KPMG's Solvency II Readiness Survey for CEE - the flaw in EIOPA's plan?

So KPMG released this little gem in the same time period as Solvency II preparedness became something of a moot point!

Drawing in responses from 84 people, with around three-quarters EU-based and 70% under £100m in GWP, the questions were posed in Q2 2012, so with Omnibus II missing the last plenary before summer holidays, the writing was already on the wall - despite that, KPMG reckon most respondees would have been working to a 2014 go-live date. It expands on their 2010 work in this area, where 44% or respondents hadn't got started on their Solvency II projects, so progress on that front would be considered a good start!

I gleaned the following from it;

• 31% not expecting to be "Solvency II compliant" before 2014 - one problem that's gone away then!
• Almost half do not have a risk management function in line with the Directive, with smaller companies the main culprits
• Only 19% (down from 40% in 2010) will be using IM or PIM for SCR calculation. Attributed to the realities of building them as well as Groups rethinking their IMAP strategies over the last few years.
• 62% of companies not even planning an ORSA dry run until 2013 at the earliest, with 14% not planning for one at all as it stands.
• Only 14% electing to use more than 3 years as their "business planning period" for ORSA - two thirds settling for 3 years - supports the anecdotal trend of 3-5 years as par for the course
• 20% reported that their internal models allow for multiple year calculations to project for the ORSA - not sure if that is stochastic or deterministic though, didn't think any of the kernel technologies out there could do multi-year projections
• Half of companies have 50% or less of the data required to populate their QRTs
• Extraordinary perceptions on staffing requirements for both project and BAU, which even KPMG are drawn into calling "excessively pessimistic and indeed unrealistic" - it may be led in some respects by subsidiaries using shared Group services, but is still shocking in its naivety.
• Three quarters would like "more interpretation" from their regulator on Level 1 and 2 texts - not sure what there is to "interpret", so maybe its the Pillar 2 and 3 elements that they are struggling with (the other stats here would certainly lend weight to that).
• More than half of model applicants strugglinbg with Validation, highlights assumption setting and expert judgement as problem areas (no surprises there)
• 70% looking to define "new roles and responsibilities" around Data Governance - as referenced in my earlier post, not convinced that will end happily. Over a quarter don't plan to compile their data dictionaries until mid-2013.
• Only a third looking to do full SCR calculations quarterly, and over 50% look like they will struggle to generate the SCR calculation faster than 8 weeks.
• 20% have a dedicated Solvency II team - explaining a lot of the shortfalls in preparedness relative to Western Europe, but given the delays and uncertainty, a financially astute move.

What should worry EIOPA is the results around control function preparedness, or lack of it. If Sr Bernadino thinks that the low hanging fruit of Pillar 2 is ripe for picking before 2016, a quick review of those stats would suggest that a decent number of the 27 countries are in no such state.

Accenture study on Risk Analytics - lessons for Insurance Industry

Decent piece of benchmarking from Accenture on the current usage of risk analytics as well as drivers for the future. 450 mostly c-suite level respondees from across industries (40% insurers), but the findings are targeted specifically at the Insurance industry. Interestingly, respondees leaned towards incomplete data sets, rather than a lack of data or technological capability, as the main constraint.

While it touches on a number of areas of interest for Use Test specialists, it also covers Stress and Scenario Testing (13% of Life and 21% of P&C insurers reporting that they "rarely" or "never" use stress testing in decision making), and Reporting (which suggests the main driver for reporting improvements is regulatory rather than voluntary, due to regulators "...[increasing] their focus on the quality and frequency of reporting"). Internal Modelling also gets a mention, with almost 80% of respondents saying they already use, or are planning to use, an internal model for capital adequacy requirements.

Data Governance  of course gets decent treatment here. Only 69% of insurers polled currently have a Data Policy, but 41% have a data quality department, which feels alarmingly high, particularly when drawn against Accenture's comment that "...many firms have insufficient rigor who owns data, who sets it up and who manages it". The FSA concurred with that in their preliminary Data Quality Review findings back in September, and I'm not at all convinced that a DQ department will help in this respect (i.e. BAU absolve themselves of responsibility for their data sets!)

The Accenture crew use the "Leaders" and "Laggards" analogy throughout, so benchmark away and find out which one you are!

EIOPA Conference in Frankfurt - "The authenticity of hopelessness"

"What do we want?" - "SOLVENCY II"
"When do we want it?" - "WHENEVER!"

...or so goes the leitmotif of today's EIOPA conference in Frankfurt, attended by the great and good from EIOPA, the Commission and various regulatory/lobbying bodies - ably tweeted by DIMA and Mr Varnell.

Sr. Bernadino's early morning speech covers the IORP issue as well as pure Solvency II, and tells us;

• Politicial institutions should commit to Solvency II
• All need to agree on "sound and prudent regime" for valuing long-term guarantees - EIOPA hoping to receive a clear mandate "as soon as possible", which is not promising for outcome delivery to a March 2013 plenary session!
• Regardless of how long we stretch out to for full go-live ("not earlier than 2016" is his indication in the speech, rather than a fait accompli), EIOPA will look to co-ordinate early implementation of Pillar 2 and Pillar 3 elements based on their existing powers. Not certain if that means "existing" anticipates including or excluding the Omnibus II changes though.

Interestingly, on the same day our pals at Bloomberg produced this tidy summary of piecemeal introduction of elements of Pillars 2 and 3 which touches on some of the elements from my blog post the other week - particularly like Oliver Bate's "Balkanisation" comment!

Since Bernadino's speech the tweetosphere has been full of comment from the Montalvos/Van Hulles/Creedons etc around the practicalities of Pillar 1 parallel running, leading or following IAIS developments in insurance regulation, and ORSA - get stuck in on the #EIOPA2012 hashtag!

Solvency II compliance ahead of "Go-Live" date - over to you, regulators

Judging by the rather resigned tones around the achievability of Solvency II "go-live" by 2014 (CBoI recently joining the FSA) and 2015 (here and here), there appears to be a growing swell of support for implementing some of the less wobbly bits sooner rather than later.

While it's unlikely that there will be more spurious adoptions than a Madonna safari trip, it is interesting to see what we can point at to-date;

UK - ICA+ regime, which lends itself, subject to the quality of the ICA-to-SCR reconciliation, to implementation from as early as year-end 2013, though one suspects 2014 is a safer bet.

Germany - Cheeky bit of Pillar II, judging by Bafin's (indirectly quoted) comments on Reuters today, although what "some risk controls" actually means is another thing!

