UK Senior Insurance Managers Regime - just be natural...

The PRA’s Supervisory Statement on Strengthening Individual Accountability in Insurance (SS35/15) has been released, not that far apart from their demolition job on Co-op Bank’s system of governance, which demonstrated something of an absence of such accountability across all three lines of defence, quite a feat!

While the Banking industry have been catered for on this topic with a few more bells and whistles, most noticeably by including an element of criminal liability  for their senior management (thanks Fred!), the approach for insurers and banks is supposed to be largely consistent.

The doc itself rather awkwardly references multiple sections of the incoming PRA Rulebook which, as yet at least, doesn’t exist as a conventional reference site, though it is due for release in “the summer” (the PRA subsequently released the new site 3 days after I published this post - that'll teach me!). It still pays to fish through the appendices of old Consultation Papers to get the materials cross referenced in this Supervisory Statement (here for most of them, from p44)

SIMF Interviews - "Next"...

I did cover this topic when the consultation paper first hit the table, and for those of a nervous disposition, the PRA have since produced a nice one-pager summarising what you need to know in the context of Approved Persons, Solvency II etc here (and done so much better than me, I hasten to add!). In addition, the transitional map from CF-XX to SIMF-YY is already available here.

I had a look through (largely ignoring the Group and Third Country specifics) to see if there was anything new and exciting since the consultation, and naturally there isn't! That said, the industry feedback received is detailed here (section 2), while I noted a few things below for my own benefit;

• PRA not concerned about individuals located overseas, unless they are involved in strategic implementation, as opposed to strategy formulation (2.11).
• Alerting to potential PRA blocking of SIMF applications where someone wishes to wear more than one hat, citing the obvious CEO & Chair example (2.15)
• Persons allowed to do the same function in more than one firm - targeted perhaps at the floating actuary contignent who do the CF12 job for a few firms?
• Awkwardly try to accommodate SIMF job-sharing, but lean towards discouraging it in the text (2.17-2.19)
• List a few examples of what firms might consider to be "Key Functions" over and above those named in the Solvency II legislation, being particularly keen on Investments (2.25 and 2.27)
• On the list of 11 Prescribed Responsibilities, they do their best to keep the NED world out of assuming any of them (2.40)!
• Some attempt to informally restrict Chairpersons from filling their time with multiple other roles and responsibilities (2.44)
• A timely reference, given the Co-op Bank Final Notice, to ensuring that Boards understand the Threshold Conditions (p12-13) and Fundamental Rules.

The Individual Conduct Standards (from p16) all seem fair at face value, with a bit of devil in the details, such as;

• Key function holders being told (3.19) to not only meet the letter of the prevailing regulatory system, but also not to engage in "...creative compliance or regulatory arbitrage" - spoilsports!
• Expectations that Key Function holders "take reasonable steps" to ensure that the business has sufficient systems of control, even if they delegate some, or indeed most, of the associated tasks themselves (3.20-3.22).
• That should you breach any of the Conduct Standards, it materially affects your fitness and/or propriety, and therefore the PRA expect to be notified

Finally, to clear up that age-old debate, the PRA clarified in 2.4 that it "...does not expect persons other than natural persons to be approved for a SIMF". Anyone with career ambitions had better lay off the Botox and Bronzing then...

PRA Final Notice on Co-op Bank - "cautious", with blurry lines...

"Two straws please"...

The PRA published a Final Notice last week regarding the numerous shortcomings of a UK bank over the last few years, which included the news of a colossal £121m fine which the PRA would have levied if the entity wasn't still losing wedge faster than a mojito in a cement mixer.

I'm sure some of us chortled at the Chrystal Methodist headlines a couple of years ago when the Non-Executive Chair of the UK's Co-operative Bank had his numerous vices sold to the highest tabloid bidder by a rented acquaintance. I covered some of the initial fallout on here, themed mostly around reputational risk and fit and proper persons, given the exponential effects of the exposé on the ultimate failure of the Group in its form at the time.

A document covering part of Co-op's demise, specifically its Bank, was released last week by the PRA,

The PRA's Final Notice to the Co-op Bank is issued publicly, and highlights where the firm breached what were at the time the FSA's Principles for Business, replaced since the PRA/FCA divorce by the PRA's Fundamental Rules.

Included in the Final Notice on this matter was a number of matters which risk practitioners should be salivating over, given the failures which led to this punishment include

• Inappropriate culture,
• Internal control framework failures,
• Ineffective risk management policies, and, the jackpot,
• A "three lines of defence" model "...flawed in both design and operation"!

The activities demonstrating this include a woeful suite of incomplete management information, three horrendously chancy accounting interpretations benefiting the balance sheet at the expense of real-world accuracy, and a suite of defensive line failures, all of which are followed through in forensic detail.

I have sectioned my notes below for my own use, particularly given the PRA goes on something of a limb here and provide usable definitions for certain terms which I suspect many practitioners would benefit from reading. The PRA (and EIOPA) generally try to dodge requests for definitions, so while the peg is square and the hole is round, it might be as good as you get!

Definitions and expressions

• Three lines of defence - "This is a system which relies on there being an opportunity at three complementary and independent levels to identify and correct any control failures". 
• Second line of defence - "Second line functions should support and challenge the management of risks firm-wide, by expressing views within a firm on the appropriateness of the level of risks being run"
• The above is supplemented by the following: "Responsibility for risk should not be delegated to risk management and control functions" - amen brother!
• Third line of defence - "Internal Audit should provide independent assurance over firms' internal controls, risk management and governance"
• Risk Appetite - "A firm's stated risk appetite is an important factor in determining whether a firm's risk and control framework is commensurate with [the] nature of its business, and should be both integral to a firm's strategy and at the heart of its risk management system" - not far off a direct quote from last year's Approach Paper on Banking Supervision (p22), though it has moved from "foundation" to "heart" in this Final Notice. I know what I prefer to build on!
• "Clearly-defined strategy" - they list "well-defined objectives, responsibilities and milestones" as expected
• Policies - "The establishment of appropriate policies [and procedures] governing the conduct of a firm's activities is an essential component in the exercise of appropriate organisation and control of a firm's business"
• "Good risk management culture" (p7) - interestingly an expression most bodies have avoided using, preferring "sound" to "good". They later go on to talk of culture more generically in terms of "right" and "inappropriate" (p33).

