Board Diversity - should gender and ethnicity have a quota?

Having seen a few snippets in quick succession on the matter, I figured it was as good a time as any to revisit Board Diversity, the gift that keeps on giving...headaches to Legal, Compliance and Company Secretarial departments all over Europe!

My initial interest in the matter was piqued by the potential dichotomy between having a Board that was "Fit and Proper" in the context of Solvency II or indeed the myriad Corporate Governance Codes within Europe, and the simultaneous push within the EU for setting quotas for a minimum percentage of female representatives on Boards.

Certainly a couple of years back, it looked like companies may be faced with a choice of meeting any gender quota (but with a Board that was not "Fit and Proper", if only due to lack of Board-level exposure and experience), or simply thumbing their noses at the quotas. The UK's current informal approach recommended by Lord Davies suggests that, while progress is being made on the gender front specifically, there is no danger of radical positive discrimination in order to meet a quota, regardless of who sets it.

I have therefore rather caustically covered the topic on previous posts (here, here and here) due to the hijacking of the word "diversity" as actually meaning "gender diversity" - seulement! There is evidently nowhere near enough working class (or working class origin) representation on plc Boards, not to mention ethnicity, disabilities and people who have served coal-face time in not-for-profit or charitable sectors - do they get a quota too?

All levity aside, there are rumblings from the UK Labour party that perhaps gender isn't the only quota worth talking about, floating the idea of ethnic quotas should they be elected next year. Bearing in mind the shamefully unrepresentative gender and ethnic make-up of the British members of parliament, and the triteness of his leader's behaviour when white-bloke hunting at PMQs the other week, he may wish to turn his attentions closer to home. That said, if the diversity debate has broken out of its gender-soaked malaise, it is cause to celebrate.

Dude? You're barred...

InsuranceERM have (unwittingly?) helped to perpetuate the idea of "diversity" being a debate that is overwhelmingly about gender in a recent round-table centred on how the Insurance industry "...can become more reflective of society" - which had no dudes in attendance!

While I certainly wouldn't argue that Insurance was, is, and will continue to be the "domain of the white male" for the foreseeable future, can that be remedied by excluding said males from a conversation on inclusivity of all things?

While the conventional pros and cons were discussed about Golden Skirt-style quotas, mandatory shortlisting of women for senior positions and mentoring, the child-rearing-sized elephant in the room was also tabled. The prevailing opinion seemed to be that it is encumbent on both employers and women to do a bit more during that phase of life to maintain career progression.

Had my two cents been sought (heaven forbid!), I would have added the "H" bomb into the mix. As a husband who works in another country from my family home, I personally offer an additional constraint to my wife's career every single working day, and one thing which won't change between generations is that one partner generally has to "take one for the team". Do the significant others of UK plc realistically provide more of a constraint on career development than any of the factors discussed by the InsuranceERM panel?

I would also have referenced Britain's blue-rinsed demographic timebomb, caring for infirm relatives, in this context, a job that most men manage to avoid, even when it's their parents! I have no first hand experience on the matter, so am reluctant to do more than float the idea, particularly when high-achieving female talent may have the means to outsource such activity.

Progress on the diversity issue therefore remains clunky, piecemeal and gender-obsessed. With every Lloyds (voluntarily?) taking the initiative, there is a Glencore or LSE who manages to clear the decks!

I certainly hope to see some progress on the gender percentage front soon, if only to hit a target so that we may switch the debate back to genuine diversity. With the topic gaining traction across the pond, maybe we won't have to wait too long.

"Implementing Measures" to "Delegated Acts", "RTS" and "ITS" - Unsporting Lisbon...

How to make sense of post-
Lisbon legislative processes

OK, I have finally broken. I think it was a paragraph that had the words "acts" "delegated" "implementing" "regulatory" "measures" and "standards" strewn around like the gin-soaked occupants of a broken carousel that got to me.

The transition of Solvency II-relevant terminology from pre-Lisbon to post-Lisbon, and the lack of clear supporting material to aid the understanding of an idiot prole like me, has led me to have a stab at clarifying it myself, in the lead up to the Omnibus II vote in a couple of weeks.

The fundamentals are easy enough - the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon aimed to put Parliament and Council on an even keel in the decision making process, and get things done quicker. Lisbon was enacted around the same time that the original Solvency II Directive was coming in to land, so naturally any Lisbon-inspired changes in how EU legislation is made and maintained would need to be factored in to the wording of the Solvency II Directive when convenient.

Coupled with this was the European Union's decision (post-credit crunch) to develop a new architecture of financial supervision, which allowed EIOPA to rise in 2010 freshly armed from the embers of CEIOPS with new legislative drafting powers, changing the comfort blanket of the existing 4-level Lamfalussy process into something much trickier to fathom.

There was therefore plenty to factor in when Omnibus II, the tidying-up vehicle, was first envisaged  (covered nicely in this blast from the past from Freshfields), most prominently;

• EIOPA's ability to draft and recommend "technical" standards which could become law without Parliament and Council having a blocking vote - as CEIOPS, they would have only had an "advisory" capacity.
• The EU Parliament now being in a position to suggest that certain "technical" matters were actually "political", thus bringing some of the granular mathematics (specifically, Long Term Guarantee-related) back into their sphere of influence during the trilogues - without co-decision making, this would have been much trickier.

To supplement any confusion that might arise in the Lisbonising of the Solvency II Directive, there has been an opportunistic replacement, recycling or bastardisation of terms from pre-Lisbon over to the current day, without an effective mapping (this is by far the best offering I've seen, from Herbert Smith Freehills). Therefore for my own benefit, I have broken it down, and any benefit you can derive you are most welcome to!

Old Term - Implementing Measures (or "Level 2 Text")

New Term (part 1) - Delegated Acts

Why New - Comitology was the process of the Council and Parliament leaving Commission-led "committees" to deal with the development of secondary legislation to sit alongside core legislation (Solvency II Directive in our case). For years, Parliament was largely out of the loop of its drafting, receiving a Yes/No vote on such legislation only as late as 2006.

