clarity may be significant - as significant as consultancy spend preparing for something which never arrives perhaps?
• That compliance functions are naturally struggling to cope with the current volume of initiatives

Solvency II-specific

• They extrapolate an estimated €550m cost of Solvency II compliance preparations in 2012 into a €1.5bn-€1.8bn 'top 40 insurers' number, and a €2.4-€2.9bn figure for the whole industry - feels a bit light, bearing in mind 'UK plc' must have done the best part of £1bn on Solvency II alone in 2012.
• They quote one strategy director as saying that "Solvency II is killing European M&A..." - p10

Their recommendations (from p19) are too woolly in aggregate to help a normal practitioner - they are probably targeted more towards programme directors and managers - but the recommendation  to establish a Regulatory Assessment and Response Executive with a suitable remit is a smart idea, even if from a practical perspective this might need to either be balled in with the responsibilities of an existing executive, or only be a mid/senior management role, in smaller companies. 

These recommendations also include the marvellous suggestion to "embed a new modus operandi" - an expression normally reserved for profilers of serial killers, and perhaps the hardest sell since Isle of Man beach holidays.

PS I apparently missed the memo where the oft-ridiculed speech of Donald Rumsfeld used to support war against Iraq became de rigeur in risk management/insurance white papers. If there is one "known known" in this world, it is that I will never use that expression on the job!

Central Bank of Ireland - Corporate Governance Code refresh

The Irish approach to corporate governance in financial services, at least up until the onset of the financial crisis in 2006/07, resembled something of an all-you-can-grasp buffet for a select number of executive golf club pals and octogenarian ex-politico Non-Executive Directors (NEDs), having their voting arms operated a la Weekend at Bernies.

Ireland pre-2007 - Waking NED?

The new FSA-flavoured approach brought in by Matthew Elderfield in 2009 (elaborated on here) fortified by the findings of a devastating 2011 report summarising the truly horrid governance practices in the Irish banking industry, has led to a change of regulatory tack at the Central Bank of Ireland that represents the biggest volte-face in Europe since the Macarena.

Alongside PRISM, a piece of revolutionary work in the assessment of financial institutions by supervisory bodies, the CBoI also made substantial changes in areas such as Annual Compliance Statements, Fitness and Probity of directors, Risk Appetite Statements.

All of this ran off the back of Mr Elderfield's first major gig in 2010, a full revamp of the Corporate Governance Code, which could hitch a ride off the back of the work of the FSA and CEIOPS (at the time!) and deliver a more substantial suite of obligations to a cabal of directors who, after feasting on carrots for years, desperately needed the stick.

This makes the release of yesterday's consultation on the Corporate Governance code a touch baffling, as the ink is barely dry on 2010's effort - it perhaps reflects that the regulator has reached optimum staffing levels if they can review it so regularly! Having said that, the level of divergence from accepted CG practices in the UK was flagged by Grant Thornton back in 2011 as being substantial, so a point-in-time revamp should not be so unwelcome, regardless of the proximity to the last one, and of course, all of this activity was too late to prevent Quinn Insurance from going down.

They emphasise that this review takes into account developments in the Solvency II space, as well as on-the-ground experience and publications from other parties of interest. Of particular note was their emphasis that, where national regulations are not as stringent as relevant EU or international one (or indeed vice versa?), the most onerous one should be complied with. In a number of instances around corporate governance, this will mean the CBoI outranking Solvency II as the more onerous of the two!

While these are proposals rather than stitched-on changes at this point, the CBoI doesn't have a great track record for backtracking these days. Highlights for me were;

Risk Committees

• Require a majority of NEDs on Risk Committees, and must be chaired by a NED

Committees in general

• Require the Risk Committee and Audit Committee chairs to sit on each other's committees
• Require the Remuneration Committee chair to sit on the Risk Committee
• In High Impact firms, the Risk Committee and Audit Committee Chair may not be the same person
• Must be at least 3 members of Risk Committees and Audit Committees

Chief Risk Officers

• They note that it is "Generally accepted best practice" to have a CRO who, amongst other tasks, is charged with "...facilitating risk appetite setting by the Board". In addition;
• All "High Impact" firms will be required to appoint a specialist CRO
• Firms with a lower PRISM rating may have a CRO who is shared with another control function, "...provided that there is no conflict of interest between the two roles". Can't help but feel that this might rule out CRO/Chief Actuary dual roles, but allows for CRO/Head of Compliance and CRO/Head of Internal Audit, which would be to the chagrin of the Society of Actuaries in Ireland!
• CRO to have direct access to the Chairman of the Board

Board Meeting frequency

• Seem to acknowledge that the compulsory 11 meetings per year for High Impact firms may be a touch much, so are looking for comments
• Also acknowledge that compulsory 1 meeting per calendar quarter is a bit constrictive for the smaller firms, so may relieve this to be pragmatic

Chairman and CEO

• Some of the restrictions around number of roles held at any one time to be relieved for smaller firms, but seemingly only to populate inter-Group roles.