Observations

• Interestingly, Co-op Bank never refer to operating "3LOD" until their 2012 Annual Report (p56 for the boilerplate and clearly untrue definitions), so any deficiencies in the model before that year might be for a good reason!
• First line management oversight was seen as "inadequate" and "inappropriate" (p12)
• Their second line managers "...repeatedly voiced concerns" about headcount (p29), which weren't addressed until the back end of the period under scrutiny. Hard to think post-2007 it would be hard to justify reinforcing that area of the business, which perhaps says a lot about the entity's culture. 
• Second line not monitoring adherence to policies (p29) - quite hard to conceive of nobody in the second line doing this!
• A clear distinction made more than once between "Risk Management Framework Policies" and "adequate policies and procedures" relating to operational matters (p5)
• Some of the failure to follow 'internal policies' seems to have been sponsored by the acquisition of the Britannia book - perhaps a natural by-product of M&A activity, where the cultures and modus operandi clash (p21)
• Second line criticised for not providing proper "independent challenge" - happy to see this, given the focus tends to be on second line oversight, which always feels like a bit of a jib-job.
• Third line giving the business credit for proposed remedial action in its audit reports (p31) - even taking this into account, they were rolling over around 30% of recommended actions in their reports as "overdue"!
• Head of Internal Audit reported to the Head of Risk
• An implication that one may be permitted shortcomings in one's internal control framework, providing one's culture is "appropriate" (p5). 
• An interesting slant on reputational risk emerges from one of the accounting interpretations used, specifically that while assuming a particular accounting treatment (on the Leek notes in this case) which benefits the entity at the expense of counterparty might benefit the immediate balance sheet, the long-term effect on being able to raise new capital must be considered (p16)
• External Auditors using a 1-to-7 scale to assess how punitive/liberal the accounting treatments used by clients are. These assessments have bitten this particular client on the bum, given the PRA quote them in the document in the context of whether they align with a "cautious" risk taker!

Open ended questions

• Is "cautious" a realistic appetite for risk at Entity level? More importantly, if one has a "cautious" risk appetite, is one obliged to manage its capital "cautiously"?
• Management information was criticised for not being "sufficiently forward looking" - should it be (as opposed to mostly summarising positions at a point in time)?
• Is the PRA allocating resources to firms based on their Risk Appetite Statements (p13)?
• Is it possible for non-Accounting experts working in the second line to identify just how many ropey interpretations of UK GAAP/IFRS are being applied to a balance sheet? Is it plausible to leave such work to external audit firms who couldn't have a more vested interest in the grey areas of such legislation? The artificial boosting of the balance sheet listed in this notice would be subtle enough to trick an accountant or two I'd bet!
• Can quant risks be effectively managed in a separate team from the qualitative world? Appreciating there is a shockingly blurry line in Co-op Bank's approach (p29), it certainly feels like Solvency II pressures might lead to similar pressures on the staffing front, particularly for modellers and small/medium sized firms where staff may wear more than one hat.

Solvency II Updates and Corporate Governance in Financials - PRA "Back for Good"?

A few releases of note out of the UK regulator over the last working week or so means I had some catching up to do - sometimes it feels like "All I do each night is PRA"...

They started off with a Director's Letter just before the bank holiday weekend. A general unwillingness to crack whips was present throughout this doc, even at this late stage, with a few references to "inform your supervisor" as opposed to "just do it".

The letter states that the PRA were due to publish some of their findings from their balance sheet review work by the end of the month - not done as yet, hopefully turns out to be money well spent

Regarding Standard Formula appropriateness:

• They stress that firms must identify deviations from Standard Formula from their risk profiles, and include an assessment of the significance of that deviation in their ORSAs (emphasised in their October industry presentation from p6)- is the implication here that firms are not doing this at all at the moment, or just not reporting it in ORSA?
• Highlight that "supplementary information" used to explain such deviations will also be assessed by the PRA. Does this add significance to one's qualitative commentary around Standard Formula/Risk Profile deviations? Can a good explanation be the difference between having to IM/PIM at the earliest opportunity against being given a couple of years of capital add-on breathing room?
• The PRA note that, "...where a firm's conclusion on this question is not appropriate", it will intervene. It is not clear how a firm's conclusions about its deviation between SF and its Risk Profile could be considered "not appropriate", but I imagine that anything which attempts to dodge USPs/PIM/IM ONCE the divergence hits the limits in the Delegated Acts (276-287) would be frowned upon. There is certainly no appetite at the PRA for renewing capital add-ons in perpetuity (slide 13), which given the UK's familiarity with ICA and ICG, might be a desperado's first chance saloon.
• The PRA are planning "specific interventions" on this front (detailed here), but not necessarily in time to correct before 2016.

Regarding Internal Models

• Not happy with "wide variation in quality of IM Change policies. Sounds like firms are doing their best to avoid change criteria that results in frequent submissions for reapproval, which one would expect!



IMAP Submissions
- Everything Changes

• PRA seemingly expecting firms to have not only taken on board their feedback, but also had their IMs revalidated, before submitting their IM application. Given that validation will be chalked down as a 'once-a-year' job at the moment (despite the IRM's efforts), that seems highly unlikely. They give themselves a get-out-of-jail-free card though by stating that firms must be confident that any changes in their IMs both address PRA feedback and meet the tests and standards for model approval.
• They appear to advise against submitting applications if you have a material change in the pipeline.
• Heavily critical of Board involvement in validation. Here they look for evidence of Boards "overseeing and influencing" the validation process, whereas previous PRA presentation slides  did not have such expectations of Boards (slide 8 here), or indeed expected more (slide 9 here)!
• The expression "internal management loadings" appeared in my life for the first time, which sounds to a non-technical person like myself that firms are effectively "dumbing-up" the capital requirement currently delivered by their IM in order to plaster over mathematical or data weaknesses. PRA certainly not impressed by industry suggestions to date.
• Given the number of firms who must have dropped out of looking for Day 1 approval, they still shake the pineapple tree here in order to remind applicants that contingency plans should be ready in the case of application failures. "Many firms still have a considerable amount of work to do" sounds to me like some applicants are being pre-warned of their imminent failure!

The PRA also released a consultation paper entitled Corporate Governance: Board Responsibilities, which has the rather light ambition of identifying "key aspects of good board governance to which the PRA attaches particular importance in the conduct of its supervision".

A few straggler items in it;

• That failures in governance and/or risk management have been a key factor in "many" financial sector failures - as opposed to "all"
• That they consider the FRC's Corporate Governance Code, amongst others, a "comprehensive guide to good corporate governance" - given the firms experiencing the financial sector failures were most probably complying with it, not a great advert!
• "Culture is the collective responsibility of the Board" - a bit of a nowhere comment, but instinctively, I don't see how this can be right. They can be accountable to both supervisors and shareholders/members for cultural failings, but where could such a responsibility materialise into demonstrable actions? 
• "...the Board is responsible for the oversight of, but not for managing the business" - in relation to my comment directly above, can both statement be correct?
• "The Risk Control Framework should flow from the Board's Risk Appetite" - I'll work on the premise that this is missing the word "statement" at the end of the line
• Section 11 on remuneration expects that incentives are aligned with "prudent risk taking" - what if prudence is too conservative for one's risk appetite?