Ireland - via the sterling work on PRISM, fitness and probity and corporate governance, it's hard to argue where they are not already Pillar II Solvency II-equivalent (at least in word, if not in deed!)

France - reference to compulsory submissions to the ACP in XBRL by Q1 2014 at the bottom of this doc, apparently confirmed at a recent soiree.

So we could very well have 3 Pillar coverage by 2014, just randomly spread out over multiple countries...

Any more for any more?

Legal and General - Counting the cost of Solvency II

Spotted by his Lordship John Walton this morning, L&G  appear to have broken the mould by dropping some substantive Solvency II comment into their Q3 IMS, notably that they have booked £129m of costs in project spend.

They also go on to plead unhappiness on the inability of the rules as they stand to encourage the provision of long-term capital to the wider economy, echoing DG Faull's rollocking letter to Sr Bernadino the other week on longer-duration debt instrument capital costs, though are clearly only interested in UK investment opportunities as opposed to loading up on fruity Eurozone government debt (good on you!).

Of course the Solvency II preparation costs of most of the big-boys have been covered on this blog before, and £129m feels suitably light for a UK-focused business in comparison to some of its more complicated competitors. That said, with the FSA offering some hope of a transition to "ICA+" rather than dual running ICA and IM SCR for the next x years, how much leverage does this sort of investment buy a firm down at Canary Wharf when it comes to meeting the transitional criteria?

Look forward to seeing a bit more of these disclosures over the next week or so now we are in IMS season, but not counting on it!

Institute of Risk Management on Risk Culture - ABCs, Double S's and mercenaries

So I figured it might be worth seeing how the other half were living by reading something that didn't start with "Solvency II" and end with "indefinite delay"!

The IRM are endeavouring to produce white papers on some of the less tangible elements of a risk practitioner's day job, which one would hope contribute to more consistency in practitioner approaches and ultimately more credence in the concept of risk professionalism (indeed, their work around defending pure risk professionalism as a career, as opposed to loading risk functions with cross-over actuaries, was very much required in early 2011).

Having scrutinised their work on Risk Appetite in 2011 (lined up against some of the competing influencing bodies here), I figured it was only fair to take a punt at their new release on Risk Culture. It's fair to say that for politicians, regulators and fingers-caught-in-the-till employees, 'culture' or 'risk culture' appears to be a handy soundbite when explaining why they didn't fulfil their obligations to their stakeholders. The IRM are joined by Protiviti in producing this guidance, Protiviti themselves having delivered a survey based on UK insurers on this very topic in the summer, which was not shy about highlighting how little some organisations think of their Risk functions.

I've always felt that the 'culture' comfort blanket was one weasel word too many i.e. "there was a culture of greed" = "they were greedy ********", or "there was a culture of fear" = "scared of the gaffer", so I approached this doc with a pretty open mind, but tempered with a Manxman's natural scepticism. I found the following (sequentially);

What does a good risk culture look like?

• Appears to have used examples of what a "bad" risk culture has recently led to, then flipped that on its head! Would have thought a clean slate approach is better for white papers, rather than reacting to zeitgeist incidents
• Fair list of 10 criteria for anyone in the risk culture assessment space, though will always be a nightmare to codify/quantify.
• The appearance of the dreaded "tone from the top" suggestion, which makes an appearance in the FRC's (p4), the FSA's and EIOPA's world (p10) - bearing in mind that the "top" is normally the problem when it comes to organisational catastrophe (Lehman, Northern Rock) as opposed to fat tail op risk loss events UBS/Credit Agricole/JP Morgan), I would be more inclined to call it "tone at the top".

What does risk culture mean?

• I like the IRM's take on culture being "the repeated behaviour" of a group - very convincing definition in comparison to say the FSA in SYSC (p12), though the rest of the ABC approach is a tad woolly.
• "Virtuous" versus "vicious" cycle sits nicely alongside this image of repetition, but nothing as such around how best to break a vicious one, either as a NED or a Head of Risk - perhaps that has been saved for the more extensive and expensive practitioner's guide!

Why is risk culture important?

• Don't agree that risk culture affects the capability to take strategic decisions, rather it enhances or impairs the quality of those decisions. Immediately makes me think of ORSA, and how "playing" at it or "doing" it doesn't prevent strategic decisions from being made.
• Also don't agree that "at worst" an inappropriate risk culture could lead to "serious reputational and financial damage" - I'm sure stockholders at Bear Stearns may say it can be a bit graver than that!
• Nice emphasis on how risk culture can both stifle necessary risk-seeking behaviour at one extreme (smartly citing Eastman Kodak as a "too slow" corporate failure), as well as the more obvious "prison rules" which emerge from uncontrolled risk taking.

What can the board do?

• Should they really ask themselves "what is the current risk culture"? If so, is that at a chinwag-type round table, or via some kind of evaluation survey issued by Risk function? Instinctively sounds like the kind of thing that would be squeezed into a Q1/Q3 board meeting at the point of a gun, which is as cynical as it is sad!

Understanding risk culture in an organisation

• The meatier (i.e. costs money!) practitioner guide apparently contains some diagnostic tools to effectively indicate and track culture within an organisation. The flash we are given here reminds me of the psychometric testing for "what makes a great Risk Manager" that I looked at last year, but feels ultimately very high-end.
• The "Double S" model is an intriguing addition to the mix, specifically the comment that low scores on either rating "create a barrier to the effective management of risk". Would love to see more of the research cited, as I've found that the odd mercenary firm can work wonders...

Changing a risk culture

• Can a risk culture effectively be changed top-down without a change in personnel? Can't imagine an existing CEO being prepared to antagonise his board/exec team by declaring them culturally bankrupt unless he had carte blanche to do so, which is normally the case with regime change. I'm more inclined to think a decent CEO, partnered with Risk, could do it by stealth, rather than with a pricey change management programme which would inevitably rock a few boats.
• "Risk culture is not a precise science" - does that make it an art?

10 questions a Board should ask itself

• I would probably make it 11 questions, and frame the first one "Do we genuinely care about how culture impacts on our decision making, or only insofar as laws and regulations insist upon it?". If a Risk practitioner gets the answer to that directly from the Board/Exec, the other questions can be catered for with proportional vigour.

Thought provoking in the right ways, I guess it does what a good white-paper should - thanks to all concerned at the Institute.

Aon Benfield's CRO guide to Solvency II - in case you're not ready yet...

For all those CROs who are about to get left holding the Solvency II baby three years early by their over-enthusiastic executive colleagues, Aon Benfield pulled together a CRO guide to Solvency II which aims to take the journey "from complexity to best practice". 10 out of 10 for ambition...

