Central Bank of Ireland - Corporate Governance Code refresh

The Irish approach to corporate governance in financial services, at least up until the onset of the financial crisis in 2006/07, resembled something of an all-you-can-grasp buffet for a select number of executive golf club pals and octogenarian ex-politico Non-Executive Directors (NEDs), having their voting arms operated a la Weekend at Bernies.

Ireland pre-2007 - Waking NED?

The new FSA-flavoured approach brought in by Matthew Elderfield in 2009 (elaborated on here) fortified by the findings of a devastating 2011 report summarising the truly horrid governance practices in the Irish banking industry, has led to a change of regulatory tack at the Central Bank of Ireland that represents the biggest volte-face in Europe since the Macarena.

Alongside PRISM, a piece of revolutionary work in the assessment of financial institutions by supervisory bodies, the CBoI also made substantial changes in areas such as Annual Compliance Statements, Fitness and Probity of directors, Risk Appetite Statements.

All of this ran off the back of Mr Elderfield's first major gig in 2010, a full revamp of the Corporate Governance Code, which could hitch a ride off the back of the work of the FSA and CEIOPS (at the time!) and deliver a more substantial suite of obligations to a cabal of directors who, after feasting on carrots for years, desperately needed the stick.

This makes the release of yesterday's consultation on the Corporate Governance code a touch baffling, as the ink is barely dry on 2010's effort - it perhaps reflects that the regulator has reached optimum staffing levels if they can review it so regularly! Having said that, the level of divergence from accepted CG practices in the UK was flagged by Grant Thornton back in 2011 as being substantial, so a point-in-time revamp should not be so unwelcome, regardless of the proximity to the last one, and of course, all of this activity was too late to prevent Quinn Insurance from going down.

They emphasise that this review takes into account developments in the Solvency II space, as well as on-the-ground experience and publications from other parties of interest. Of particular note was their emphasis that, where national regulations are not as stringent as relevant EU or international one (or indeed vice versa?), the most onerous one should be complied with. In a number of instances around corporate governance, this will mean the CBoI outranking Solvency II as the more onerous of the two!

While these are proposals rather than stitched-on changes at this point, the CBoI doesn't have a great track record for backtracking these days. Highlights for me were;

Risk Committees

• Require a majority of NEDs on Risk Committees, and must be chaired by a NED

Committees in general

• Require the Risk Committee and Audit Committee chairs to sit on each other's committees
• Require the Remuneration Committee chair to sit on the Risk Committee
• In High Impact firms, the Risk Committee and Audit Committee Chair may not be the same person
• Must be at least 3 members of Risk Committees and Audit Committees

Chief Risk Officers

• They note that it is "Generally accepted best practice" to have a CRO who, amongst other tasks, is charged with "...facilitating risk appetite setting by the Board". In addition;
• All "High Impact" firms will be required to appoint a specialist CRO
• Firms with a lower PRISM rating may have a CRO who is shared with another control function, "...provided that there is no conflict of interest between the two roles". Can't help but feel that this might rule out CRO/Chief Actuary dual roles, but allows for CRO/Head of Compliance and CRO/Head of Internal Audit, which would be to the chagrin of the Society of Actuaries in Ireland!
• CRO to have direct access to the Chairman of the Board

Board Meeting frequency

• Seem to acknowledge that the compulsory 11 meetings per year for High Impact firms may be a touch much, so are looking for comments
• Also acknowledge that compulsory 1 meeting per calendar quarter is a bit constrictive for the smaller firms, so may relieve this to be pragmatic

Chairman and CEO

• Some of the restrictions around number of roles held at any one time to be relieved for smaller firms, but seemingly only to populate inter-Group roles.

Board Diversity

• Acknowledges that, while the debate in the EU is gender-centric, that diversity of all types is a worthy target for Boards, but falls short of compelling firms to do anything at national level, choosing to seek comments and wait for the supra-national activity to drive any compulsion. This seems to fit with the thinking of Irish directors published back in 2011 i.e. no "Golden Skirt" quotas.

Random

• "...appropriate Risk Culture" makes its way in (6.3), perhaps cognisant of the FSB's proposals
• Built in a piece which allows for video-conferencing rather than physical attendance at meetings (7.5)
• Board responsibilities updated (13.1)
• Compulsory Board skills matrix (14.9)

Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors - recommendations for UK financial services

The Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors recently created a sub-committee to provide professional guidance "...designed to be a benchmark for effective internal audit in financial services in the UK", and they have just reported back with this feast of fun, which is a vital read for anyone working in control functions within financial services. The opinions they have used to create this guidance have been purloined not only from the profession itself, but also from other professions, regulatory bodies and executive/non-executive directors

They note in summary that there is "strong support for an unrestricted scope for internal audit", while drawing attention to disparity of opinion around matters such as: IA directly challenging strategy; IA reporting to Risk Committees (rather than audit committees) in certain instances; compulsory attendance of Chief Internal Auditors at Executive Committees; and the direction of managerial reporting lines.

The proposed guidance reads very much like the Corporate Governance Code, and is relatively light. It is broken into the following sections, where I have noted anything I found new or controversial alongside (my focus being predominantly scope creep into the Risk function's activity):

1. Role and Mandate of IA - increased focus on risk assessment and risk coverage adequacy
2. Scope and Priorities of IA - unrestricted scope ultimately advised; expected to "independently determine" key risks, and assess "the setting of, and adherence to, risk appetite"; assess the "risk and control culture"; allows for potential involvement of IA on "real time basis" in key corporate events (mergers, disposals, new lines of business etc)
3. Reporting results - factors in reporting obligations to both Risk and Audit Committees where appropriate, and builds in an expectation of an annual independent assessment of governance (which covers off one of the FSB's recommendations covered yesterday!)
4. Interaction with Risk, Compliance and Finance functions - nothing new
5. Independence and Authority - Chief Internal Auditor expected to be executive committee-equivalent, have the right to attend Excom, access to all MI, and report directly to either the Chairman of the Board, Audit Committee or at a push, Risk Committee. A secondary line to an executive director should only go to CEO
6. Resources - all resourcing decisions effectively divorced from the business, to reside with the Chief Internal Auditor and the Audit Committee
7. Quality assessment - external assessment of the function recommended periodically.
8. Relationships with regulators - nothing new
9. Wider considerations - expectation that the "tone at the top" of a firm should be what fosters acceptance of IA

Any controversy? Perhaps around the seniority of the Chief Internal Auditor, and their assessment of the setting of and adherence to Risk Appetite. I think my main concern as a risk practitioner would be the potential for differences of opinion around what constitutes "adequate" risk management, given the Internal Audit predeliction for COSO on all things risk-related, against the IRM or ISO31000. 

Let battle commence?