The post-Lisbon move from implementing measures to Delegated Acts gave Parliament the right to veto and amend drafts of secondary legislation. The European Council have the same powers. The delegated powers can also be revoked if either co-legislator doesn't like the Commission's tone.

The Commission, who remain responsible for developing Delegated Acts, have the drafting powers delegated, via article 290 of the TFEU. They continue to receive assistance from expert committees to create this material, with EGBIP assembled last summer to advise on the Delegated Acts side of things.

What does it really mean - not much on its own, however the new process is proving to be just as opaque and convoluted as it was previously (covered nicely here). It evidently means that influencing the content of Solvency II's Delegated Acts remains in the hands of a chosen few, for example, when Dr Wiedner noted (in AOB) that 'Member States' will get to see draft Delegated Acts before they are finalised in trimester 2 of this year, I think he meant the representatives in the room, not us!

This shadowy future was nicely predicted here back in 2011 - a less efficient process, less formality, less visibility of legislative influencers, and more horsetrading than bank holiday barbeque weekend at Tesco.

Old Term - Implementing Measures ("Level 2 Text")

New Term (part 2) - Implementing Acts

Why new - The concept of "Implementing Measures" has effectively been cut in half, with Implementing Acts very much a sideshow in the context of Solvency II - the Herbert Smith Freehills paper referenced above states that implementing acts are only referenced in one article of the Directive.

These are drafted by the Commission through powers delegated via article 291 of the TFEU, and the distinction between Delegated and Implementing Acts is shown here.

What does it really mean - nothing of consequence it would appear!

Old Term - N/A

New Term (part 3a) - Regulatory Technical Standards/RTS/

"Level 2.5"

Why New - EIOPA were empowered through the 2010 "EIOPA Legislation to draft technical standards on behalf of the Commission which would ensure consistent harmonisation of Solvency II across the Union. These kick in formally as soon as Omnibus II gets through.

A huge step up from their previous guise as CEIOPS, where they were little more than a sparsely staffed lobbying aggregator, Regulatory Technical Standards (RTS) are directly enforcable in Member State law once approved.

RTS may only be for technical matters and "shall not imply strategic decision or policy choices". These are published for public consultation, then submitted to the Commission, who can adopt, reject or amend them.

Both the Council and Parliament receive the draft RTS at the same time as the Commission, and have limited windows in which to object to their content. A specific "sunrise clause" has also been added to Omnibus II which allows the Commission (for a limited period) to circumvent the RTS process entirely and deal directly with certain matters without EIOPA involvement.

What does it really mean - For both RTS and ITS (below), EIOPA, as pen-holders, have had a significant amount of influence placed in their hands with respect to what "uniform conditions" are, and how they should be enforced.

As we have seen in recent consultations, EIOPA do not tend to change their minds, which may perversely make life easier (or at least more certain)!

Ultimately, the reality of "Level 2.5" is that the co-legislators have lost much of their ability to influence or veto acutely technical material, further distancing Solvency II's amendment and approval from Parliament and Council, into the hands of unelected, quasi-autonomous technocrats. Which can only be a good thing...

Old Term - N/A

New Term (part 3b) - Implementing Technical Standards/ITS/"Level 2.5" text

Why New - As with RTS, Implementing Technical Standards (ITS) are directly enforcable in Member State law once approved, and follow the same drafting process. EIOPA's scheduled work in the "Level 2.5" space is of course ITS, not RTS, in the run up to 2016.

Risk.net have tried to cover the distinction between RTS and ITS Standards here (subscription required), but it is not even massively clear from the Regulations which empower EIOPA!

The crucial difference is that ITS, once adopted by the Commission, receive no further scrutiny, unlike RTS, where the co-decision makers can still object after the Commission adopts.

What does it really mean - The reality of the legislative process means that even in the sticky-beaker's paradise of Solvency II, Parliament and Council do not have the time or inclination to argue the toss over this material, so will hopefully leave EIOPA and the Commission to it.


Hard to conclude this post really. For sure we have been unlucky to have bridged the Lisbon divide, as well as the genesis of EIOPA and the realisation midway through proceedings that some of the "technical" matters had immense political significance.

That said, the legislative path we have set Solvency II down for the last few years has made a mockery of the best laid preparation plans within the Union's insurers. Andrew Tyrie MP really hit the nail on the head...

Omnibus II and Delegated Acts - state of play summary (before it gets interesting!)

Unless you've been hiding in a cave since last summer, you shouldn't find anything new in this post, but I wanted to accumulate all relevant materials into one place for the run up to Omnibus II D-Day for my own convenience, and you're welcome to share.

At the moment we have;

European Parliament

• Omnibus II Plenary vote is still  scheduled for Tuesday March 11th. The Plenary page is here, but the forward agenda is not available, despite draft agendas apparently being due a month prior to Plenary meetings (suspicious?). There doesn't appear to have been any recent parliamentary agitation, from the steaming-mad Green contingent in particular, to suggests Omnibus II will get derailed at this point.

European Commission

• I'll cover the fineries of this on a separate post, but worth noting that the Commission's "draft implementing measures" document, which have been circulating for over 2 years, is now referred to as "Delegated Acts", after being Lisbonised.
• A revised draft of these rebadged Delegated Acts, on the assumption that Omnibus II gets through Plenary, will be delivered like an impatient baby in the deuxieme trimestre of this year (p21). 
• It apparently not be made available to the proles for public consumption beforehand (reported here and here). Still plenty of time for the faceless exponents of dark arts and back-room shenanighans to influence its content, so the lack of formal consultation is not necessarily a calendar breaker, though it is exceptionally poor form. 
• The Commission's advisers now come in the form of EGIBF (for Delegated Acts) and EIOPC (for Implementing Acts). EIOPC are evidently a garage without a car at the moment, having not published a scrap of material in 15 months while Omnibus II dragged its heels. 

EIOPA

• EIOPA's work on implementing technical standards is due to be released from April, in a phased manner.  I don't think that the activity is Omnibus II-dependent as such, even if EIOPA's influence is a little less formal without it!

