Munich Re on Strategic Risk - ORSA food for thought

A thought-provoker from Munich Re for anyone in the business of Emerging Risk/'Top Down' risk review activity with this release called "Strategic Risk to Risk Strategy", which leans on the findings of the World Economic Forum's 2012 Risk Report to observe how the risks highlighted may compromise existing insurer strategies, as well as materialise into the thoughts of underwriters once sufficient data exists.

With coverage of "strategic risk" featuring in everyone's ORSA thoughts, as well as obligations around scenario analysis and reverse stress testing, there are some benchmarks in here that are worthy of consideration for practitioners. In particular;

Strategic Risk definition
Risk of making wrong business decisions, implementing decisions poorly, or being unable to adapt to changes in the operating environment


Subcategories of Strategic Risk

• Ineffective M&A
• Incorrect interpretation of external activity in a given market
• Decision making based on poor pricing/profitability assumptions
• Legal misinterpretation

Specific points

• In their opinion an insurer's risk strategy "goes beyond covering the risk capital requirement for a portfolio for the forthcoming financial year on the basis of valid models" to actually questioning and enhancing a company's business. I think most practitioners would agree that any documented risk strategy would look further forward than one-year! 
• That shortcomings around the evaluation of Strategic Risk "...are not so much of a question of the [informational] resources available", which are plentiful, nor are they especially time-pressured.
• They also include a definition of Reverse Stress Testing as scenarios which "endanger a company's business model as a whole" - interesting purely in the absence of an EU-driven definition to-date, as it tallies along with UK equivalent definitions.

An edited list of Strategic Risk scenarios is included (p3) which you may want to line up against your own activity in this field, and follow on by exploring which of these are within and outside of an insurer's sphere of influence. You might also benefit from the diagram on p6 on the main stakeholders in an insurance company which may influence your selection of strategic risk scenarios depending on your structure and business model. 

The aim of Solvency II is...

As Solvency II implementation stubbornly drags its heels like a legislative bull in the Plaza del Toros of European bureaucracy, I noticed a few mutterings about the 'aim', 'purpose' and 'objective' of the Directive and its companion texts as the main protagonists play for time.

Aim of Solvency II - could be better

This is particularly frustrating as a practitioner, where consistency and brevity of message is vital when one generally has limited time with AMSB members (most notably Non-Executives), and therefore may find the messages being offered to the press differ from those previously communicated to clients.

In addition, EIOPA's status as "super-regulator" (Omnibus II pending!) now allows for further demarcation of message between those who currently determine the adequacy of senior management/director fitness, propriety and Solvency II knowledge, and those who will be co-ordinating the revised approach from 2014.

Finally from the bottom up, the stealthy creep of Solvency II into the general public/intermediaries worlds surely makes it imperative that the overriding purpose of the Directive (as well as the expense and delays!) can be explained in unequivocal lay terms - though maybe not as haplessly as the PRA's top man the other week when he tried to price Solvency II in terms of unfinished tunnel projects...


Regulators and industry tend to be focusing on policyholder protection when justifying the Solvency II approach to supervision, though in a rather long-winded manner in the CBoI's case!

Regulators

Bernadino to Croatian press, March 2013

Purpose of Solvency II is "...a harmonized prudential framework in the EU"

Bernadino to German press, April 2013

"The purpose [of Solvency II] was to increase policyholder protection and incentivise better risk management"

The Prudential Regulatory Authority

"[Solvency II's] main objective is the adequate protection of policyholders and beneficiaries"

Central Bank of Ireland

"Solvency II is a risk based approach that aims to provide the basis for a more ‘root and branch’ review of the overall financial position of an insurance undertaking. It represents a new system of supervision that assesses the overall financial position of an insurance undertaking or group. The new supervisory system is concerned with, amongst other areas, highlighting the importance of holistic risk management and prudential standards. Solvency II also aims to reduce the possibility of both insurance undertaking failure and, in a wider sense, of disruption to the efficient operation of the insurance market"

Industry

Lloyds (whose CEO has been a touch vocal on the threat of Solvency II early implementation recently) have the objectives bullet-pointed on their site as;

• Improved consumer protection
• Modernised supervision
• Deepened EU market integration
• Increased international competitiveness of EU insurers 

Others tend to get "protection" somewhere in the mix;