Into some of the expected themes;

• Strategy to be "owned by the Board as a whole"
• They wed Culture and Remuneration "...to encourage and enforce the kind of behaviours the Board wished to see"
• They want a "well articulated and measurable" Risk Appetite Statement which can also be "...readily understood by employees throughout the business". Doesn't seem feasible, given the metrics commonly used in risk appetite statements are not exactly Finance 101 (Solvency/Liquidity/Earnings-related),
• "It is the responsibility of the Board to ensure that the effectiveness of the Risk Control framework is kept actively under review" - has at least an air of COSO about it, don't think it was deliberate
• Big section (6) on responsibilities and accountabilities of exec and non-exec directors.
• Followed in 7.1 with "...non-executives should not simply delegate responsibility for major decisions to individuals among them who are considered specialist in the area" - this has internal models written all over it (p5-6)!

Happy to see this second document, though I don't know what it adds to firms' understanding about what is "good and bad".




IRM on Internal Model Validation - Red Card or Green Card?

Cyclic Validation - Quelle horreur...

Just back from Paris, where I spent a weekend queueing behind selfie-taking tourists before taking out a second mortgage to buy bottled water. A beautiful place, though I found Depardieu was much quieter off-screen...

Onto the topic in hand, the PRA were pretty vicious back in the day on Validation efforts in their infancy, with Julian Adams lambasting both progress ("significantly behind") and validation scope ("narrow"). Given that the Solvency II sabbatical which bridged half of 2012 and all of 2013 gave firms time to catch up and widen, you might think that those with internal model ambitions would be pretty tidy by now. The PRA have even told firms how they believe "good" model application paperwork to look, carving out for themselves and the Validators of the world an easy-to-read "model reviewer" level of detail (p1).

In those salad days, Internal Model Validation felt to me like it would be the chernozem of the nascent Risk Management profession in insurers; a skill set that a quant or a non-quant could acquire, apply, and ultimately ease through the promotional path within insurance entities, given the depth and breadth of technical and strategic information the process challenges...

...but the moves never came. Despite the actuarial world themselves happily disassembling the complexities of quantitative modelling into easy-to-digest IM Validation themes, the non-quant world has waited patiently to see if anything of substance would emerge from one of its representative bodies.

And this week it arrived! The Institute of Risk Management has delivered, as part of its Internal Model Industry Forum (IMIF), a white paper on the validation cycle.

The IRM have been active in this area prior to the formation of the IMIF. I have covered an ERM in Insurance event at the start of 2014 here, while this more volumous slide pack featuring a number of the Billy and Betty Big Biscuits of the field emerged from summer of last year, when the IMIF seemed to come to fruition. This white paper itself appears to move along the concepts and ideas inside an IRM slide deck from last Christmas.

Given that the IRM is not-for-profit, there is always a likelihood that sponsors will unduly influence the products (indeed the IRM Chair notes in this that they rely on "enlightened industry support" to knock these documents out).

Sadly in this case, the sponsors include Three of the "Big 4" (with the fourth on the IMIF steering committee) , leaving the document dripping with consultancy hallmarks rather than pragmatic solutions to execute the tasks in hand.

That view is reinforced somewhat by this follow-on presentation to the IMIF from last week by this white paper's workstream lead and supporting consultant - one selected industry comment on slide 8 (presumably from a chocolate bar shortly before it ate itself) reads, "validators should really be experienced modellers"!

A few general points jump out of the white paper;

• That a firm's IM is "...at the heart of risk and capital evaluation" - I thought it was supposed to "inform" this evaluation, not dominate it (slide 3 here, as well as Julian Adams's speech from a couple of years ago [p4]).
• Is the insurance industry "...increasingly reliant on sophisticated models" - maybe in terms of AUM/Market Cap, but given the UK IMAP queue is down to approximately 40 firms out of over 400 (p4), and that number has steadily reduced over the last 3 years, feels a touch disingenuous. I've no doubt the firms represented on the Steering Group are "...increasingly reliant" though
• The document claims to set out "best practice principles" - not sure if "practice" and "principle" share the same bed, but that aside, would anyone find it remotely acceptable to have the consultancy world fund a document which details "best practice" on IM Validation?

And a few stand out elements from the proposed Validation Cycle, which is heavily influenced by EIOPA's guidelines:

• "Best practice now requires firms to demonstrate, with evidence, that the cycle...[is] being actively and effectively carried out" - how can best practice "require" anything from anyone?
• "...resulting best practice that is emerging" (p4)  - how is any practice considered "best" at this stage of proceedings, when we are literally practising! Against what criteria?
• References to "model risk impact assessment" and the "model risk assessment process" (p5) seem to come from nowhere. Alluding to something formal, but not very clear
• Lot of coverage of "triggers" of IM Validation, which feels like a fishing expedition for the paper sponsors, rather than direct address of L2 Art 241 - the number of areas of "change" to consider as IM Validation triggers covers pretty much any change, anywhere, both inside and outside of an insurer (p8)! Most would also be ad-hoc ORSA triggers in my experience, so this potentially sets up insurers for a bucketload of work every time they hear a pin drop.
• Formulaic and periodic IM Validation a "needless cost"? Surely periodic validation, no matter how badly executed, is compulsory (L1 Art 125)?
• The Trigger Impact Assessment stage (p10) is barely legible - "The trigger impact assessment against model risk appetite stage" - and terminologically it is all well above legislative requirements.
• "Unexpected triggers" (p12) get a mention. Again, not making sense to me - you either know your triggers or not.
• "Model validation is complex" and "less than black and white" (p16) - certainly is if you try and follow this process! A focus on plain questions and less quant can only help the models non-expert users (slide 7).
• If the validation cycle, processes and execution are "continuously evolving" (p18), are they reliable? Feels difficult to meet L2 Art 241.3, at least from a planning and execution perspective, if the process is constantly being tinkered with 
• "Developing a communications strategy" (p20) as part of the validation scoping and planning stage feels terribly over-elaborate.
• "Robust planning" expected to be common (p22), which doesn't necessarily marry up with the expectation of dynamic rather than cyclic validation in future (p10)

I think it is right to take the hump to a certain extent here. The PRA have been cunningly silent on capital add-ons to date, but given the implication that they will not be applied and renewed ICG-style (slide 13), there is likely to be many more less monied Partial IM applicants to follow over the next couple of years. Having the most influential consultancy firms decide on what is "best" in the validation world (and for it to have this many bells, whistles and legislative off-roads) feels like setting those firms up for either a fall, or another bill.

The PRA actually delivered something with much less padding to the IRM back at the end of 2013, so I'm struggling to see why that has justifiably been turbo-charged. Given they have three of their finest involved with the IMIF, but are continuing to be directly vocal on this topic (as recently as March 2015), it sends a worrying message to the capital add-on brigade that the IMAP early birds will be setting disproportionately high bars for 2017 and beyond when they deliver their PIMs.