Board Diversity

• Acknowledges that, while the debate in the EU is gender-centric, that diversity of all types is a worthy target for Boards, but falls short of compelling firms to do anything at national level, choosing to seek comments and wait for the supra-national activity to drive any compulsion. This seems to fit with the thinking of Irish directors published back in 2011 i.e. no "Golden Skirt" quotas.

Random

• "...appropriate Risk Culture" makes its way in (6.3), perhaps cognisant of the FSB's proposals
• Built in a piece which allows for video-conferencing rather than physical attendance at meetings (7.5)
• Board responsibilities updated (13.1)
• Compulsory Board skills matrix (14.9)

Risk Appetite white paper from Oliver Wyman - hold the onions...

A white paper on Risk Appetite from Oliver Wyman caught my eye recently whilst fishing for supporting materials for my own take on the matter. I have covered on this blog a range of opinion

Risk Appetite - need to 'ketchup' with
latest benchmarks?

pieces on Risk Appetite from the professional institutes to the consultancies to the regulators perspectives, and so far they never seem to be on the same page at the same time.

From the Solvency II perspective, we know that (as it stands) Risk Appetite only exists in written word in Level 3 System of Governance and ORSA guidance, namely;

• That the AMSB is "ultimately responsible" for setting it (Sys Gov G15)
• That EIOPA did not wish to distinguish between "risk appetite" and "risk tolerance", rather let national regulators and the industry scrap out any divergence in term usage themselves (Sys Gov p30-38!)
• On that basis, "Risk Appetite" doesn't even feature in the L3 ORSA Guidance, though "risk tolerance limits" do (ORSA G7 and G11), perhaps indicating what terminology EIOPA prefer.

From the national regulatory perspective, the PRA have ingrained its importance as the "foundation of [an insurer's] risk management framework" in its new approach paper (section 110), whilst the Central Bank of Ireland have not only built Risk Appetite into the supervisory structure, but even had time remonstrate with the industry for its lack of progress around Risk Appetite statements!

The ratings agencies expectations on Risk Appetite also come into play, with S&P expecting its "clear communication" and "linking to risk limits" as part of its ERM assessment programme (p5, and more extensively, p9). They do however have the courage to define their terms with respect to appetite, tolerance and preference in the appendix. 

Appreciating therefore the Oliver Wyman paper is catering outside of the financial services sector, it still contains a host of rather inane platitudes such as;

Risk Appetite Framework

"...bringing discipline to major strategy decisions" - as opposed to the Chief Exec and Chair? 

"...essential for firms considering an ambitious growth strategy" - as opposed to all firms?

"...developing a robust risk appetite framework does not take an inordinate amount of time and effort" - might want to tell that to the rest of the invoice-generating consultancy world!

Risk Appetite Statement

"...more than just a set of benchmarks" - at what point has a RAS ever been that?

"...setting the 'tone at the top' about the relationship between risk and return" - "tone" as opposed to "rules"? 

It also contains a number of apocryphal tales and irritants, such as

• Senior management "often" fail to take risk appetite into account - probably true even in the financial services world pre-2007 (indeed it was a major feature of the Lehman's autopsy!), but one would think less so now.
• "Few" companies able to unlock benefits of a risk appetite framework - that feels a bit light, though I don't doubt some firms may struggle depending on their corporate structure and industry.
• Frequently interchanging between "Framework" and "Statement" throughout, in the same way as many ORSA-related materials do so for "Process" and "Report".

It ultimately recommends that a Risk Appetite Framework should contain the following characteristics;

1. Qualitative and Quantitative Risk Appetite Statement
2. Ensure the statement content is "useful" for all internal stakeholders (Board, Senior Management, Financial analysis teams and business unit leaders"
3. Connect the statement to the planning, review and decision making processes and forums

There are also a number of positive elements within the document, which I would certainly advocate, such as;

• Size Limit - they recommend no more than 4 pages for a Risk Appetite Statement, and one could probably get away with less
• Concepts of Ability (what one can technically afford) and Willingness (to tolerate uncertainty)...
• ...applied as appropriate to a set of qualitative and quantitative themes which are pretty much ready off the shelf (p3)
• Ensuring the metrics used for monitoring are company-specific - very easy to replicate what one has seen in previous firms, but these will inevitably not make the cut in decision making processes, thus defeating the point.