Obviously as a practitioner in the Risk field who doesn't want to wallow in the details of European Union lexicon, the forthcoming spurt of activity is considerably murkier than it would have been pre-Lisbon. Virtually every relevant term or participating body in the Solvency II hemisphere has had a name or remit change in the interim, and I'm not seeing anyone offer a mapping between "Pre" and "Post"-Lisbon terms.

I'll have a stab on a separate post, for my own sanity if nothing else.

PRA's Pillar 3 Industry Working Group - the horsetrading begins...

The PRA have at last released the materials from their pre-Christmas Pillar 3 industry working group, which should provide a little cheer to anyone working in that space, and indeed the vendors who are manfully trying to supply software solutions to address it.

The materials include;

• A "record of the discussions" (definitely not 'minutes'!) 
• A Pillar 3-specific Q&A
• Some feedback on the industry data collection exercise held in May 2013 (details here)

As I mentioned in a previous post, these materials were due for publication 12 working days after the meeting, and the lag had me a little bit concerned that the debate had taken a terrible turn! It wouldn't appear so on review, but I thought the following issues were worth flagging;

From Q&A

• National-specific template consultations will start "at earliest" in July 2014
• Suggest that dialogue between firms and the PRA will aid the appropriate application of proportionality up to 2016
• Suggest that firms "regularly check" EIOPA's website for relevant material, as well as stating that they will update the Q&A doc. Both of these things lead to a "pull" of information by individual firms rather than a co-ordinated "push" by supervisors and rulemakers, which I find displeasing.
• EIOPA will be expected to provide definitions of any ambiguous terms
• PRA will not publish a reporting timetable in the preparatory period
• Smaller firms will not be allowed to submit material in a format other than XBRL

From "record of the discussion"

• Myriad issues tabled regarding interactions with external parties (ratings agencies, data vendors, asset managers)
• Range of assumptions, simplifications and materiality calls already being made in the absence of definitive guidance or supervisory college "party line"
• Publicly disclosed QRTs listed as an area where "more information is needed" - the PRA expect the Implementing Technical Standards to cover these in more detail. 
• XBRL - Final templates for preparatory phase are due in May 2014. The final ones for Solvency II itself are due in December 2014.
• The industry flagged their issues regarding XBRL solution vendors and the poorly taxonomised templates as they stand. The PRA therefore asked for specific examples of what might be compromising lead times and budgets.
• There are some open ended questions at the back of this document which are for the PRA to answer at a later date.

From Data Collection exercise

• PRA confirm that in most cases, the information submitted is being used "to inform ongoing supervisory work" as a minimum.
• Some general insurers submissions were incomplete, while some life insurer submissions either did not segregate their with-profit and non-profit funds. This is seemingly less than helpful while the PRA struggle to calibrate their Early Warning Indicators (more on that here and here).
• A clear supervisory focus on the standardised risk information submitted around the tails of the distributions and diversification benefits - you've been warned about taking liberties already UK and Ireland!

PRA, BaFin and Disclosure - Grüne with envy...

Without being hypercritical, it occured to me that the PRA appear to be keeping materials and opinions "on the downsie" at a time where perhaps the industry would benefit from their overexposure, and I can't work out why.

A few things triggered that thought over the last week;

• The Internal Model Validation presentation delivered by a PRA representative to the Institute of Risk Management's Solvency II group, which publicly elaborates on the topic more than anything I have seen on the PRA site.
• The apparent failure of the PRA to follow their own Terms of Reference for their recently convened Regulatory Reporting Industry Working Group by not publishing the minutes of the December meeting yet. The TORs say 10+2 working days, and I can't find them anywhere!
• The recent overwrite of the PRA's initial response document to EIOPA regarding "comply or explain" for EIOPA's Preparatory Guidance, which has not yet been "explained" to the industry they oversee! (Well spotted John Walton)
• The almost diametrically opposed position which BaFin have taken over in Germany, where they unequivocally lay out their intentions regarding "comply or explain".

It is worth expanding on the last point, bearing in mind what a useful piece of text it is for anyone looking to confirm within their own Programme how best to interpret EIOPA's guidelines. BaFin explicitly state;

• Insurers should "immediately take the necessary steps" to implement the Preparatory Guidelines.
• That "undertakings are effectively the target audience" for the Preparatory Guidance, which I am delighted to see acknowledged publicly by such a significant participant.
• It is up to each insurer to determine the order of their implementation activity prior to 2016.
• That, for the benefit of the industry, BaFin have carved up the Guidance into 15 blocks, and will provide "additional information and tips" periodically over the next two years.
• That a special activity for Life Insurers will take place, one suspects in order to help identify the capital shortfalls hinted at at the back end of last year for those with high cost of guarantees.
• That everyone is expected to participate in the QRT exercise, ignoring the thresholds offered by EIOPA to the NCAs.
• That they will be translating any EIOPA texts released prior to 2016 in English-only into German.

Whilst it may be a case of thinking das gras ist grüner, it would be easy to envy the German contingent when offered this level of disclosure and certainty in dealing with the preparatory phase. What say you, Moorgate?

Model Validation - benchmarks and best practices from the IRM, PRA and Lloyds

Models - seeking validation

Bearing in mind we have passed the 2013 financial year end, and all of the internal modellers amongst us will be trying out their new processes and technology in the production of a balance sheet for the first time, a few very timely pieces of material on internal model validation have been released, which should help anyone who is curious about what their neighbours are up to!

The Institute of Risk Management's rebadged Solvency II Special Interest Group held a get-together in December on IM Validation, and a couple of interesting documents have emerged.

One from a PRA Validation guru is particularly useful for anyone in the IMAP space who has any uncertainty about the PRA's approach to assessing the quality of one's validation processes and reports, covering;

• The purpose of validation
• The PRA's approach - Life and GI-specific SME groups
• An overview of IMAP findings - 40+ reviews conducted to date, and they also state what your evidence "should" demonstrate
• Their observations - Noting that Validation Reports are generally deficient
• A schematic view of what they consider the Validation process to be
• A bullet point list of how validation effectiveness can be demonstrated

I guess the odd thing for me is why this kind of material isn't presented/circulated more widely by the PRA, as it is surely of benefit to IMAP participants, who wouldn't always be in attendance at a pre-Christmas IRM event!