"[Solvency II] should bring consistency to the way in which EU insurers manage capital and risk with the aim of enhancing protection for consumers" - Standard Life AR&A 2012 p6

"[Solvency II's] objectives are to establish a solvency system that is better aligned to the true risks of insurers, and aims to enable supervisors to protect policyholder interests as effectively as possible" - Aviva AR&A 2012 p129

"The purpose of Solvency II is to unify a single EU insurance market and to enhance policyholder protection" - IPB 360 AR&A 2012 p69

"The aim of Solvency II is to introduce EU-wide regulations that match capital requirements as closely as possible to the risks incurred." - Munich Re

Expert lobbyists

"The overriding aim of Solvency II is to bring a common, risk-based approach to capital setting, supervision and disclosure to the whole of Europe" - ABI's Tim Breedon, 2010 (original speech text unavailable from ABI site)

"The primary purpose of Solvency II is consumer protection" - FERMA executive board member 

Naturally, the consultant/vested interest world generally prefers to keep it fluffier to justify the invoices (Thomson Reuters a notable exception);

Consultancies

"Solvency II represents an opportunity to not only improve insurers' operations, but also develop significant competitive advantage in a challenging market" - KPMG's Phil Smart

"[Solvency II] is expected to provide a catalyst to transform the way insurance companies run their business" - E&Y

"[The Solvency II] project aims to create a more harmonised, risk-oriented solvency regime resulting in capital requirements that are more reflective of the risks facing insurers" - Towers Watson

Vendors/vested interests

"The aim of Solvency II is to gather all risk together in a holistic way" - FINCAD

 "[Solvency II] will ensure that insurers are protected against financial collapse, which is rife in today's unstable financial environment" - Xactium, clearly not big readers of the SIFI materials currently doing the rounds!

"The primary aim of Solvency II is the creation of an effective single market in insurance services across all 27 countries, creating the conditions for an adequate level of consumer protection." - Thomson Reuters

"[Solvency II's] aim is to ensure the financial soundness of insurance companies to not only protect policyholders’ interest, but also increase competition in the EU insurance market" - SAS 

Saddening really to see how a decade of malaise and false starts can even start to erode the fundamentals...

Preliminary full year results - Solvency II implementation costs and opinions

Now the UK preliminary full year results are starting to flow in, we can get more visibility on what was spent in last year's Solvency II phoney war. This is a topic I have covered for the last two years on this Blog (here touches on previous disclosures in particular) and bearing in mind most of the UK's Big Rigs are in the habit of disclosing the sums spent on preparation, it gives a good feel for where the implementation costs tally may finally get to.

So read on if you are interested in seeing if 2012, just like the popular 'Lovely Day' singer, was the year that the...errrr....Bill Withers (?)

Legal and General

• "Delivered the core components" of Solvency II, though there remains "much uncertainty" - go figure!
• £50m spent on Sol II and "other strategic projects" (no further split available) - this figure was £56m last year

RSA

• Costs of £32m (£30m previous year) for Solvency II
• Expect costs to fall by "around 50%" for the next two years
• "Rephased our implementation project to minimise costs"
• EC calibrated to 1-in-1,250 (S&P 'A' rated)
• In the AR&A, they add that they "...remain at the forefront for internal model approval"

Resolution 

• £76m spent on (predominantly) Solvency II in 2012, as opposed to £56m in 2011 - 2012 was of course the year that they dropped out of IMAP, so the spend dropped in the second half of the year
• Original provision for Sol II released from MCEV this year was £34m!
• Economic Capital coverage of 182%

Aviva

• £117m spent on Sol II specifically, against £96m last year
• "Well placed" for ICAS+ review 

Standard Life

• £112m spent on Sol II, RDR and other restructuring (no further split available) - was down as £59m specifically on Solvency II in 2011

Old Mutual

• Economic capital at risk managed to 99.93%, and currently at over 160%
• "Given the delay to the Solvency II go-live date", focusing on embedding ORSA and internal model during 2013
• No coverage of project spend - same as last year

Prudential

• £48m of Solvency II implementation costs in 2012 (£55m previous year)
• "...expects to engage in the initial stage of the FSA's proposed Individual Capital Adequacy Standards Plus (ICAS+) regime"
• Solvency II "may" provide a more risk-based capital framework, but "...we now know that it will not be implemented before December 31st 2015"
• "Continue to evaluate [their] options, including consideration of the Group's domicile"
• "...remain focused on preparing for implementation" despite uncertainty