Ultimately, I was disappointed by the publication, which reads more like a flannel manual, and is certainly not the kind of Risk Profession contribution that the topic so badly needs if the PRA's dreams of Board's "directing" and "owning" the IM valdiation process (slide 9) are ever going to come true. The 200 page novella world of Validation Reporting feels closer than ever...

EIOPA Chair's speech in Ireland - Nothing Compares to U2...

The huff has concluded it would appear – EIOPA’s gaffer has returned to the speaking circuit after a few weeks where the institution’s communications had been reduced to Post-It notes on the fridge after the EU butchered their budget.

Bernadino - dodgy stand-up

 

A recent Solvency II industry event was held in sunny Dublin, with Sr. Bernadino providing the keynote address. He chose to start and conclude with U2 jokes, which were as lame as a constipated flamingo (I would have thought Ben Folds Five or Lulu would be top of his playlist right now…)

That aside, the meat in this musical sandwich was pertinent to the whole industry, so I've picked out a few highlights;

General

• Wants to outline EIOPA’s move “from regulation to supervision” (p2), though goes on to say that “…EIOPA does not replace NSAs. The responsibility of the day-to-day supervision…rests with the NSAs” (p10). I think this subject warrants clarification from NSAs and EIOPA in concert, given we can see how having a remit-less overseer is putting the PRA on the back foot
• Acknowledges that the result of the mathematical squabbles is “…perhaps a too complex SCR formulation” (p3)

ORSA

• ORSA considered to be “…best practice at international level” (p4) – not sure if he means ORSA in general IAIS terms, or the ORSA concept he has curated within the EU!
• While he drops some of the usual ORSA bluster in about it being a “game changer”, he beefs up on the Board’s obligations, citing their "fundamental role to play", and stating in particular that "they need to set, communicate and enforce a risk culture".
• Of particular significance to his Irish audience was his emphasis on risk culture as "..an appropriate balance with the natural sales driven culture". This is perhaps the first instance where I have seen insurers' distribution arms formally considered by a supervisory body to be the enemy of 'risk culture', and for EIOPA's chair to choose Ireland, a country which has for years marketed itself as a cross-border sales centre on the right side of General Good provisions, is shown at the end speech to be a pre-emptive strike.

Internal Models

• Like his associates at the PRA, he notes that the use of internal models on the banking side "has been subject to increasing scepticism" in justifying the rigour of the Solvency II approach to modelling
• Worried that models will become a "capital optimization tool" - the PRA's NED briefing (slide 8) paints a similar picture if you read between the lines regarding missing risks and experience not reflected in parameter setting.

EIOPA's workload

• "Current different supervisory cultures" in the EU are creating work for EIOPA, noting that "our feedback can sometimes be challenging". Wonder who they're getting at there, France!
• They appear to be developing a Supervisory Handbook of good Solvency II practices. Chapters are already written on Risk Assessment, Boards and Governance, PPP and proportionality in Key Functions to name a few. Something to look forward to no doubt

Ireland-specific

• Go out of their way to applaud the onerous reserving governance in Ireland (here?), considering it practice which other countries should emulate.
• On the other hand, "...in the specific case of the Irish insurance market" he targets the country from a conduct risk/General Good perspective as one of the main cross-border players in the Union.

One can't help but feel the latter part of the speech was deliberately laid at the feet of the Irish, rather than aired in a more generic manner, given the country's continued corporation tax-related appeal to cross-border distributors. I guess when it comes to identifying the perfect audience to sketch out EIOPA's inevitable foray into Conduct Risk regulation, Sr. Bernadino found what he was looking for...

Pillar 3 implementation phase - "I can change, I can change"...

There has been a bit of noteworthy activity on the Pillar 3 side over the last few weeks, which I will cover below if I can keep awake long enough.

Pillar 3 Deadlines - "take it easy fella"

Pillar 3 was shouldered in to the NED briefing at the end of March (slide 19), and in a style similar to South Park's Saddam Hussein charicature, they effectively told the audience to "relax guy"...

Were those calming words justifiable? Given the PRA's admin function was seemingly on a "no uploading" break for Lent, we have in the last couple of days seen a whopping 3 months worth of minutes from their Regulatory Reporting Industry Working Group (or "Pillar 3 whingepit" as it more commonly known) made public. Interesting snippets include;

Jan 2015 - PRA full working group

• Publication of example reporting schedules for anyone without a December year-end
• "Early May" appears to be the starting point for any Category 1-3 firms who need to test out the PRA's QRT recepticle handiwork
• Firms "must submit data in XBRL" from July of this year, in case there were any chancers out there
• No additional information about the spectre of external auditors poring through your reporting efforts until Q2 2015 (i.e. now!). This will be in the form of EIOPA Guidelines, from which the PRA will "determine its position".
• About 20% of firms responded to the PRA's readiness survey that they are behind the curve
• Sourcing asset data still noted as an "issue", as well as vendor limitations, which would be of some concern for anyone who has splashed out on a software solution.

Feb 2015 - PRA testing sub-group

•  Problems around compatability of firms' earlier efforts appear to emerge every time EIOPA apply a hotfix to their taxonomy
• EIOPA filing rules and guidance were scheduled for Q1 2015 release - I can't seem to see them (though I haven't looked hard), so their timeliness maybe a victim of the EIOPA budget cuts?
• Firms are directed to the draft ITS to distinguish between preparatory requirements on Reporting and "live" requirements. This seems to be a repeated message, so presumably firms are not reading this document properly. 
• First testing cycle kicked off on 27th Feb, with (9) firms down at the PRA's offices. Second cycle scheduled for soon/now in April, performed externally to "test connectivity"
• Firms were effectively encouraged to sent in any old tat in XBRL, which the PRA would feedback on.

March 2015 - PRA testing sub-group

• Initial testing of the PRA's facilities doesn't appear to have been discouraging
• Less that half a dozen firms will be kicking the tyres in the second test phase
• EIOPA effectively overrule the PRA by allowing old and new taxonomies to be used in the preparatory phase.
• The PRA's (unpublished?) validation rules will not be applied during the preparatory phase, which will be light relief to some firms.

This information seems to support rather than contradict the more general yet widely reported Grant Thornton survey which suggests there will be a good number of firms who will struggle with their 2016 obligations, let alone 2017's. They made the following points;

• GI and composite firms seemingly the most worried
• Half of firms are planning to create their own reporting solution (based on T4U?), mostly Lloyds and GI firms. Are these "have-a-go heroes" the hidden issue for the PRA, given their restricted testing group.
• Around 20% are behind schedule on QRTs
• A third have done little if anything on the SFCR/RSR front – the PRA have stated that these are required "in year 1" (Q17, and yes, both of them!)
• Compared against an earlier survey they conducted, the one topic which hasn’t alleviated any concerns is the ability to extract data from internal IT systems.
• Majority of firms are having a single dry run for quarterly and annual QRTs

Should anyone be worried given the granular information above, or is Pillar 3 still tomorrow's problem?