The other useful benchmarking item from this event is the survey on participants' experiences to date in the validation field. While the sample is small in absolute terms at 18, and is a touch heavy on the GI side (over half of respondents), this is as good a benchmarking aid as you will see for a while, so it is worth noting the following;

• Just over half have transitioned Validation into BAU
• Only 3 respondents had a Validation-specific steering committee to help govern the process, with others choosing to use existing committees or the CRO/Risk function
• Over 80% use the SCR contribution of each risk driver to determine the depth of validation activity. Other determinants include regulator feedback, risk registers and previosu validation reports
• Over 40% say that their independent validation work is identifying flaws in their "dependent" validation work, while over a quarter say that independent validation has been scaled back due to the quality of "dependent" work!
• Less than a quarter say that validation of external models (ESGs etc) has been effective
• Around two-thirds use peer review and sensitivity analysis to validate expert judgements. Horrifically, two respondents said they haven't been able to validate expert judgement at all!
• Over half are still using external contractors/consultants for independent validation
• Page 12 covers the popularity of certain sections of a Validation Report. Less than half include a section on benchmarking
• Most are keeping the Validation Report to under 100 pages, with management feedback being the main catalyst for changing the length.

Finally, a survey from LCP Consulting was published this week covering the progress of Lloyds syndicates in their Validation activity. This was an area which Lloyds acknowledged as "work to do" back in May last year, particularly around validation testing and documentation.

The findings appear to be positive on the whole, with most firms saying they are at least halfway towards their "ideal process". Unsurprisingly, dependency modelling and validating expert judgement make the list of "key challenges" remaining.

PRA - Q&A from December's Industry Briefing

Following on from the PRA's Industry Briefing on Solvency II prior to Christmas, they have released a set of Questions and Answers, which appear to have prompted by questions asked on the day as opposed to being more generic. A useful document to push around your programmes in the UK in particular, even if you are not part of ICAS+/IMAP.

I was particularly interested to see if they had rowed back on any topics where they have previously expressed an opinion, as well as any new insights which aren't necessarily made public as a matter of course. The Q&A is broken out into topics, so I have grouped my thoughts accordingly.

Proportionality

• For ICAS+, the PRA are "...focusing in on those areas which move the dial the most", referring specifically to the ICA calculations.
• They will therefore apply "a relatively higher view" in some areas than others (later referred to in terms of their intensity of focus).
• They use their IMAP approach as an example of this, where they have grouped the 300+ requirements into 15 categories.
• My common-sense read of this is, to be proportionate in the above context, the first 7 consecutive categories on the IMAP template would receive less time and attention than the following 8, all of which have the potential to numerically "move the dial".
• They are already looking prospectively at firm's risk profiles during planning sessions, in advance of ORSA, so that they work and plan proportionally, but with the future in mind.
• They suggest that firms provide their own opinions on materiality if they wish for the favourable application of the proportionality principle (though they don't guarantee it!).

Documentation-specific proportionality

• Confirm that "...there is definitely a need for an improvement in the quality of documentation".
• Seem to specifically align the calibration requirements of Solvency II with the need for additional documentation, therefore a good area to be elaborate in your work.
• On expert judgement, they suggest that documenting why a judgement was made, and what were the alternatives will help firms currently falling short.
• "...no aspiration" to revisit documentation review work already conducted and concluded.

PRA's Supervisory Statement

• They confirm that letters confirming whether a firm is covered by the reporting guidelines will be sent this month. They suggest categories 1-3 (p20) will be the bulk of participants
• There are national-specific reporting templates to come, currently under consideration. While they are not certain on submission format for those, they reiterate that xBRL is required for QRT submission.
• QRTs can be submitted incomplete, but they reserve the right to intervene if you take too many liberties!
• Acknowledge that, due to most firms' ORSA Processes operating around year-end balance sheets, that they expect to receive a flood of ORSA Supervisory Reports, and that this will delay feedback (presumably worse in 2015 than this year?).
• A question regarding 'who is the ORSA for' was answered rather dismissively. However, bearing in mind the content of their "good and bad documentation" letter (which constantly refers to "the reader", which for me meant "the PRA"), it felt like a reasonable question. Clearly if the PRA do not like your style, it will add to your review time.
• They seem to indicate that the amount of time one's Board should spend on reviewing/using their ORSA is not subject to any periodic expectations. That means if you are planning for annual intensive interaction, or something more regular and fluid, you should get a fair hearing from the PRA.

Standard Formula

• Without much subtlety, they seem to be encouraging firms to look at the appropriateness of Standard Formula asap, encouraging further by stressing "...that internal models do not need to be overly complex". This feels like early positioning for their planned SF work with the industry, where no doubt they will find a few firms ripe for USPs/PIMs during the next 18 months. 

Early Warning Indicators (EWIs)

• Following on from a post in October, they are evidently still stuggling to calibrate them!
• They confirm that the purpose of automatic capital add-ons (in the event of a future EWI breach) is to freeze the modelled capital figure to prevent distribution

Trilogue

• Question 29 is a good example of the PRA showing where their hands are now tied, and where EIOPA will be the provider of guidance.
• Interesting confirmation that the Commission has apparently asked that as little as possible of the Draft Implementing Measures be changed. Those of us working on non-mathematical areas can perhaps take some comfort from that!

"Comply or Explain" responses to EIOPA's preparatory guidance - UK oddities?

Isle of Man - "Call that a flood"

Happy New Year (or Blein Vie Noa as we say on the relatively unflooded Isle of Man). I hope you all took the opportunity to fall ill and get fat like I did, so we can recommence battle in 2014 with overflowing sinuses and bursting belt buckles...

I managed to take a look at some of the responses that EIOPA have received regarding whether or not the 32 National Competent Authorities (NCA) currently invested in the Solvency II game are planning to follow EIOPA's Preparatory Guidance over the next 2 years. Please serve yourselves from this central location.