I'll be doing more on this topic in the near future, but for now this material may at least be of use to you for benchmarking purposes.

The aim of Solvency II is...

As Solvency II implementation stubbornly drags its heels like a legislative bull in the Plaza del Toros of European bureaucracy, I noticed a few mutterings about the 'aim', 'purpose' and 'objective' of the Directive and its companion texts as the main protagonists play for time.

Aim of Solvency II - could be better

This is particularly frustrating as a practitioner, where consistency and brevity of message is vital when one generally has limited time with AMSB members (most notably Non-Executives), and therefore may find the messages being offered to the press differ from those previously communicated to clients.

In addition, EIOPA's status as "super-regulator" (Omnibus II pending!) now allows for further demarcation of message between those who currently determine the adequacy of senior management/director fitness, propriety and Solvency II knowledge, and those who will be co-ordinating the revised approach from 2014.

Finally from the bottom up, the stealthy creep of Solvency II into the general public/intermediaries worlds surely makes it imperative that the overriding purpose of the Directive (as well as the expense and delays!) can be explained in unequivocal lay terms - though maybe not as haplessly as the PRA's top man the other week when he tried to price Solvency II in terms of unfinished tunnel projects...


Regulators and industry tend to be focusing on policyholder protection when justifying the Solvency II approach to supervision, though in a rather long-winded manner in the CBoI's case!

Regulators

Bernadino to Croatian press, March 2013

Purpose of Solvency II is "...a harmonized prudential framework in the EU"

Bernadino to German press, April 2013

"The purpose [of Solvency II] was to increase policyholder protection and incentivise better risk management"

The Prudential Regulatory Authority

"[Solvency II's] main objective is the adequate protection of policyholders and beneficiaries"

Central Bank of Ireland

"Solvency II is a risk based approach that aims to provide the basis for a more ‘root and branch’ review of the overall financial position of an insurance undertaking. It represents a new system of supervision that assesses the overall financial position of an insurance undertaking or group. The new supervisory system is concerned with, amongst other areas, highlighting the importance of holistic risk management and prudential standards. Solvency II also aims to reduce the possibility of both insurance undertaking failure and, in a wider sense, of disruption to the efficient operation of the insurance market"

Industry

Lloyds (whose CEO has been a touch vocal on the threat of Solvency II early implementation recently) have the objectives bullet-pointed on their site as;

• Improved consumer protection
• Modernised supervision
• Deepened EU market integration
• Increased international competitiveness of EU insurers 

Others tend to get "protection" somewhere in the mix;

"[Solvency II] should bring consistency to the way in which EU insurers manage capital and risk with the aim of enhancing protection for consumers" - Standard Life AR&A 2012 p6

"[Solvency II's] objectives are to establish a solvency system that is better aligned to the true risks of insurers, and aims to enable supervisors to protect policyholder interests as effectively as possible" - Aviva AR&A 2012 p129

"The purpose of Solvency II is to unify a single EU insurance market and to enhance policyholder protection" - IPB 360 AR&A 2012 p69

"The aim of Solvency II is to introduce EU-wide regulations that match capital requirements as closely as possible to the risks incurred." - Munich Re

Expert lobbyists

"The overriding aim of Solvency II is to bring a common, risk-based approach to capital setting, supervision and disclosure to the whole of Europe" - ABI's Tim Breedon, 2010 (original speech text unavailable from ABI site)

"The primary purpose of Solvency II is consumer protection" - FERMA executive board member 

Naturally, the consultant/vested interest world generally prefers to keep it fluffier to justify the invoices (Thomson Reuters a notable exception);

Consultancies

"Solvency II represents an opportunity to not only improve insurers' operations, but also develop significant competitive advantage in a challenging market" - KPMG's Phil Smart

"[Solvency II] is expected to provide a catalyst to transform the way insurance companies run their business" - E&Y

"[The Solvency II] project aims to create a more harmonised, risk-oriented solvency regime resulting in capital requirements that are more reflective of the risks facing insurers" - Towers Watson

Vendors/vested interests

"The aim of Solvency II is to gather all risk together in a holistic way" - FINCAD

 "[Solvency II] will ensure that insurers are protected against financial collapse, which is rife in today's unstable financial environment" - Xactium, clearly not big readers of the SIFI materials currently doing the rounds!

"The primary aim of Solvency II is the creation of an effective single market in insurance services across all 27 countries, creating the conditions for an adequate level of consumer protection." - Thomson Reuters

"[Solvency II's] aim is to ensure the financial soundness of insurance companies to not only protect policyholders’ interest, but also increase competition in the EU insurance market" - SAS 

Saddening really to see how a decade of malaise and false starts can even start to erode the fundamentals...