Jurassic Talk - enhanced NED challenges during Solvency II preparations?

 Britain's youngest NED

Given that there won’t be a heck of a lot more briefing done on the Non-Executive Director front, I’ve given the PRA Industry Event slide pack published the other week a bit more of a going over to see if the left and right hands are pushing the Solvency II wheelie bin in the right direction. I haven’t gone as far as watching the 1h 30m video of the event yet – if I wanted to watch a room full of fidgeting old men in ill-fitting suits I’d just go to Bridge Night at the bowling club…

I can’t say I was massively enthused by the read of the slides as an individual who is frequently delivering material to the very audience the presentation was aimed at. I would highlight the following oddities;

Internal Model-specific (slides 6-12)

• That Solvency II “sets a high bar” for model approval – that feels a little disingenuous given that the PRA has had the whip hand in the IRSG’s internal model committee for years, and has evidently driven their CAT. Fair to say that the PRA set the "high bar" on behalf of the rest of Europe.
• From the “lessons learned” section they suggest that some IMAP/CAT firms have used assumptions which are not matching their experience. Is that not bravado bordering on criminality? Doesn’t feel like small beer, so unless the PRA are splitting hairs with that comment, I trust the protagonists had a strip torn from them.
• Some models ignoring “Key Risks” faced by a firm – how can this be? If this is about cheeky risk selection (i.e. let’s use SF, but model Market Risk as we get a good number from it) all well and good, but to say that firms are ignoring them is not a good steer, and if they are, then how is punishment not already being dispensed?
• For Use Test purposes, NEDS told to have “belief” but not “blind faith” – this feels like Bank Creep, given that the PRA  have been vocal (here and here) on firms blindly following models after the banks got caught with their trolleys down a few years back (nice PRA summary here). Doesn’t feel especially fair to tar insurers with exactly the same brush in advance, even if it is smart!
• “Boards need to own validation design” – just sounds meaningless when you read it back. If you want them to “do” the design (which Andrew Marshall’s later slides deriding the efforts of the validation contracting community suggest also support), then just say it.
• The “Key Questions” slides contain some very ropey gear. “Does the output of the model give a credible answer”? “Can the firm survive on the Standard Formula”? The terms used are so flimsy that one could spend hours arguing the toss about their definition – “so what is survival – EC+, SCR+, MCR+ with recovery plan” etc.

ORSA and SoG (slides 14-18)
Starts with a bit of good news – some generic industry feedback is seemingly due within the next couple of months (pertaining to our 2014 ORSA efforts?). The slide summarising findings to date is also a useful yardstick for those who can’t wait that long.

For System of Governance, the executive world should prepare themselves for NED questions regarding whether or not they (as opposed to their underlings and contractors) are reading EIOPA's Guidelines. Let's hope they have!

On the gnarlier side;

• Seems to be an obsession with assigning named individuals (as opposed to roles or teams)  to perform mitigating tasks relating to anything ropey uncovered during the ORSA
• “ORSA should be holistic” – at what point is that breathtakingly grim term going to be put to pasture? For a NED briefing, the use of plain English should be considered par for the course. It is followed two slides later by “top-down/bottom-up” which is equally non-specific.
• “ORSA is not a compliance exercise resulting in a report to the PRA” – I think you meant to say “not ONLY...”!

The final slides from Ian Marshall’s presentation are revealing more due to the clumsy terminology often used at the table with NEDs (“Key Drivers” and “Key Correlations” for example – if you mean “most money riding on it”, then say it!). Also, the idea that Risk Appetite is “no longer an aspiration” is worrying – I would have given the insurance industry credit that it ceased to be aspirational some time ago, and doesn’t need a 2015 ‘tick’, but then I am a trusting fellow.

Does anyone think, off the back of these slides, that their NEDs will be chomping at the bit at the next Risk Committee/Board meeting using the ammunition supplied here?

Maybe I’d better watch the video after all… 

Solvency II - things what happened in the last couple of months...

She might not be singing yet, but just like my nana at Pilates, the Solvency II fat lady is taking some deep breaths. As I have spent the last couple of months at home in au-pair mode, gladly leaving the rest of the world to waffle about ERM and Solvency II, I thought I would throw together a catch-up post, given that applications for some of the Solvency II goodies have been open since 1st April.

Starting at the top, the UK Government managed to stay sellotaped together long enough to get the fundamental Solvency II legislative work pushed through Parliament before they disbanded for the General Election. The documentation is available in full here, with synopsis here. Interestingly, this formally obliges the PRA to review capital add-ons "at least" once a year, as well as to provide specific reporting to EIOPA on the topic. There is also a little more meat around the sticky issue of firms who breach their MCR, then look unlikely to rectify the matter.

The Government also released the findings of their Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) in assessing whether Solvency II was going to be a blessing or a curse for Britain. This is actually a very handy drop-in document for your NEDs/peripheral programme figures, and is worth pushing on to them.

They do make the rather controversial statement that on top of the estimated £2.6bn cost to the industry of implementation (!!!!!), the ongoing costs of c.£200m a year will be due to reporting obligations (fair enough) as well as the need for a remuneration policy (hmmm?). Rather disparagingly, the Treasury merely estimate "un-quantified administrative benefits" off the back of improvements in risk management and governance arrangements.

The PRA have recently released the Policy Statement covering their final rules for Solvency II implementation, which on paper should contain no surprises (other associated materials available here). Generalist media chatter (here and here for example) was pretty underwhelming, and while Mark Carney emphasises in the statement that Insurers must be "robustly supervised", Andrew Bailey stated merely that while the "...new regime will not be perfect...it is a welcome step in the right direction"

On a lighter note, the European institutions got a bit beefy over the new year when the newly installed Commissioner Hill had his ears chewed by ECON's new Chair regarding a range of issues or unanswered questions regarding the Delegated Acts. Having given himself a couple of weeks to digest, he pinged out a reply thanking ECON for pointing out three typos, and otherwise defending his corner. Much of the background noise in this correspondence regarding infrastructure investment and EIOPA funding has had a life of its own for some time now - indeed, EIOPA's dummy was definitively spat on the matter last week when they "reprioritised" their 2015 work plan to account for budget cuts.

B-ABI - got back?

NEDs have recently been the beneficiaries of a webcast featuring the juicy double of Huw Evans and Paul Fisher discussing the implications of Solvency II's progression for NEDs. For anyone struggling to get their NEDs to read overinflated board packs these days, a diversion to this footge would be a smart idea (video 1 is more chatter, so start at video 2).

A parallel release for NEDs came from the PRA in the form of a slide pack and a monster 1hr 30m recording of the presentation which it accompanied. Clearly the PRA have seen enough gaps in the efforts of NEDs to date to go to these en-masse tutorial lengths, but the material on validation and ORSA in particular should be swallowed whole.