It became evident over December that there was likely to be some non-compliance (both the French and British put their heads above the parapet), though as this was a "comply or explain" exercise, this was not necessarily grave - we are after all in the business of 'preparing' at this juncture - but I was curious to see precisely how different countries "explained" themselves.

In response to each guideline within the 4 EIOPA documents, the options for each NCA were to respond;

1. Yes - we already comply
2. Yes - we intend to comply
3. No - we do not and will not comply
4. Not applicable (though I'm not certain why this is an option)

They were also given space to provide text/links to prove how they are compliant with each guideline, and som space to provide explanations (questionnaire template here).

I was therefore surprised to see the British approach (which was generally "yes") also involved;

• Not providing an explanation when they have said "No" to a guideline (which admittedly is only in one case!)
• Unnecessarily using a copy/paste piece of text as an explanation for a number of guidelines where they have said they "Intend to comply"
• Unexpectedly answering "Not Applicable" to no fewer than 10 articles within the System of Governance guidance, some of which definitely featured in the feedback on the PRA's recent Supervisory Statement as bones of contention (the actuarial function's responsibilities for example).

Obviously no surprises that the French will not be attempting to comply anything in the System of Governance world after their earlier warning, though their rationale is expanded upon in this Risk.net article. That the strict definition of "AMSB" is an issue for the French industry is surely old news at this juncture, and it is ludicrous that such a matter has yet to be dealt with by the Commission's draftsmen. It certainly hasn't posed an issue for Germany (who intend to comply with all of Sys Gov), who operate dual boards.

While more may emerge over the next few weeks on what has been submitted here across the countries, I am more immediately interested in why the UK have elected to respond "not applicable" to so many System of Governance guidelines. It seems to fly in the face of their Supervisory Statement, and I can't imagine EIOPA are satisfied with that response. 

PRA on "good" and "bad" documentation for IMAP - restart or refresh?

As an welcome aside from the PRA's activity day on the 12th, they also delivered on a promise to provide examples of what constitutes "good" and "bad" documentation in the context of the internal model approval process (IMAP). Bearing in mind it has been quite some time since the PRA publicly pronounced on the matter - indeed, they were called something else the last time they did - the industry welcomed this in like a lottery-winning prodigal son.

Bad documentation
- reform or execute?

There have certainly been enough apocryphal tales spewed out by the industry over the last couple of years to suggest that the production of documentation to support participation in IMAP had transformed from a small cottage industry into something of a palatial Georgian Mansion house with a granny annex.

Whether or not this kind of advice is therefore timely enough to save the Solvency II Programmes of the UK from using documentation in their revitalised IMAP preparations that is neither good for man nor beast is another thing, bearing in mind there is three years worth of accumulated flotsam currently kicking around the servers of UK insurers which, given this message, will need to be revisited as a matter of urgency.

Regardless, as the UK still appear to hold the whip hand in EIOPA's model sub-committee, the PRA's views on model documentation are relevant to readers across the continent, so the document is well worth a read for anyone in pre-application.

I took the following from it;

• They have 3 principles of "good documentation" - accessibility, evidence and quality control
• "It is helpful to have a clear separation of policy, methodology and results"
• The document refers throughout to giving consideration to "the reader". Feels a little disingenuous if they mean "the PRA", and after reading their document a couple of times, I can't imagine who else they have in mind.
• Following on from that point, a reference to a bad example suggests that "...the author is not thinking carefully about the audience" - it is equally fair to suggest that the author may be assuming a level of technical/commercial knowledge at the PRA end which is lacking?
• The PRA are evidently not happy to have to "seek clarification" on matters, which suggests the time allocated to assessments is tightly planned, or indeed the level of technical knowledge held by the assessors is limited.
• Interested to know if these principles hold firm for Standard Formula firms if viewed conversely e.g. does paperwork for the justification to not use an internal model need to be of a similar standard?
• The reiteration that the PRA "...will rely, in large part, on the submitted documents" when assessing the model - just in case your friendly executive committee reckon they can talk their way in!
• A lofty aim to improve "accessibility" of documentation, by having levels covering; executive summaries; model reviewer/validator level info; and model user/operator level technical documentation. The PRA only want the first two levels as a matter of course, which would suggest that procedures and technical documentation should be used as supporting evidence only.
• Tabling up references to the Directive and Implementing Measures within documents is viewed favourably.
• Their "useful rule of thumb" feels instinctively unwieldy - they suggest better documents contain one-third 'what has been done' with the rest covering 'why and how'. That said, expert judgements are clearly not being evidenced anywhere near the level desired.
• A convoluted and potentially frightening reference to "self-validation" testing, which the PRA view favourably, but which seems to point towards a preference to see suites of documentary evidence for each assumption applied in the modelling process. 
• To conclude, readers are redirected to Julian Adams's letters from  mid- 2012 (here and here) - important to note that this guidance remains relevant, regardless of the passing of time.

I suspect that most model applicants will find they have re-work to do off the back of this, both with the pen and with the sickle. Expert judgement and assumptions documentation remain the unquenchable thirst though, so one's best endeavours would be well spent in that field in early 2014.

Governance flaws in UK financial institutions - complacency or one-offs?

Some very interesting bits released over the weekend which should prick the ears of the UK's banking and insurance entities like a corporate governance-driven piercing gun, hot off the back of last month's Co-operative Group scandal.

Governance structures
- unchallenged by Risk for too long?

Over at RSA, one of the UK's most venerable General Insurance, a house of horrors-style drama appears to be emerging. Starting with what looked like a serious, yet relatively modest, localised valuation issue over in Ireland has developed in short order into the straw which has broken the camel's back with regards to the tenure of the Chief Executive of the entire group - all off the back of a routine audit, according to one source, and perhaps not coincidentally breaking formally as a story one day after the announcement of enormous premium hikes in the country.

Astonishingly, one of the three men suspended at the Irish unit is also one of the biggest hitters in their national industry, being the current president of the Irish Insurance Federation. He was quoted in August thus (my emphasis);

I’m very optimistic about the future. The Irish Insurance Industry is robust, well capitalised, making a significant contribution to the economy and most importantly, delivering for customers.