It leans heavily towards General Insurers/Reinsurers (indeed it reads like a reinsurance sales brochure in many parts!), but nevertheless contains a suite of very useful content for anyone in the Risk space, as well as attempting to shatter a few myths. I took the following from it;

• Steady early bits on capital planning and common questions a CRO should be posing in that space
• On page 5, an excellent table comparing standard formula against internal modelling by risk driver, in particular emphasising why internal modelling may be more appropriate, rather than how much capital it could shave off. Being able to explain to the national regulator why one has neglected to apply the enhancements that internal modelling introduces to the accuracy of one's quantitative risk profile would be a smart thing for CROs to practice!
• The undo some of that noble work by suggesting part of any IM feasibility study should include estimating the capital benefits!
• Nice examples at the top of p6 of what mixes of business lend themselves to benefitting from an IM approach
• Highlighting that domicile of firm continues to dictate feasibility of IMs for smaller firms (i.e some countries can't staff it!).
• Recommend reviewing SF SCR factoring in the draft L2 asap. As was clear from the E&Y research I covered yesterday, many firms across the EU consider themselves to be advanced in the Pillar 1 space while disregarding draft L2. They highlight the Swiss experience as one where they struggled to authorise models for "Day 1" approval, and the Aon crowd propose some meaningful contingencies on p8
• Useful analysis of capital drivers and optimisation strategies (p9-10)
• Section on expert judgement validation (p15), touching on the Level 3 expectations, and in particular how a (non-Actuarial) CRO may struggle to adequately challenge certain judgement calls, such as selected data series or correlation matrices, without specialist advice. Very hard for smaller firms to obtain that, as most of their actuarial function will have probably contributed to the judgement!
• Note that one of the key challenges for documenting the IM is getting the best-placed people (who are normally swimming in BAU) to pick up a pen and write!
• Neat section on ORSA (p27-29), emphasising that SF firms with complex risk profiles may find they struggle to justify that approach when concluding the assessment. They go on to suggest that early experiences of ORSA Report/process documentation submissions have left CROs feeling that the regulatory approach is (Level 3?) tickbox as to content expectations.
• Key challenges for CRO in briefing and educating senior colleagues for Solvency II-readiness are all fair, in particular the gap that could emerge if a CRO is not also an executive member.
• The section on Risk Appetite is particularly useful for smaller non-IMAP firms, who may struggle to quantify their target measures - whether using Standard Deviations/volatility measures as suggested is a touch too simple depends on the business I guess.
• The Pillar 3 section hits on the same issues I (and the FSA!)have picked up on earlier, such as end-user computing, inability to transition to BAU, data ownership issues etc.

I did take exception to a couple of bits in here, where the industry or indeed common sense appears to suggest otherwise;

• The "fallacy" outlined on p5 that an IM enables a firm to hold less capital than an SF equivalent. The research I pointed to yesterday (p20) suggests across the EU that modellers are already "making it rain" with their capital savings
• That the IM alternative for Op Risk is based on ORIC and individual loss event info. I'd certainly seen Milliman suggest that this approach is as flimsy as the SF approach, recommending options such as Bayesian networks to generate IM inputs.
• Concerns that evidencing senior management model "use" could create a "value-destroying documentation burden". Is that what we call "minutes" these days!
• Comments around the documentation delivery for the Internal Model Application Process becoming detached from the underlying processes referenced in those docs influencing BAU value-adding activity are perfectly valid, but no real solution is proposed.
• The operation of the Model Change Policy features heavily (p19-21), as anyone in that space would expect. Again. little offered in the way of solutions, but I certainly would have expected more discussion on the "scope" of the model, which in my experience is a solid, liquid or gas depending on which control function you speak to, and I'm sure the FSA would agree!

PS All the best to you guys on the US East Coast, let's hope the worst has passed...

Ernst and Young European Solvency II survey - the storm before the calm...

So Ernst and Young have decided to join the party with one of the more noble attempts to gather EU-wide industry opinion on progress towards Solvency II compliance, and kindly published those findings recently. Yes, I understand that this survey came out over a week ago, but I left my notes in the Isle of Man last Monday, and I'm not so enthusiastic that I fancied another turbo-prop into Ronaldsway Airport to 'go fetch'.

There was naturally plenty of media comment on its content (here, here and here for a start, but I'm sure you can do better), but bearing in mind it was released with a backdrop of 2015/2016 and the moveable feast that is UK IMAP, one could be forgiven for not caring less about the results that point to preparedness 'by 2014'. However, the E&Y guys obviously stayed up all night to do it, so I gave it the once-over and noted the following;

Sample - 160+ respondents from 19 countries, about as volumous as I have come across, though clearly weighted towards medium/large firms (€100m+ premium income per annum), and what we might call "old" Europe.

General

• 90% reckoned they could be compliant by 2015 (though E&Y say that is the date proposed by the EC, rather than to it)
• High level of confidence around Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 preparedness, though shockingly two-thirds of respondents did not use the draft L2 rules when producing their balance sheet, which makes you wonder what constitutes "ready" in some countries! 
• 80% not meeting Pillar 3 "requirements", with loose use of the expression "all requirements" for (as mentioned for Pillar 1, is this 'Level 1 plus draft Level 2', or 'Level 1 plus EIOPA advice'?). One of the worst affected areas is the development of a Disclosure Policy, which I find as understandable as I do sad.
• Almost 70% have only met some of the data quality requirements - I'm sure the national regulators, in particular the FSA, would wince at that, even factoring in an extension.
• Very interesting stat on the number of respondents developing Partial Internal Models (around half), with half of that number again looking for, what was at the time, "Day 1 approval". I wonder if the likely shift of "Day 1" to 2015 or 2016 allows these figures to flex, and if the national regulators are staffed to cope with it?
• "Range of capital optimisation strategies" will be applied by the majority of respondents in 2013 - curious to know why firms would not optimise their capital deployment as a matter of course!
• Larger organisations said to be tailing off expenditure during 2013 and have delivered compliance by mid-2014. Will an extension simply elongate existing expenditure plans or require fresh budget, and indeed how many times can one go 'back to the well' on this?
• ORSA is by some distance the biggest laggard in the Pillar 2 space, with only 30% "mostly" meeting requirements as they stand. Can only imagine the question was asked before EIOPA came back on the L3 public consultation in June, as EIOPA were pretty clear on what to do next.
• Some pretty flabby words on Data and IT readiness, but easy to get the general picture of "not very good" progress, particularly in the end-user computing space (three-quarters

E&Y angles

• Clearly lobbying for recalibrating long-duration debt (p5)
• Bit of scaremongering for smaller companies on their resource estimates (p6) - shake them down all you want, they just can't afford you!
• Strange bit of touting done around a lack of formal assessment around the effectiveness of one's Risk Management System (p12) - don't believe this is compulsory, only that your Risk Management System is effective.
• Also fishing hard for what was previously low hanging fruit around documentation, data governance and use test (p20).