PRA Pillar 3 Working Group - testing commences

Bit of activity on the Pillar 3 front, with the PRA's industry working group publishing minutes from their 'recent' meeting (i.e. 2 months ago).

Rather than another bleat about late delivery in contravention of their Terms of Reference (bottom of last page!), let's enjoy the content for what it is, which is incredibly useful.

Data Collection and xBRL
A few basics were formally tabled, such as the PRA completing their vendor selection for a data collection system, and a note that the xBRL process chosen across the EU has "some commonality". Of particular interest is the commencement of a testing sub-group which has been charged with assisting the PRA in getting their technology up and running with sample data, and that work is apparently ongoing as we speak.

They have planned to allow selected submittors to dry-run their facilities in Q1 2015, before opening it up to all other firms obliged to submit material in the preparatory phase in Q2. Not sure how much lag this set-up allows, so let's hope they get happy before Christmas!

External Audit and Pillar 3
Another sore point has been the potential inclusion, on a short or long-term basis, of external auditors in the preparation and delivery of Pillar 3 reporting (raised on the Solvency II Wire last month). The PRA opine that external audit requirement guidelines "...are not scheduled to be included" in the forthcoming ITS, and that EIOPA has not decided when to issue public consultation on the matter, though they will at some point.

Clearly the PRA have ambitions to continue their existing requirements for the external audit of regulatory submissions, as evidenced by their preparatory phase approach to gaining comfort on Solvency II Balance Sheet components of all IM applicants and larger SF firms, which will pad out a few partner's wallets at the Big 4 (though perhaps for the right reasons).

Lobbying and questions
Effectively told the attendees to direct more questions to EIOPA rather than them, and in particular to wait for EIOPA's second set of ITS, due any day now. On the basis that ITS will (probably) be accepted by the Commission as delivered, the PRA are reminding firms that this is effectively the only window for the industry to bleat.

Board sign-off of QRTs
A huge bugbear across the industry was the implication, reinforced through the PRA's Pillar 3 Q&A document (Q20, last page), that June 2015 would see piles of QRT material tabled at Board meetings across the UK for them to formally approve. They confirmed at this meeting that the Board "...may choose to delegate aspects of the process for operational reasons" - CFO sign-offs all round!

Asset Data, and interaction between Asset Managers and Insurers
A slightly odd, but very relevant point was raised regarding Insurers interacting with their asset managers to ensure they get the right quantity and level of granularity in their asset data to populate the QRTs. The PRA are naturally concerned about this, given the shortening timeframe, and given that the asset management industry themselves appear to be making some voluntary efforts, it feels like the insurers have some work to do.

Approved Persons in UK under Solvency II - "SIMF-ly The Best"?

The UK prudential and conduct supervisors doubled-up this week with a barrage of paperwork regarding "Fit and Proper" assessment of senior staff members in Insurers under Solvency II.

This was already acknowledged as an area where intelligent copy-out wouldn't quite cut the mustard for UK plc, so no doubt the Compliance functions of insurance entities have been looking forward to these publications appearing. Given the light touch on the topic in the Directive (Art.42) and Delegated Acts (Art.273), this is very much welcome gristle.

Evidently "Proper" - but "Fit" enough?

While the maintream media has cranked out some comment already on both the FCA (here) and PRA approach (here, here and here), they are naturally broad with their brushes. I thought I would cut it up into my much more insular world of "what does it mean for Key Functions under Solvency II".



PRA Consultation Paper

• The regulatory framework for individuals will be called the Senior Insurance Managers Regime (SIMR), and will come into force from 1st Jan 2016. 
• The CP is targeted at ensuring fitness and propriety of individuals running an insurer, or performing a Key Function.
• NED's have been left out of this paper, as there is a wealth of comment already provided on a separate joint FCA/PRA consultation from the Banking industry.
• That said "...the regime for insurers should not be identical to the regime for banks". 
• While Controlled Functions continues to exist as a PRA term, it will be interchangeable with the term Senior Insurance Management Functions ("SIMFs"), which I have used below.

Going into detail, we find the following;

• CEO, CFO, CRO and Head of Internal Audit are all SIMFs, with Chief Actuary, WP Actuary and a couple of Lloyds-specific roles also lined up.
• Some Group-specific SIMFs also created.
• Any Solvency II "Key Function" holders who are not SIMFs will simply be assessed within the business, with the PRA having right to overturn. I thought this would include the Head of Compliance, but they are picked up by the FCA (below). Not sure who else could be Key Function but not a SIMF, unless some SIMF role-holders don't plan to also do a day job.
• List of new Core Responsibilities provided which need to be allocated to one or more SIMFs (2.21). These include the old chestnuts of remuneration policy and "culture" in its broadest sense, as well as performance of ORSA.
• A form will follow which needs to be completed by firms for all prospective SIMFs and Key Function holders containing "relevant information" on them - I suspect this will be a LinkedIn cut-and-paste job.
• Obligation to make and maintain a "Governance Map" listing the positions and key functions which run the firm, the allocation of management responsibilities (including the new ones in 2.21 presumably) and relevant reporting lines. Oddly, the PRA think "...there will be some costs in compiling and maintaining the Governance Map", when it feels like a lazy Thursday morning for Company Secretarial to me...
• Some reinforcement of Conduct standards for SIMFs and Key Function holders, with Key Function holders having an additional policyholder protection-related standard added to their armoury.
• Emphasise that Fit and Proper needs to be assessed on an ongoing basis, as opposed to periodically, which effectively gives the regulator a get-out-of-jail when a bad apple SIMF mismanages a firm (i.e. "why didn't you pick it up internally first?").
• Solvency II brings in a legal requirement for firms to satisfy themselves of a candidate's fitness and propriety before sending applications to the PRA. They therefore plan to assess whether firms recruitment processes are "appropriately rigorous", which feels like a step into the un-assessable (if that is even a word).

Proposed Supervisory Statements are appended to their document covering the assessment of fitness and propriety, and the application of new conduct standards. From those I would highlight;

• "The norm" is for single individuals to perform SIMFs
• That firms may add to the list of conventional Key Functions using a bullet-point checklist
• Firms can "...freely decise how to organise each function in practice"

FCA Consultation Paper

• The existing Approved Persons Regime will be adapted to fit Solvency II and PRA/EIOPA requirements, as well as existing application forms.
• "Pre-approval" will therefore still exist in 2016.
• While the PRA pick up approval of most Key Functions under Solvency II, the FCA keep hold of the approval of Compliance Function heads, which don't feature in the SIMF list.
• Give themselves some leeway to impose approval and conduct obligations on "certain other functions" in insurers
• Appear to be combing over conduct-related rules from their work with the banking industry

Frankly, the amount of crossover between prudential and conduct regulators, existing and new rulebooks, and banking and insurance industries, makes this particular topic an awkward read, which is why I don't work in Compliance!