And over to continental Europe;

Allianz

• "...adoption in 2014 is no longer guaranteed"
• EC coverage of 199%, calibrated to 99.5% VaR over 1 year - was previously calibrated to 99.97%, and Solvency II is used as rationalisation for the y-o-y change
• Rated 'strong' by S&P for ERM, and have had their internal model positively rated by them
• "Will take advantage of the delay in the implementation of Solvency II" to industrialise balance sheet production and internal model processes

Munich Re

• "..some uncertainty remains" around Solvency II, and they are banking on "at least two further years" delay
• Note that "...the risk that our Life primary insurers may not meet the capital requirements cannot yet be entirely excluded"
• Confident that "new opportunities...will exceed the challenges"
• Targeting 1.75 x 99.5% VaR over 1 year as their Economic Capital Target - this is a "...conservative approach, offering a high degree of security"
• Currently hold 129% of that figure
• Perhaps more significantly from an internal model perspective, hold 225% of 99.5% VaR over 1 year - if we considered that "conservative", I wonder what we might consider "liberal"?

Generali

• Economic capital ratio (calibrated by their internal model to ultimately deliver the required SCR percentile) of 159%, unchanged y-o-y, despite a lot of positive capital management activity (p33)
• Solvency I ratio is 150% (p31), up significantly on last year's 119%

Munich Re on Solvency II Control Functions - an actuary for all seasons...

Munich Re have continued their infrequent-yet-valuable Solvency Knowledge Series with a piece on Key functions within the system of governance of insurers under Solvency II.

Of course to the grizzled old set of risk practitioners who have done the rounds for the last few years, the fundamentals of the directive's requirements on the four control functions are as basic as the ingredients list for a frozen lasagne. It naturally draws attention to the likelihood that there will be "some overlap" between the activities of Risk, Actuarial, Compliance and Internal Audit, as well as touching on outsourcing as "...an attractive way of meeting the wide range of requirements" for those

However I detected more than a whiff of controversy around the content of this particular publication (which I hasten to add is a smart read nevertheless), were one to take it at face value. In particular;

• Their use of the three lines of defence model in the publication - while perceived to be good practice for segregating operations from risk advisory from risk assurance, it is certainly not cited in any existing materials at Level 1, 2 or 3, and the structure may be disproportionate at the small end of the insurer spectrum. On top of that is the Actuarial function's acknowledged dwelling over a grey area between the first and second lines, in particular if they haven't catered separately for the reporting lines of reserving, pricing and capital management actuaries (p8).
• The comment that "The risk management function will no doubt have to include people with a professional scientific and mathematical background, ideally backed up by appropriate qualifications (eg actuaries)". Whilst, internal model or not, the Actuarial function will clearly have to provide "considerable support" to the Risk function, I don't see any reason at the small-to-medium level for the Risk function to include actuaries unless through choice, using the lever of proportionality.
• That the Risk function "...shares responsibility for the risk strategy" - I think the implication is that it shares responsibility with the Board, but the statement doesn't help identify a) who authors and authorizes it and b) who gets fired for its poor deployment! I am more inclined to think the Risk function owns the risk management system and is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the implementation of the risk strategy which sits within it. The FSA define their requirements on this page in any case.
• That the Risk function "...identify potential risks and recommend appropriate countermeasures to the Board" - as far as emerging risk/top-down risk assessment goes, I certainly expect the function to facilitate the emerging risk/scenario analysis/reverse stress test activities in this regard, but it is most certainly not a solo job.
• That "The compliance function...will have to include staff with a legal background" - appreciating what the wording of Article 46 implies in particular, this is more a proportionality/outsourcing issue for me than anything. Having said that, I'm sure any existing compliance professionals out their who didn't take the Bar might feel slighted by this! 
• That "all four functions have a direct reporting line to the Board" - not certain that this is so in the vast majority of cases. Certainly via Board committees the Risk and Internal Audit functions will be well catered for (and the FSB recommended even better than that for the Risk function last week), but I suspect an executive reporting line is as good as it gets for the other two functions in most firms.