Internal Model - specific

• Two thirds of French and half of German internal model applicants not fishing for "Day 1" approval - not sure if this is due to BAFIN and the ACP playing hardball (already seen an instance of a modeller fleeing Germany), but an extension to 2016 puts them back in the game for "Day 1" surely.
• Some expected discontent, though not in the majority, around the current SF risk calibrations (Op risk too low, underwriting and market too high). Even number found credit risk too high and too low, perhaps reflecting thought on long duration corporate debt and Eurozone government debt respectively.
• Nearly 80% of respondents expect the IM SCR to be at least 10% lower than SF SCR.

Worth adding as a footnote that 14% of UK respondents thought they'll be ready for implementation "in the course of 2012" - without Level 2 kiddies, are you sure!

FSA's Adams on Solvency II delay, IMAP and ICA - how long do you want lads?

It would appear that stabs in the dark on the Solvency II implementation date by senior insurance industry officials are like British buses - after the omerta-like silence of September, no fewer than three bigwigs have piped up in the last few days. First Sr. Bernadino decided to do his briefing via a Stateside publication, settling on 2016 as most probable, followed by Sr Montalvo who concurred (along with a great joke about his missus!).

While it didn't take a handsome Archaeology graduate to know that 2014 was ash, what the industry likes more than anything is cold, hard confirmation from their friendly national supervisor...

...which came today! Julian Adams gave a speech this morning ostensibly about the practical side of implementing the PRA's new approach after they get divorced from their FCA counterparts next year. Worth bulleting the big messages on IMAP;

• Current timetable "completely unrealistic" after Plenary postponement confirmed last week
• 2015 "...likely to prove very challenging"
• FSA will agree a revised landing slot with IMAP participants (presumably just those who have yet to submit?), UP TO A MAXIMUM OF END DECEMBER 2015.
• Will change this to match up with what comes out of Brussels if the two are divergent
• For ICAS, "we will have to live with the current regime for longer than any of us expected"
• The previously stated "aspiration" of potentially replacing ICA with internal model SCR will be formalised into a two step process. First, reconcile ICA with IM SCR (the easy bit!), then once the FSA are sufficiently happy, just produce IM SCR.
• Retain discretion to apply ICG throughout the interim period
• Benefits of this approach will therefore include much meatier pre-application evidence of use.

Hard to know where to go with this. Great news for anyone who remains on target for their original landing slots, as there is potentially some early-adopter capital benefits if they can abandon ICA. That said, the recent E&Y industry survey (which I will look at separately) suggested the Brits are mostly in a good spot for IMAP, so does extending the window negatively impact on the work already delivered? Certainly opens up a rather pricey Pandora's box around Validation activity which I'm sure many firms would have been delighted to have paid for one-time-only!

All in all, these public declarations will be welcomed by everyone who isn't writing a cheque for next year's IMAP activity...

Solvency II implementation delay - round up

"No news is good news" so goes the old motto, but in the case of this blog, "no news is new news"! After last week's sneaky peek at the options presented during trialogue discussions, the inevitable change of  EU Parliamentary Procedure file for Omnibus II was duly applied, and will now be discussed at the Plenary on March 28-31^st 2013 (honest).

That wouldn't have ruled out either of the options on the table of the Trialogue parties at the moment, but they might struggle to squeeze in an impact study on LTGs and publish the findings between now and March, particularly after it was made publicly clear by one regulator that EIOPA were not going to start that work as scheduled. The EIOPA lads did push out the tech specs for balance sheet valuation today though, which should at least get the frog out of the box.

 

It would have been a push to complete the study and leave enough digestion-time by March-end even without a late kick-off, so our friend Sr Bernadino has happily corroborated the "Big 4" speculators and faceless "sources" promoting 2016 as the new "go-live" date by giving his own counsel to the Wall Street Journal (cited in this non-paywall article). His preference for 2015 is qualified with the probability that 2016 will prevail.

 

While thumbing my nose at the Reuters article above, it does make the link between postponement and the Commission's desire to immediately spur longer-term investment in a stagnating, rioting, semi-employed Eurozone (which is much easier without Solvency II's heavy embrace, particularly the calibration of capital requirements for long duration debt instruments which the document referenced in this post covers all too well).

 

However, for DG Faull to effectively command a recalibration of that element now the going is a bit better makes you wonder how many more cherries we are going to pick - un deux trois, nous irons aux bois...

Society of Actuaries in Ireland on ORSA - a rock in a sea of turmoil

In these days of certainty around the Solvency II implementation timetable (i.e. certainly not 2014!), it’s nice to cling on to the consultant's comfort blanket of ORSA which, thanks to the IAIS and NAIC, isn’t disappearing in a hurry for global insurers. This item flagged on the SAI's newsletter last month, but dating back to April, would benefit anyone working in the ORSA space, being a "practical considerations" guide which is very accessible for non-actuaries, particularly for assessing or challenging options for the required ORSA processes.

 

The document takes care to reference the at-the-time EIOPA guidelines in each chapter (which would have been superseded by June's release of course, but didn't change seismically), and does an excellent job of focusing on required processes as opposed to ORSA Reporting, which these types of papers often do. Worth reading all but noting the following;

Overview

·     Proportionality - remember justification of approach is as important as executing the selected approach itself.

·     Documentation - "...Traditionally, this is not an area of strength for actuaries" - I'll drink to that!

ORSA Contributors

·     "It is likely" that Risk will co-ordinate the process. This logic follows on from the IRM’s survey findings (p2) which saw Risk as predominantly leading early process development, and there is nothing to suggest the other candidate functions are likely to be sufficiently staffed in the BAU world to both actively participate and co-ordinate.

·     Board as "owners” of the ORSA – this is an important point which, for practitioners, is awkwardly inferred by the Directive text, rather than spelled out. Indeed this document later goes on to say the Risk function "will likely be the owner of the overall ORSA process".

This gruesome melange of who owns what in the ORSA space (and indeed what 'ownership' confers), remains a little too common in thought papers like this, so be certain to define these elements in your ORSA Policy.