Levity aside, the outcome of these consultation papers will have a significant effect on insurers existing onboarding and approval processes, content of executive job specifications, and indeed the fundamental operacy of governance systems, given the level of prescription involved. Now would be a good time to start briefing!

EIOPA's Implementing Technical Standards on Internal Model Approval - ready to "submit"?

EIOPA have kicked into life at the end of October like Freddy Krueger on laughing gas, releasing a swarm of consultation papers and summaries. While the releases on Colleges of Supervisors or the calculation of the risk-free interest rate will be of interest to some, my own interest was in a subset of their draft Implementing Technical Standards on Solvency II Approval Processes

I have tried to cover the distinction between ITS and the other weaponry in the hands of EIOPA and legislators here. The aggregated feedback received by EIOPA on the suite of Solvency II approvals covered by ITS is neatly summarised in this doc, with EIOPA adding dollops of proportionality into the summary, to effectively remind supervisors not to treat the applications of giants and pygmys with the same vigour. Given the audience reaction to the UK regulator's industry event a couple of weeks ago, I think 'proportionality' may need to become the PRA's middle name (though it probably works better as its first name...)

Clearly, two big moans have been common threads in the responses received, and both have been rebuffed. The concept of supervisory requests for supplementary information "stopping the clock" on one's approval window has been retained, while the idea of "no answer in 6 months equals approval" has been firmly rejected.

Internal Model approval
- "Easy, Easy"

Of more interest to me than the other approvals covered by the consultation is the Big Daddy himself, Internal Model Approvals. From a UK perspective I have covered this in multiple posts previously (here, here, here and here for a start) , and was interested to see if any more whistles and bells had been added to what is already an area causing serious fatigue within the UK's potential applicants, not to mention a few dozen corpses from the c.100 interested parties back in 2011 (slide 4 here).

I thought the following was worth highlighting;

• Given that the Delegated Acts are already loaded with granular Documentation requirements for IM applications (articles 243 & 244), the ITS insists on a few more pieces! Having cross-referenced between the DAs and the ITS, I reckon the items listed in Article 3 d, h, j, p, q and r are all new requirements, though none would be a stretch to produce.
• Expectations that your model has been in use prior to application (Art 2 (3 a ii)), and is integrated into your current system of governance (Act 2 (c)) - perhaps this is the effort which firms with capital add-ons will be compelled to do in 2016 & 2017 in advance of model applications?
• Results of your "last" Validation Process must be submitted in a Model application (Art 2 (m)) - again, suggests there will need to be a year's worth of "live" modelling in advance of making an application
• The supervisors have 30 days to assess the "completeness" of an application - this feels weirdly generous, given those 30 days count towards the overall 6-month assessment window (provided the application is complete).
• Despite the PRA's firm assertion on Oct 17th (slide 8) that conditional approval for Model applications is not available, Articles 3 (8) and 5 (4 b) both suggest otherwise, namely that proposed "adjustments" or "terms and conditions" can be accounted for in their decision. 
• As much prominence being given to Model Change process and Model Change policy as the initial Model Application process - applications can actually be rejected on the strength of the change policy (Art 5 (2)). Despite that, the articles designated for these areas (Arts 7 & 8) are relatively straightforward.

There is no real reason why these ITS for IM approval won't sail through at the Commission, so best to prepare accordingly. However, UK applicants with 2016 modelling ambitions will of course need to wait further for EIOPA's Common Application Package before they can finalise this montagne de papier.

PRA's Countdown to Solvency II Implementation Event - When I Need U(SPs)

PRA Implementation countdown
- "Feel like dancing" now?

So along with the entire UK Solvency II sticky-beak brigade, I had the unbridled pleasure of attending the PRA's 'Leo Sayer' on Friday, confidently titled Countdown to Implementation, despite going on to list a range of matters which have probably given both Internal Model and Standard Formula firms plenty of enthusiasm to try and turn the clock backwards rapidly!

Paul Fisher, Julian Adams' replacement as Executive Director of Insurance at the PRA, kicked off with a set of Solvency II vox-pops;

• Solvency II is the "main game in town"
• "The end is in sight"
• The PRA are "not gold-plating the Directive"

A nice bit of reassurance at kick-off time then - unfortunately, the clarity which was to follow from the technical specialists on a range of topics was probably not what everyone wanted to hear, given the tone of some of the audience questioning that followed! In particular (and with everything in full quotation marks below having been said by a PRA rep on the day);

• That the PRA will "have to prioritise" if everyone in the IMAP queue for 'from 2016' approval drops their applications in at the end of June, and that applicants should be "striving to submit" sooner. Suggests to me that the smaller firms in IMAP may get bumped to squeeze in the big boys.
• The reinforcement of Mark Carney's message from the other week that they will have no problem refusing permission to use models, though this was couched by Fisher in the more appropriate context of failure to meet any of the TSIMs simply "cannot be allowed".
• That, although over 90% of the UK industry was down for using Standard Formula, the PRA will be equally aggressive when challenging their preparedness as they will for IM firms.

I didn't hang around for the afternoon sessions as I had a hot date with BA, so pull whatever you can out of the Other Approvals and Regulatory Reporting slideshows. However, I would draw attention to the following from the earlier sessions:

Implementation and Policy overview

• The Old Lady of Threadneedle Street protested through multiple speakers about how they recognise that bank and insurance internal models are different, and how Insurance Supervision is now "embedded into the Bank" - I would assume to justify the credit crunch-influenced aggression now being taken by the PRA on assessing capital models (visible from Adams's speech around the time of BOE/FSA merger right through to Bailey's speech at Mansion House on Thursday night).
• An interesting slide 3 about how much more work Solvency II will generate for the PRA from go-live!
• Referred to FLAOR only once before switching to ORSA, suggesting that this disposable acronym is as much of a pain in the neck for the supervisor as it is for firms!
• Highlight what "Good" and "Bad" ORSAs have contained to-date. Clearly some firms are box-ticking, leaving an unusable report which is only skin-deep compliant as output. They were particularly scathing on Stress and Scenario Testing efforts, and implored that Reports should not be written for the PRA's benefit (though naturally must cover what the DAs and EIOPA have already set out).
• A nice piece was discussed around the expected depth of director-level knowledge of their internal models. Andrew Bulley made a useful distinction between "conceptual" and "technical" knowledge, where your dithering 80 year-old INED from the fishing industry might not be expected to understand correlation matrices, but should probably know their significance, and alternatives to them.
• For model applications to date, far too big ("encyclopedic" in cases), with too much process description, and not enough on assumptions and expert judgements.
• That it is a firm's responsibility to "ensure compliance" with the Delegated Acts, and given their lessening proximity to the legislators, the PRA flag in advance that they will not be able to give "concrete advice" to firms in future.

Standard Formula

A particularly good ground-setter, given the dearth of work published previously on Standard Formula firms and the PRA's expectations. Calendar included on the slide pack, which will be of massive use to your PM/PMO staff!