Certainly plenty to engage the grey matt with regardless of your country of origin, even around control function crossover areas (which I presented on at the end of last year), so dig in.

FTSE (and other) results and spare capital - Prudential, Munich Re, Standard Life

...and the result keep raining in! Hot on the heels of Old Mutual, Aviva, and a bunch of others all bundled together, a few more preliminaries of those we know and love slipped out today. Highlights below;

Standard Life

“significantly de-risked our business…well placed to operate in the currently proposed Solvency II environment”

• P63 - £59m spent on Solvency II (£64m last year)
• P32 - Solvency cover down from 206% to 173%, mostly due to subordinated debt shenanighans last year

Prudential

• P34 - £55m spent on Solvency II (£45m last year)
• P63 - "Our capital position remains strong. We have continued to place emphasis on maintaining the Group’s financial strength through optimising the balance between writing profitable new business, conserving capital and generating cash. We estimate that our IGD capital surplus is £4.0 billion at 31 December 2011 (before taking into account the 2011 final dividend), with available capital covering our capital requirements 2.75 times. This compares to a capital surplus of £4.3 billion at the end of 2010 (before taking into account the 2010 final dividend)." Note - not sure of the necessity to qualify "pre-dividend", but normally means something cheeky!
• "Therefore, in parallel to continuing our preparation for eventually implementing the Solvency II rules, we also evaluate actions to mitigate the possible negative effects. We regularly review the range of options available to us to maximise the strategic flexibility of the Group. Among these options is consideration of optimising the Group’s domicile, including as a possible response to an adverse outcome on Solvency II."
• Tracts of explanatory text on p63-64 on Solvency II status, most pertinent being "...the Solvency II rules relating to the determination of the liability discount rate and to the treatment of US business remain unclear and Prudential's capital position is sensitive to these outcomes"

Munich Re

• "The economic solvency ratio thus totals 111% (136%), a year-on-year decline of 25 percentage points that is largely ascribable to the very low interest rates and high volatility on the capital markets. Nevertheless, the figure still clearly reflects Munich Re's capital strength – Munich Re's economic risk capital, which produces the solvency ratio described above, corresponds to 1.75 times the capital that is likely to be necessary under Solvency II based on the Group's internal risk model. Munich Re's available financial resources therefore add up to 194% of the required risk capital under Solvency II. "

• "As part of its active capital management, Munich Re intends to buy back an outstanding subordinated bond and to issue a new subordinated bond. Owing to restrictions resulting from US legislation, offers will only be made to investors resident outside the USA. It is not possible to provide further written information at present, also for legal reasons. This new bond is designed to be compliant with the existing (Solvency I) and anticipated future (Solvency II) supervisory regime, and to meet current rating agency requirements." (i.e. More subordinated bond activity having substantial impact on balance sheets, as found at Aviva and Old Mutual)

• P140 "Though the economic solvency ratio of 111% (136%) is 25 percentage points lower than for the previous year, it reflects Munich Re’s capital strength. Munich Re’s economic risk capital, which produces the solvency ratio described above, corresponds to 1.75 times the capital that is likely to be necessary under Solvency II according to our internal risk model. Were we not to apply the safety cushion of 75% to the value at risk with a confidence level of 99.5% and merely to comply with the Solvency II standard, the economic solvency ratio would be 195% (238%)."

• 
  

  P154 "Our long-term target of a 15% return on our risk-adjusted capital (RORAC ) after tax across the capital-market and insurance cycle applies unchanged, but it will be difficult to achieve given the current low-interest-rate environment. As soon as the requirements of Solvency II and the new IFRS s for insurance contracts and financial instruments have been finalised, we will gear our target performance measures to the key indicators from this new framework with its strong economic focus."

Munich Re on QIS5 - Bravo

A fantastic summary of QIS5 changes was released at the end of April by Munich Re (my fault for blogging late on it!) - nothing especially new, but it is so concise, as well as simplifying the key messages such as;

• Ticklist of state of readiness issues on p2
• Brilliant comparison of Sol I and Sol II balance sheet changes (not as clear on any EC/EIOPA docs in my view
• Highlights the issue on Op Risk calibration, which despite being over-simplified, is preferred even by model-participating companies as it is so generous!

At 8 pages, it is absolutely the document to have for QIS5 summation, as well as the likely lobbying points for near future.