While it is fair to say that the knives were already out for the Group CEO, who has presided over general bad news over the last year or so (this year's profit warnings one and two for example), to actually see a FTSE 100 insurer crippled to the point of fire sales to plug capital holes by such a matter is pretty remarkable, even if the geographical source of the pain is less surprising after Quinn went down actuary-less a couple of years back.

What's more, the interim CEO (who is pulling off the much-maligned Chairman/CEO double act for now, though was Non-Exec) has sanctioned a root and branch review of governance arrangements in the firm across all markets (cited here from an analyst call), quite an undertaking in itself bearing in mind its geographical spread.

It made me revisit the published feedback to EIOPA's preparatory guidance, where I had remembered that the feedback received from RSA was pretty caustic with regards to the appropriateness of EIOPA's guidance where it seemingly went above and beyond the Directive and Implementing Measures.

Pointedly in the context of this particular failure of their internal controls, they fed back extensively on the Fit and Proper requirements (p237), most of which centred around 'less is more', and emphasised the administrative burden such activity already causes. This is supplemented on p339 with a piece against the rotation of internal audit teams, both of which look discomforting in hindsight!

PRA briefing on Solvency II, IMAP and application of EIOPA's preparatory guidance

Santa's 'Omnibus 3' joke was not so

well received... 

Santa obviously couldn't wait to put a smile on the faces of the insurance industry this year, so his little helpers at the PRA delivered an industry briefing yesterday, and subsequently released a bucketload of materials which aimed to help give everyone's still-defrosting Solvency II programmes an early steer as to expectations over the next two years.

The main document released was a supervisory statement (along with a video explaining what a 'supervisory statement is!), which followed on from a recent consultation on how the PRA plan to apply EIOPA's preparatory guidelines.

That blog post is effectively still relevant, as virtually nothing changed as a result of the consultation which, at 18 responses, was appallingly participated in, and is perhaps symptomatic of the malaise with which the topic has been infected by during 2013.

The three areas where the PRA have provided specific clarifications following the consultation were;

• Sys Gov Guideline 30 (Securitised Instruments) - note that they will tell EIOPA that it is badly drafted, but that ultimately firms should focus on intended outcomes of it if in doubt 
• Sys Gov Guideline 41 (Actuarial Function) - confirm that the function will need to provide opinions on the reinsurance arrangements and underwriting policies during transition
• Reporting - Confirm that submissions in XBRL are expected by June 2015, but give some wriggle room should EIOPA not fix the templates!

Other than that, it is "as you were".

Julian Adams took time off from his new YouTube career to speak at the event as well - the speech, lovingly titled "A Turning Point", has been published, and from a UK Solvency II Programme perspective. I took the following from it;

General Solvency II

• "Certainty" on timetable, so while he appreciates that firms "downsized their Solvency II programmes", "...now is the time to reassess priorities" - so go tell your CFOs you need another cheque!
• "Expects to have discussions with firms" on the effect of the agreed matching adjustment on capital and technical provisions.
• On the 16-year transition to full Solvency II technical provisions, they are pleased "...to have the safeguard of the transitional floor" which will keep the old regime relevant for years to come
• The Commission "...hope to have a stable version [of delegated acts] ready by March", though won't be publishing them until summer. Does that mean we'll get another leak, like in October 2011?
• "...it is important that firms stay appraised of developments in delegated acts, implementing technical standards and guidance to be issued by the Commission and EIOPA" - PRA seemingly distancing themselves as an influencer at this point, and positioning itself as an administrator
• To that end, the PRA Handbook will follow "intelligent copy-out" rules, so the only elaboration we should expect in future outside of materials produced in the low countries will be in the form of Supervisory Statements (see above!)
• Some technical actuarial papers will be released by the PRA in the New Year 
• Reminder for standard formula firms that they will need to make sure their SCR calculation is suitable, including consideration of USPs/PIM

Specific to the PRA's application of EIOPA Preparatory Guidance

• "...emphasis is on preparations for Solvency II and not its early implementation"
• "We are not gold plating any of the guidelines" - no definition of what "gold plating" means though, which would have been useful.
• "[Proportionality] does not mean that firms can select which requirements to comply with or not"
• Expect incremental improvement in the quality of ORSA Supervisory Reports submitted between 2014 and 2015
• Industry Working Group on Reporting has been set up, as there is evidently enough discord within the UK at the prospect of parallel running numbers to justify a PRA/Industry jam session. That said, July 2015 remains the PRA expectation for XBRL reporting to come in from firms within the thresholds
• For IMAP, "it is critical that firms keep to their allocated submission slot" - if you miss, you "...will join the end of the queue", which might help free up some purse strings!
• "...no longer possible" to offer any flexibility to firms in the IMAP space. 

ICAEW on "overarching principles of corporate governance" - how much is too much?

I hadn't got around to this thought-leadership document from the ICAEW on corporate governance, despite their kind tweet asking for my thoughts, due to the welter of Solvency II activity that started from September.

The premise behind their document seems to be that corporate governance codes are perhaps a touch unwieldy these days, and might benefit from some Google-style "Do No Evil" overarching principles which even the sneakiest, mealiest-mouthed Board member would struggle to justify their (mis)conduct in the context of.

In general, the word 'overarching' makes me want to pull my thinning tufts out. I'm not much of a compliance-ferret, but the thought of Board conduct being so misguided by the corporate governance codes in place in developed countries that we need to refine it another notch is one I couldn't entertain. Certainly, given the importance of holding these people to account, and the level of education and experience a great many of them will have attained, I am inclined to think that 'more is more' rather than 'less'.