• PRA will review ALL firms ahead of 2016 for SF appropriateness - "priority" firms assessed by Q1 2015, everyone else by end of 2015.
• While SF SCR is apparently close to current ICG numbers for GENERAL insurers in the UK, it is noticeably larger in LIFE firms 
• PRA is "not promoting" SF ahead of internal models
• Vigorously directed all attendees to EIOPA's Underlying Assumptions of SF Paper - expectation that some firms won't read it, and just expect SF plus any add-ons?
• Very vocal on the "significance of the deviation" between SF SCR and one's own Risk Profile - as we know, the Delegated Acts quantify what 'significant' is in the context of capital add-ons
• An expectation that ORSAs will be used in the assessment of SF appropriateness - qualitative for sure, possibly quant elements as well?
• Range of examples of where significant divergences are being found, by Risk Category, and by Life vs General Insurer.
• A lot of emphasis on Capital Add-ons being used "only as a temporary measure", which will ultimately allow firms to PIM/IM or de-risk. They are however "patient and realistic" on how quickly that change can be done, so it sounds on the face of it like 2016 and 2017 will be targeted for Capital Add-on elimination.
• In the following session on models, a piece came up on Capital Add-ons, where the PRA confirmed that their process for handling these in future is "still developing", though they expect them to be "a lot, lot rarer" than the existing regime of ICG.

Internal Models

Calendar also provided for IM firms (slide 4), showing how tight their schedule is, and explaining why they threw the earlier curveball about all firms expecting to drop their applications in on 30th June 2015. They also touched on the following:

• Highlighting weak areas identified to-date such as over-optimistic (new?) business plans being used in capital calculations; ENIDs; omission of certain "Key Risks", and suspiciously low correlations
• That Use Test is "fundamentally important", and is an opportunity for firms to "put their money where their mouth is". They do not expect to see either end of the use spectrum i.e. no use, or blind use!
• Too much technical actuarial validation seen. Usefully suggested that validation questions may be better posed as "where might this model be inadequate", rather than "why is it OK".
• Confirmed that the PRA's SAT has now been replaced by EIOPA's CAT, which won't arrive until the back end of this year - surprisingly, no-one laughed when they said this "might create some work" for existing IMAP programmes!
• Importantly, they stressed that their powers are to Approve or Reject applications, with no "conditional" powers whatsoever. Attendees were therefore encouraged to delay applications which were thought to be unlikely to succeed, both now and in future.

Though they instinctively feel like they could have been supplied sooner, the clarifications provided in the presentations I witnesses will be hugely welcome by programme directors and PM's alike. I would venture a guess that they will be less welcome by executive committees, who may have hoped for more flexibility on the risk quantification front post-2016.

PRA on Solvency II Approvals - One in the "IMAP"

The PRA today released a consultation paper on applying for Solvency II approvals (with the checklists for firms thinking of applying here), covering such juicy topics  as;

• Matching adjustments
• Ancilliary own funds
• USPs
• Group shenanighans (single ORSA for Groups, and excluding entities from Groups)
• SFCR dispensations

And of course the big man on campus - Internal Model Approval.


I had covered on here back in March that EIOPA intened to bring in a common internal model application package (press release here), whilst also noting that while EIOPA "expected" NCAs to accept and use it, it was not compulsory.

IMAP - waste not want not

With the UK being the largest Internal Model application handler by some distance, the stupendous amount of money, management time and administrative effort which had been injected into the IMAP Process since 2011, there was at least a theoretical possibility that the PRA might say "no thanks", and ask its applicants to continue as they were, albeit with an Excel template amended to reflect the Directive and Delegated Acts as they currently stand

Therefore the rather vicious tearing of hair and gnarling of teeth coming from the UK today is the sound of 60-odd internal model applicants finding out that 3 years of IMAP work is now redundant! Section 2.11 of today's CP states;

EIOPA is expected to publish an internal model application template which the PRA will require all firms to use for their formal internal model applications.

...[firms] will be expected to transpose data onto the new EIOPA template when they make their formal application. The PRA will not be updating the SAT to align with EIOPA's application template

Perhaps I am being a touch harsh to call IMAP efforts to-date "redundant". The UK will naturally have dominated EIOPA discussions around what a template should contain, and how it should be structured to assess applications with maximum efficiency, as they have had the Chair of the Internal Model Committee since 2009!

There is an implication in the CP though that the transposition between the two "templates" will not be as seamless as I had imagined back in March, so I suspect that internal model applicants will need to go back to the market looking for expensive IMAP cajolers in the not too distant future. A shame for UK plc, who will rightly feel they have spent a lifetime's money on this topic already.

 

KPMG on Pillar 3 and Public Disclosure - in or out?

Pillar 3 - rude awakening?

The operational reality of Solvency II Pillar 3 is seemingly about to deliver a ruder awakening than breakfast at Chubby Brown's. Whilst for example the UK's regulator has offered an element of flexibility in the content of the QRT reporting to be submitted during the Solvency II preparatory phase (Q21 here), Finance functions across the EU will be in an spreadsheet-fuelled scramble to deliver Solvency I, Solvency II and public reporting from now on in.

The lie of the land is not pretty as it stands. Evidently the PRA's crack team of Pillar 3 regulator and industry expets is tabling some sobering questions, given their recently revised Q&A, and both software solution providers (here) and asset data firms (here) continue to ebb and flow with their contributions to preparedness, depending on the pay-off. Some co-odination efforts have recently begun on asset data transference involving the larger EU players, but doesn't yet sound like the golden ticket for the teams charged with delivering Pillar 3 material.

Even EIOPA, the new custodians of the word ERRATA, are seemingly tied up with the less technologically developed EU members in an Excel-flavoured workaround to the xBRL question which, judging by the number of QRT template amendments already applied, has an air of inevitability about it.

It was therefore nice to see one of the Big 4 release results from this survey on how firms are preparing for Pillar 3 in the content of existing and future public disclosure requirements. Small sample (11 firms, all multinationals), and all evidently have existing plc-type disclosure requirements, but the topics and trends covered should inform anyone in the Pillar 3 space who has transitioning on their agendas.

Worthy of note:

• Pre-Solvency II disclosure of quantitative material not favoured - not much to be gained I suppose
• No-one planning to publish projected capital adequacy!
• Responders in IMAP seemingly working on the basis that "Plan B" won't be required
• Few likely to publish "internal views of capital" ( for this read "overall solvency needs" or "ORSA Capital") - analysts felt unlikely to be looking for it.
• Most common differences between Pillar 1 and OSN used were treatment of contract boundaries and the risk-free rate, with the list of distinctions going into double figures
• Some provisional plans for IFRS alignment on the balance sheet methodology front
• Embedded Value about to be jettisoned as a reporting metric - analysts are of course devastated!

Who said accountancy was boring?