·     Capital Management function - "ORSA is the process where risk and capital management get together" - get a room you guys!

Policy and Process

·     Generally a very clean and useful section, particularly around "dynamic" and "static" processes and their outputs. Section on ORSA Report content is less useful, being based on the 2008 issues paper, and there are plenty of papers covering that topic (sift through yourself!).

·     Projection process - No suggestion of whether recommendations from balance sheet projection activity should be balled up in the ORSA Report or reported separately as part of conventional committee/Board reporting. I always found this element a nuisance to pin down, as one wouldn’t necessarily want to present material of such significance in a 20-200 page ORSA Report if it meant it didn’t get the appropriate table time at strategy days etc.

Economic Capital 

·     Practical obstacles - all seem to revolve around there being a shortage of actuarial time/resource. Well get off my land and go do some counting then!

EC and Risk Management

·     Document is a little unclear around risk appetite framework/risk management framework/risk management system terminology, which is a little unhelpful

·     Interesting comment regarding non-quantification of risk that "risks cannot be quantified" rather than "risks cannot be quantified easily" – this is an actuarial paper, you guys can quantify anything, surely!

·     Define reverse stress testing as "testing to destruction" - the UK definition is more discrete than this, and certainly more useful for stimulating debate in Board exercises

ORSA Projections

·     More industry consensus on what 'business planning period' constitutes, being 3-5 years. Barely seen anything to suggest firms venturing outside this window for projection purposes.

·     Nice simple explanation of the component parts of the economic balance sheet which should be projected as well as recommendations for projecting risk appetite metrics and the P&L.

·     Suggestion that, unless already stochastically projecting, firms will project deterministically, "unless the company is planning significant changes to its future business mix". Judging by the jostling for position around Long Term Guarantees right now, is that not likely to be quite a few!

·     Acknowledge that the approaches already used for Financial Condition Reporting should be leaned on for smaller or less complex entities.

Scenarios

·     Reverse stress testing has grown into a different beast from that reference earlier in the piece, incorporating "back-solving" (new one on me!), and looks for events that reduce own funds to zero - not sure I've heard RST defined like that before, and certainly not convinced that own funds of zero necessarily constitutes "destruction"

·     Good recommendation for selecting scenarios from emerging risk assessments as well as a firm’s existing quantum – best not to take the path of least resistance in this area of ORSA.

Omnibus II and the inevitable delay - why it's not so clear cut

Fantastic work over on the Solvency II Wire from Gideon on the meat and potatoes inside the eternally-baking Omnibus II pie, illustrating why the trialogue parties haven't just rolled over and declared 2015 as the new 2014.

While it would appear that the lobbying arms at Insurance Europe, AMICE, GCAE etc haven't piped up on industry preference yet, it looks like we have two deeply unpleasant alternatives to look forward to; hard launching a year late (i.e Omnibus II would only get signed off after the recently requested LTG consultation but 2015 would be the definitive "go-live"), or soft launching with 2 years parallel running (i.e. Omnibus II can go through before the LTG consult is finished, but with the sword of Damocles hanging over its contibution to the regulations until 2016).

My guess would be that there is little appetite in the firms for parallel running Solvency I/Solvency II to 2016 based on the administrative burdens this would currently place on the UK in particular through the current ICA process. A 'hard' 2015 and some more effective leadership in Brussels would be welcome relief to Solvency II Programmes from a planning perspective, though the knock-on effect on the model approval process and other scheduled supervisory work is yet to be seen.

Oddly, the EIOP-ians of the world pushed out the 2013 Work Programme this week which of course skips over any of the practicalities around such a delay - so having "already achieved a great deal" in Solvency II prep, they will "finalise the [53] standards and guidelines" currently required of them, set up an "internal model support expert unit", and "finalise the preparation of the [supervisory] Colleges" - and all of this while Rome burns!

It is a perverse situation when a subject as politically divisive as capital requirements for long term guarantees across the union is not as complex as trying to get three well-briefed parties around a table to agree on an implementation date. At a time when the Commission wants an inflation-busting funding rise (which Parliament have 'ole'd through) and EIOPA have grown in headcount and cost by 50% y-o-y, the alarming regularity with which national self-interest and horse-trading has derailed a project of such significance makes me long for the jingoistic certainty of the Corn Laws - I'm guessing that's not a good thing...

Deloitte with more on the US-of-ORSA

Billed as a "regulatory guidepost to the future", Deloitte in the States have published their thoughts on ORSA developments, following on from recent activity in the space, most notably the NAIC's adoption of the RMORSA Act a few weeks back.

Hard to tell whether Deloitte have borrowed much from their European counterparts, who ponied up with the EIOPA-compliant equivalent document last week, but both documents ultimately point at the same end goal, namely getting the ORSA Process and ORSA Report content right.

Confidently declaring the first regulatory filing of an ORSA Report to be precisely, errr, "Sometime in 2015", the stateside plans are anchored more to ERM and, I guess by association, ratings agency implications. The document does help identify a couple elements which, with the Solvency II hat on, are easy to forget;

• IAIS ICP 16 is bringing ORSA to the table of all signatories at some future juncture (which means I may get a job back home one day!)
• Existing techniques for monitoring solvency, even in a jurisdiction of this size, are seemingly past their sell-by-date in terms of both content and turnaround time (p2) - holds true for many of the Solvency II-covered countries as well (plenty on that topic in here).

The rest of the document draws out the preparatory work which firms should be undertaking, despite the relative lack of certainty at this point in time, such as increasing real-time data availability and changes in reporting, management and governance structures. It also touches on suggested content, process implementation (more like formalisation from experience), and a checklist of operational considerations, resourcing (or even briefing/coaching) being highest priority in my mind in 2012.

Good document for you statesiders to pass round your friendly non-executive directors anyway, as an early socialising of the concept in this format goes a long way when you have tiny windows to educate them on the topic over the next 3 years - looks like you will be filing ORSA Reports before we are!

Interesting footnote is that AIG have been labelled as a potential SIFI today - ORSA may be 5 years too late to have saved the behemoth it once was, but let's hope it can help its slimmed down current-day version.

FSA on ongoing appropriateness of internal models (which aren't appropriate yet...)