The ICAEW paper comes up with 5 overaching principles of corporate governance, centred around;

1. Leadership
2. Capability
3. Accountability
4. Sustainability 
5. Integrity

The following parts jumped out at me;

• That overarching principles should be "aspirational and credible" - feels counter-intuitive.
• That overarching principles should "think beyond the letter of laws and regulations" - why should they? Laws and regulations, regardless of how badly drafted, capture the kind of corporate recklessness that we would all gladly see consigned to history. Punishment seems to be a bigger issue (i.e. why aren't white collar criminals thrown to the dogs, or captains of industry who are hoist by their own petard immediately banned for life?)
• The thought of companies explaining links (or gaps) between overarching principles and their actual actions is almost too grubby to contemplate, giving leaders an undeserved shade of grey to support bad governance ("...well, in principle...")
• That overarching principles should be "...easy for boards and stakeholders to understand". Why should a Board job be easy? Why do people of such talent, education, breeding (?), etc. need to have the words "Don't be an idiot" written for them in crayon? Briefing onesself on the requirements of a national corporate governance code is only beyond a Board member who cannot be ar bothered.
• That the current UK code, at 18 principles and 28 supporting principles is "...too detailed for most people to remember". That would include me! However, it's only a click away, and is certainly not justification for further refinement.

I definitely sympathise with anyone who has to keep on top of corporate governance code development, particularly in the EU, where pan-European angles bubble up with regularity (here and here for example). That said, just do your job and comply with them!

Given that certain organisational bodies cannot be held to similar standards, yet may be equally significant in the case of UK/Planet Earth plc (Government departments, Private Equity firms, Mutuals/Friendly Societies), I would certainly find it hard to transplant such a layer onto existing requirements for listed entities. If anything, these overrarching principles could be targeted towards the general public in order to help laymen and women understand what areas our current codes are focused on, and why.

I certainly don't see the overarching principles as aiding leaders of business in any other respect that providing another layer of excuse confetti when they need to explain away the next slew of avaricious corporate conduct. I wonder who it's going to be next?

Accenture Insurance Sector research - Global Risk Management survey

Flood Risk?

A nice generic risk management benchmarking piece from the guys and girls at Accenture came out this week, and after I spent last week at the Leicester rugby game, I was happy to see another 15 "tigers", albeit this time scattered throughout the survey paper itself, presumably as a subtle metaphor for "death by tiger" risk...

It is made up of 98 C-suite respondents (nicely spread across disciplines), is Insurance sector-specific, and Global in coverage (one-third Europe, half N.America), so should be useful to any reader for trend-spotting and Board briefing.

From the document itself, I've pulled out the following;

Risk Governance

• 98% have their "risk management owner" reporting to the CEO
• 96% have a senior executive (regardless of title) as "risk management owner"
• 80% have their "risk management owner" report regularly to the Board
• 55% had a titled CRO
• A number of those stats (whilst improved since their last survey) are a poor reflection on the Global insurance industry, but perhaps reflect where corporate culture is outside of the EU/US axis
• Of the governance bodies, I was surprised to see only 60% of Life companies have an operational risk committee

Solvency II/Non EU equivalent legislation-specific

• Over 80% of Life and P&C respondents seem happy that they are preparing well for their regulatory initiatives (Solvency II or local equivalent).
• Other than Internal Model development, the main outstanding issues for Life insurers to be prepared for Solvency II/equivalent is IT architecture and Data Management/Integration. For P&C, documenting risk processes and developing a meaningful Use Test are also worrying at least half of respondents.
• Issues such as training and education, risk culture and risk governance documentation are relatively low on the priority list.
• Conversely, when asked on a 1-5 scale about specific areas of risk governance, respondents were more positive about their Data preparations than their risk governance - go figure!
• Use Test preparation remains a laggard throughout.

Generic

• Top external pressure was Legal risk, and by a good distance. Regulatory risks relatively low on the list, perhaps reflecting Europe's low weighting in the quantum surveyed.
• Risk Management seemingly well integrated with strategic deployment, but not with product development or reward.
• Poor statistics around embedding risk management into core functions.
• Two thirds of Life respondents noting that a lack of "early warning capabilities" impedes emerging risk management.
• Over half of Life companies said investment benefits ("above and beyond" continued compliance with regulations) would come from better reporting and better integration of Risk and Finance.

There is some of the softer stuff on aspirational elements of risk management thinking at the back, but if you just want to check against your peers, you can save that for a rainy day.

Omnibus II text released - first casualties emerging?

It was left to COREPER to announce that the Council and Parliament have agreed on the compromise text for Omnibus II, leaving the formality (!) of the Plenary vote on February 25th as the final hurdle before, well, the next set of hurdles. But here she is - 156 pages of over-masticated Eurobelch that has held the authors hostage for years like a slaphead in Rapunzel's spare room...

Omnibus II draftsmen - you're free to go

Chris Finney has already picked a couple of bones out of it, which look good for any EU multinationals with non-equivalent subs on the face of it. I'm not inclined to peel it apart on screen (I'm sure someone will do that for us in the next couple of days), but since the Commission's original proposal we do get;

• An enormous amount of preamble to factor in EIOPA's new role, which gets more elaborate with every paragraph,
• References to IAIS developments for future considerations on the equivalence front (will that be enough to cover the States and Canada long-term?)
• Some hard coding of references to "20% of market" for exemptions from reporting requirements,
• Visibility of the drop dates being proposed for EIOPA to deliver implementing and regulatory technical standards to the Commission - a reasonable amount are due in less than a year, including on model approval and "major" model changes.

As EIOPA will be penning all technical standards for the Commission, and relations between the two seemingly cordial, we might assume that EIOPA's views (which were almost immovable during the consultation on their preparatory guidance) will inevitably come to the fore in the final set of implementing measures.

Whatever comes of it, it would appear that the trilogue negotiations haven't quite done the job for the German contingent, with Hr. Hufeld from BaFin suggesting there are "5 to 10" insurers under his watch in danger of failure, a week after the German Government referred to a "balanced package" of help for their (seemingly) beleaguered industry which will be introduced in early 2014.

"Das Gleichgewicht wird zum Verlust..."

Financial Stability Board - Principles for an Effective Risk Appetite

Christmas has come early everyone - the Financial Stability Board have released their Principles for an Effective Risk Appetite Framework today, and I'm greedily ripping in to it before JC's birthday like a spoilt, yet handsome child...

FSB's RAF Principles published- 

send the car back lads...

There has been a reasonable amount of traffic on Risk Appetite this year (here, here and here for a start), after the FSB but announced their consultation earlier in the year, I've been on tenterhooks. This was following of the back of a thematic review on Risk Governance as a whole by the FSB, which they published back in February.