Ploughing on regardless like a John Deere with a lobotomised driver, the FSA continue to work on their plans for ongoing appropriateness of internal models after Solvency II goes live. Having put their initial ideas out for feedback in June, they have this week provided an update on responses received, which hinted at a few things;

• IMAP Participant apathy - 10 responses (attrition rate is potentially rising these days, but we must still have 60-odd with skin in the IMAP game, so that feels pretty lousy)
• That inappropriateness would only be to a firm's benefit, hence the supervisory response to its detection "in all but exceptional cases" will be a capital add-on (PS if 'inappropriateness' is a word, I'll mange my chapeau, but I'll stick with it for now).
• That the early warning indicators planned will form part of the FSA's BAU Supervisory Review Process alongside "in particular" model validation results - any danger the early warning indicators may therefore be used informally in the pre-application work? They do go on to stress in the letter that they "do not intend" to use early warning indicators in the initial approval process, but bearing in mind no-one showed up for round 2 of the three-way today, we're all eating at a pretty moveable feast right now!

The link between early warning indicators and validation results is probably the big message in here - could verging on breaching the % tolerance, plus a negative validation report, lead to a capital add-on in 2014/2015/20XX?

KPMG on Solvency II - Progress in an uncertain world?

Handy survey from KPMG pushed around today touching on technical practices of UK Life firms (35 responded to the survey, so a decent enough sample). Appreciating the irony of the title in the same week as the rumour mill on an extension of Solvency II go-live to 2015 went into overdrive, the content is still valid on the benchmarking front, so worth a comb through.

Of particular interest I noted;

• IMAP remains top priority for those in the application process, though KPMG highlight that firms are closely reviewing the advantages of the IM versus standard formula due to FSA fussiness, implementation costs snowballing and less-than-attractive results coming out of the model (i.e the fabled 20% reduction guess-timates are perhaps out of reach!). Some comfort there for anyone struggling with the same issues.
• Documentation second priority for IMAP and non-IMAP firms - concerning at this stage, bearing in mind the FSA will have had plenty of opportunity to feed back on the big ticket items. If the industry still doesn't have a handle on regulatory requirements (or it does, but is not meeting them!), then perhaps it's a good job there is an extra year in the offing! 87% of the IMAP respondents said IM documentation specifically is causing challenges.
• Pillar 3 also high on priority lists - might we expect that to slip back on the agenda with the extra year? Particularly around software solutions, which may have previously been the only way for some laggards to populate QRTs etc within the proposed timeframes, some may decide to do something a little more ad-hoc for 2013 rather than full dry-running. Two-thirds of respondents note that turnaround time is a concern, and unsurprisingly 'achieving sign off' is a concern of around half, with the tight timescales naturally impacting on the likelihood of getting an executive to confidently put pen to paper.
• Only a third of respondents have dry-run their ORSAs - feels instinctively light, with those yet to run spread across the next 5 quarters. Natural areas of concern are later highlighted in this area, with ability (or lack of) to project across the business planning period, and plugging the ORSA process into the BAU strategic decision making process troubling around half of respondents. Bearing in mind only a third of respondents have performed any on-to-one training (with group training/workshops seemingly the preferred route), they may find that one will facilitate the other!

Some other noteworthy points;

• Only 80% think Solvency II will "significantly" impact the wider business - struggle to see how it could not frankly, but appreciate their are non-IMAP firms in the mix here
• Disturbingly large number of IMAP candidates appear to be behind the curve on P&L Attribution and Validation - interesting to know on the latter whether that is in respect of their internal findings or the FSA's view.
• Two-thirds of IMAP candidates using external assistance for validation - wonder how long that gravy train stays on the tracks with a shift to 2015?
• 20% don't have TPs in their IM scope - is that a bit chancey at this stage? I thought the FSA view on scope was a bit more onerous than some applicants may wish for.
• Datawarehousing seemingly moving towards being the preferred route to meet Pillar 3 obligations where an existing solution has not already been implemented prior to Solvency II

Good intelligence for both IMAP and Non-IMAP firms, and should provide some programme managers with crumbs of comfort when they see what's eating their counterparts right now.

Deloitte on "How to conduct the ORSA" - facts and apocrypha

While our pals at the FSA, EIOPA, the CRO Forum, 3 of the Big 4 (here, here and here), the Little 3 (here, here and here), the IRM,  the Irish SoA, and even the guys in the stars and stripes have deemed to recommend to all and sundry what ingredients will make a good ORSA, Deloitte have chipped in this week with a 50-page whopper that tells us everyone else was wrong and they are right...

...well OK, not quite! Deloitte's release about this "important yet enigmatic" area, which seems to have a mainland Europe-flavour to it, works its way through EIOPA's reformulated opinion on L3 ORSA guidance released in July, summarising what changed between the Nov 2011 and July 2012 versions. I of course managed this feat two months ago, but I couldn't quite pad it to 50 pages! They then embellish a section-by-section analysis of the two documents with some charming apocryphal tales of what "many companies" or "the industry" are struggling with currently (i.e. their clients' problems!).

As with most things generated by the behemoths, it is a really useful piece of material despite on the face of it not adding anything new to the knowledge pool, so from an ORSA consultant's perspective, I've made the following notes;

• Emphasises that supervisory intervention will come from lax ORSA processes, as opposed to ORSA Report content (which will drive the US approach)
• Notes that, given the opportunity for the ORSA and the SCR calculations to to be conducted on different reference dates, that this may allow organisations to keep any existing strategic planning processes where they already are in the calendar, rather than unnecessarily shift them to, say, follow financial year-ends. The proviso of "no material change in the risk profile" may of course discourage that, if only due to the need to define "material"!
• Some rather controversial free text around risk appetite ("intuitively simple" as a concept) and risk appetite frameworks ("very much a work in progress" at insurers) - appreciating progress is somewhat inconsistent across industries and the inter-body squabbling on the matter, I can imagine many practitioners would argue the opposite of both points - it's complex, but we're well on the way!
• Highlights difficulties with performing obligatory entity-level ORSAs if risk appetite is expressed in regions/products/funds, which seem perfectly reasonable anchors for risk appetite statements on the face of it.
• "Most organisations" defining AMSB as parent company Boards, plus entities if applicable - no evidence provided though.
• "Many firms" struggling with the "cultural challenge" of getting Boards to drive ORSAs - this I found odd, as many ORSA processes will already be in place to a greater or lesser extent, and most would feature in their individual crystallised reporting form in a BAU board pack. They go on to suggest that getting AMSB input into stress and scenario testing is one way of evidencing ORSA "driving".
• Comment that "In general, the ORSA guidelines were seen as too prescriptive" [my emphasis] - I generally recall the clamour from the industry over the last 3 years being that there isn't enough!
• Common (unevidenced) theme identified that ORSA policies have tended to be signed off by Risk Committees, which may not satisfy the AMSB sign-off requirement
• "Some organisations" electing to split out record of the ORSA Process from the ORSA Report to trim the document size - makes perfect sense, as there's no danger of the co-ordinating function not retaining those records for repeatability purposes.

Plenty of other clutter in there on risk quantification and capital management, but nothing controversial, just nice to read. Bon appetit...

FSA - Data Review findings in context of IMAP

So I guess there was an inevitability that, with all of the resourcing around Solvency II programmes over the last couple of years being focused on filling the yawning corporate governance chasms within EU insurers with bald, handsome, impeccably mannered Pillar 2 consultants (well, one out of three ain't bad!), that some of the more mundane aspects of preparations would take a back seat.

Step forward Data Quality! With the considerable efforts expended by UK internal model applicants already on plugging their calculation kernels in, risk calibration, loss function fitting, correlations etc, the FSA's latest review findings take us right back to the starting point of SCR generation - data inputs - and they are not impressed.

The FSA began working on this topic with the industry as far back as this time last year, and are not scheduled to be finished with this thematic review until Q3 2013. Bizarrely, they note in the introduction to these review findings that their scoping tool released in July 2011 aimed to help assess compliance with both Level 1 and draft Level 2, which wasn't released to the industry (i.e. leaked) until late October - quel chance mes amis?

Splitting hairs on timings aside, just reading the five section headings of their review work would be enough to reduce many BAU staff to a quivering wreck ("Implementation of the Data Policy"? What, today?), so I wasn't expecting a glowing report. That said, the quality of data which ultimately results in today's technical provisions, capital requirements etc is seemingly fit enough for purpose, so a full-on hatchet job would be a poor reflection on both the industry and the regulator.

Assuming a 2014 go-live date (looking unlikely as of 9pm GMT today!), the areas of major concern for insurers, based on these preliminary findings, would be;

• Difficulty in assigning data ownership - there will be enough Pontius Pilates in the BAU world who will happily wash their hands of data ownership until the cows come home. Programmes will need to be extremely forceful in assigning ownership and ensuring it sticks
• Inability to articulate "accurate", "complete" and "appropriate" - this should have been an easy win, so I'm surprised that it is seemingly an issue. Realistically, should we expect the business to take ownership of data sources when we cannot define what is and isn't acceptable output from them? 
• Data Dictionary/Data Directory confusion - a suite of pretty scathing findings in this field, suggesting both over-simplicity and over-complexity has been found in the workings of Data teams.
• Spreadsheet controls and non-compliance with end user computing policies - onerous expectations on the face of it (paragraphs 4.41 and 4.42), which will be a shock to both programme budgets as well as end-users.

Some other interesting points made in the review include;

• Firms either using their Risk Committees, or a bespoke "data steering" committee as their data governance body - pretty sure the Risk Committees won't fancy this as long-term work.
• A number of suggestions as to what areas are not currently being consistently addressed when assessing materiality (p11-12)
• Some very useful comment around data classification methods (p13)
• Suggestion that, as I expected, the techniques applied to assessing the quality of data provided by third parties is not robust enough - industry-wide consensus on how to interrogate your outsourcing parties would be useful in this respect.
• A rather strange comment around poorly designed/controlled data warehouses - I can only assume they have seen one or more horror stories on their travels, as the warehouse is surely the way to go!

Any smart cookies who haven't got going on Phase II with the FSA at this juncture should be stripping this down line-by-line. For those of you outside of the UK, you may want to cross your fingers that your friendly national regulator doesn't use this approach as a yardstick...

USA and ORSA - Let's do it baby!

Promising sounds from across the pond, as the NAIC make some definitive movements (detail here and here) towards the inclusion of Own Risk and Solvency Assessments as part of their regulatory reporting package - difficult to find the exact paperwork, but the summary of what was tabled by the ORSA subgroup at their August jamboree is here, while a statement to cover their adoption of the Risk Management and Own Risk and Solvency Assessment model act is available here.

I have touched on the movement of the US towards production of ORSAs in earlier blog posts, including recently on the preparedness of firms to meet ORSA reporting requirements,

From another earlier post, I can see the 15 volunteer company pilot which was mooted at the start of the year ultimately became 13 companies by the conclusion of the pilot (no word on who started, but couldn't be bothered finishing!). According to the Clearwater information, only 8 participants ORSA Reports were considered "complete", this despite the NAIC providing an ORSA Manual from which to work from.

Is this ratio of incompleteness indicative of what the 27 EU national regulators are likely to encounter in 2014, or is the lack of prescriptive guidance at Level 1 and Level 2 handy in this regard (i.e. ORSA Supervisory Reports will be "passed" regardless of quality, and regulatory arbitrage is back on the agenda).

Either way, Clearwater also note that 2015 is looking like the most likely time for imposition of ORSA reporting, so the guys will still have time to borrow from our experiences, as we can from theirs - suggested improvements  from the NAIC's sub-group to the participants (none of which would hurt anyone in the ORSA space over here!) include;

• Include a summary of “significant changes” from prior year
• Provide additional detail regarding risk managers and compensation
• Include additional stress testing, specifically for liquidity

 Looking forward to the sub-group's next report, the approach over there appears to be relatively easy to follow and well led, which I guess it can afford to be if it isn't masquerading as something other than a filing requirement... 

Did we learn from Equitable Life? Professor says "No"...

A cracking thought paper was released this week by Professor Roberts from Kings College regarding the lessons one could reasonably have learned from British mutual Equitable Life's demise in early 2000s, and more importantly, did UK plc actually learn them! (simple timeline of recent events here for our non GB readers, but anyone whose website starts with a banner exclaiming "recreating value for policyholders" has clearly had a lean few years!)

This document works nicely as an aide-memoire for anyone working in a financial services risk function as to what one should be wary of in the day-job. Professor Roberts ties in some of the most recent work in this space (leaning heavily on the Cass Business School/AIRMIC Roads to Ruin research and its conclusions in particular), and comes to the inevitable conclusion that lessons are well publicised, but never learned.

My main concern as a risk specialist is that certain recurring themes in the failure of financial services firms appear to remain outside of the Risk function's control or indeed influence, notably;

• Hubris of Senior/Chief executives - Almost every example of failure in insurance and banking referenced in Prof. Roberts paper includes a flukey, unchallenged CEO who got bolder as circumstance rather than skill kept their businesses growing. I had flagged a couple of articles in a post last year touching on what makes an executive tick, and since then I have seen psychopathy and leadership (as opposed to cherubic faces!) examined further in a popular mainstream book. The legitimate concern here of course is that CROs are seemingly no nearer to being guaranteed seats at the top table, let alone a veto to keep the most dominant executives in check, regardless of their loud voices, when necessary.
• Poor quality governance from Non-Executive Director level - Risk functions simply must have the NEDs performing at their optimum in order to provide acceptable services to their employers. While the "old school tie" approach to recruiting NEDs may take a generation to phase out entirely (to be replaced by an army of Fembots, so Viviane Reding would have us think), Risk functions are left with tottering old fee-sweepers as their key route to early intervention. The more visceral approaches to documenting risk appetite/tolerance/preference now being supported by corporate governance codes and vocational/professional bodies may make it easier to raise concerns with NEDs in future (probably as it will be colour coded and in Excel...), but until they are actually prepared to risk their comfortable semi-retirement with some probing questions in the C-suite itself, should Risk functions ever think they can overcome such a void?
• Failure of regulation - Should Risk functions be banking on the (inevitable?) failure of the nascent regulatory environment, and reserve for subsequent claims/compensation if one or a number of products are "too" successful, thus providing the necessary quantum of dissatisfied customers for the regulator to act? I would have laughed this suggestion out of the room until a year ago, since when the FSA have made retrospective calls on interest rate swaps, PPI, and TLPs, all of which would have been presented as "compliant" products in the Boardroom.

For the Solvency II fans, it also notes on page 11-12 that Equitable Life featured in the research which grew up to be Solvency II! Maybe we did learn something after all - if we smash up the affordability of long-term guaranteed products, we can all go unit-linked and never have to worry about another Equitable...

Clear Path Analysis - Solvency II "The Global Dimension"

This piece of research from the guys at Clear Path Analysis (sign up required) has been in the offing for a while, and as I covered their last impressive release on this blog (and I don't have a life :-( ), I've been looking forward to it...

There is certainly plenty in here to keep those of every persuasion entertained (with the sponsors as omnipresent as their funding permits!), but I've sectioned out highlights for my own benefit;

Foreword

• Solvency II "...clearly a step in the right direction" - oddly, not followed by a punchline...
• On the likelihood of Sol II remaining ahead of the IAIS approach to solvency regulation - "Asia no longer looks to the west for regulatory best practice", going on to cheekily recommend a cherry-picking approach

Barbara Ridpath - think tank CEO, on short-termism and regulation

• Highlights one (widely acknowledged) consequence of Solvency II being a disincentive to invest in long term and/or non-Sovereign debt instruments, which is not in the mandate of the regulations, or indeed the regulators.

Roundtable on un-level playing fields between EU and non-EU insurers - includes Standard Life Sol II lead

• Solvency II likely to weed out companies who can't handle the ongoing compliance cost from running EU operations
• Large piece on Canadian equivalence (of particular importance to Standard Life of course) and the practicalities of equivalence being neither sought nor at this point offered for a non-EEA wing of a EEA HQd insurer.
• Standard Life not happy with equivalence assessments running concurrently with IMAP, due (rightly) to the significance of a "yay" or a "nay" to the strategic thinking around non-EEA arms.
• Suggestion that Asia is looking harder at the IAIS approach as opposed to Solvency II for future direction

Data and Risk Reporting Interview - Dan Wilkinson, ERM head at Liberty Syndicates

• Increased formality around Data and Risk reporting, using both controls-focused and risk-focused approaches. Makes reference to a monthly management committee which takes reporting on data deficiency matters, which I have heard reference to on the circuit before, and certainly demonstrates that data inputs, whether for internal modelling or for strategic decision making, feature as a high priority, rather than taken as read.
• Notes that his employer is moving risk reporting away from the 1-in-200 VaR to "...more foreseeable points in the distribution", which we definitely like to hear in the ORSA world!
• Alludes to concerns around disclosing ORSA-related information to the outside world, which is an area yet to be adequately chewed over by regulators and industry quite yet, let alone ratings agencies, analysts etc
• "Sensible amount of proportionality" should be adopted when deciding what should be disclosed - is that a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron, or some other expression I can't quite lift off of Google!
• Sensibly stresses that an effective emerging risk policy should allow input and challenge at all levels of an organisation, when asked about internal models evolving with the risk profile of the business.
• "...biggest deliverable is cultural" - i.e. stripping back your long-since-gone consultancy friends' technical documentation (where required) in order to make it more accessible and free BAU staff to use the new facilities, be it a spruced up RMF or a full Internal Model - appreciate I may be doing myself a disservice by highlighting it!
• Didn't agree one bit with the comment that ORSA could "...inflate regulatory capital, based on rather speculative assumptions" - FSA have been pretty clear that ORSA has no bearing on required capital, appreciating the nuances around what they say and what actually transpires!
• Also wasn't massively sold on the comment that the ORSA "...should bring together information that is used within the business to allow analysis of medium term trends", unless of course he was cut off mid-sentence!

"Challenges of Pillar III" roundtable, focused seemingly on getting asset managers to pull their fingers out! Includes a CRO from an Italian insurer

• "Asset managers who are not willing or able to invest in appropriate data management and reporting systems will find it hard, if not impossible, to attract or retain insurance clients" - so there!
• Suggestion that "parts of the industry will have to get up to speed on" underlying assets which they are currently invested in for the look-through basis - I suspect that there are plenty of horror-stories to emerge once some CIOs and CFOs get a proper butchers at what some of their collectives are actually invested in, particularly with the advent of outsourcing investment management or just administration over the last decade or so...
• Note that ratings agency priorities over the near-term may focus more on differences between SF and IM-calculated SCRs and the impact of transitionals, rather than purely on SCR outcomes.
• Note that "Solvency II is effectively a lead in this area [transparency]", so no pre-conditions should be expected from ratings agencies
• Even bring up the old gripe that EEV/MCEV is still not understood well enough by agencies/analysts, so by implication there should be few worries about additional disclosures!

Considerations for Building a Diversified Investment Portfolio - Charles Pears from Insight Investment

Really accessible and well structured two-pager on portfolio diversification, of particular use to non-experts which covers

• Rationale for insurance companies looking for low risk returns;
• Risk drivers which make that difficult in today's environment, even if accepting minimal risk
• Why companies may look to seek excess returns, and the constraints around that
• Why decisions to accept more risk for enhanced rewards should be (but perhaps aren't always) knowledge based
• Basic options for enhancing portfolio returns without breaking the bank from a capital perspective.

Interesting is wrapped up with a comment that "...we expect insurers who adopt a Liability Driven Investment approach will secure a meaningful competitive advantage" - hard sell perhaps, but the rationale for it is well documented here.