So where do they take this deep dive into Risk Appetite? Other than awkwardly shoehorning in the soup de jour of "SIFIs", they stick to the hard areas which will get every risk practitioners' attention (namely, Risk Appetite Framework, Risk Appetite Statements, Risk Limits and Roles and Responsibilities), though "for clarity and simplicity", they jettison the use of Risk Tolerance. Definitions are supplied on p2-3, which you may find useful as anchor references.

They somehow make room for anodyne flannel in this very short document, for example;

Risk Appetite Frameworks

• Should "facilitate embedding risk appetite into the financial institution’s risk culture" 
• Development and establishment is an "...iterative and evolutionary process that requires ongoing dialogue throughout the financial institution to attain buy-in across the organisation" (groan)

Risk Appetite Statements

• "Risk appetite may not necessarily be expressed in a single document; however, the way it is expressed and the manner in which multiple documents form a “coherent whole” need to be carefully reviewed to ensure that the board obtains a holistic, but compact and easy to absorb, view of the financial institution’s risk appetite"

Risk Limits

• "Having risk limits that are measurable can prevent a financial institution from unknowingly exceeding its risk capacity as market conditions change and be an effective defence against excessive risk-taking" - tell that to Lehmans!

However, the salient points for me were as follows;

Risk Appetite Frameworks

• RAF "...sets the financial institution’s risk profile" - not convinced on that one, but may be semantic issue
• "explicitly defines the boundaries within which management is expected to operate when pursuing the institution’s business strategy"
• Should "be adaptable to changing business and market conditions" to allow for limit increases where appropriate

Risk Appetite Statements

• "[should] address the institution’s material risks under both normal and stressed market and macroeconomic conditions"
• "...should establish quantitative measures of loss or negative outcomes that can be aggregated and disaggregated"
• "...include key background information and assumptions"
• "...include quantitative measures that can be translated into risk limits"
• "...be forward looking and, where applicable, subject to scenario and stress testing"

Risk Limits

• "[should] be set at a level to constrain risk-taking within risk appetite"
• "...should not be strictly based on comparison to peers or default to regulatory limits"
• "[should] not be overly complicated, ambiguous, or subjective"

Roles and Responsibilities

The Board

• ...must establish the institution-wide RAF and approve the risk appetite statement, which is developed in collaboration with the chief executive officer (CEO), chief risk officer (CRO) and chief financial officer (CFO)
• FSB specifically comment that Boards who "receive" or "note" Risk Appetite Statements have a lower understanding of risk appetite (so don't sponsor it!)
• " [should] regularly review and monitor the actual risk profile and risk limits against the agreed levels (e.g. by business line, legal entity, product, risk category), "including qualitative measures of conduct risk"
• " [should] ensure risk management is supported by adequate and robust IT and MIS to 
• enable identification, measurement, assessment and reporting of risk in a timely 
• and accurate manner."

CEO should

• "...be accountable, together with the CRO, CFO, and business lines for the integrity of the RAF"
• "...ensure that the institution-wide risk appetite statement is implemented by senior management"
• "...provide leadership in communicating risk appetite to internal and external stakeholders" 
• "...establish a policy for notifying the board and the supervisor of serious breaches of risk limits and unexpected material risk exposures"

While there are specific sections for the obligations of CRO, CFO, Internal Audit and Business Unit Management, they don't necessarily expand much further than what I consider to be normal functional expectations, so I haven't elaborated on them.

One should certainly therefore expect a much more aggressive approach from supervisors in future off the back of this - combing through strategy and board papers for evidence of Risk Appetite in application, and making sure that Risk Appetite Statements are not just 'rubber stamped', for example.

I certainly don't see much in this for stakeholders. Nothing particularly new is brought to the table here, and if this is the results of peer review and shared experiences, then clearly there is concurrence on how an RAF should be constructed, what a RAS looks like, and who should do what in regard to continuous monitoring.

The skill will be for risk practitioners to convince their CEOs/NEDs that, this is no longer a sidecar activity in the ERM best practice space, but a nascent global minimum standard which will invariably surface in national regulations in the forthcoming moths and years.

Fit and Proper Persons in financial services - judge not, lest ye be judged

A quick note on the high-profile leadership-related crises which have reared their heads over the last couple of weeks, and whether the risk management professionals of the world can learn from them.

Two stories related to the flip-side of the kind of driven, charismatic figures that can progress rapidly through their chosen careers while coping with some rather spectacular character flaws. One being the ex-Chair of the UK's Co-operative Bank (already in financial turmoil), caught in a drugs and prostitutes sting this week, which has followed on from the city mayor of Toronto, who has been drawn into a similar web of videotaped misbehaviours.

Sticking with the financial services example, we have a number of issues which should interest the risk pros;

• A Chair with no financial services experience or qualifications (Northern Rock encore un fois!) ...
• In an organisation undergoing a massive transformation after acquisition...
• With a previous (if expired) criminal conviction...
• Who had resigned from public office while in the role due to pornography-related misuse of office equipment (reported at the time as due to "increasing responsibilities" at Co-op!)
• Who then (allegedly) used his work e-mail to solicit prostitutes (bottom of article)
• And all of this post-dating the nadir of the financial crisis, when one would have naturally thought that both institutions and the regulator would have been on point on such a matter.

Some elements of the story are dominating the headlines, such as the gender of the prostitutes, the type of drugs used, or the fact that the Co-operative movement, purporting to have a higher calling than the soul-hoovering plcs, should perhaps be impervious to such matters. 

For me, we have a straigthtforward case of significant internal control failings across departments, a failure to hold senior management to account when breaching internal policies, and a very strong working example of a reverse stress test, combining a number of risk factors which in concert deliver a failed business model. On that basis, I would think that the business-as-usual risk teams across the country will be analysing this one until the cows come home.

How much of a bum-paddling the FSA/PRA deserve on this is another matter. Whether light-touch or prescriptive, I think regulators in many countries will wince at the details of the approval of Rev. Flowers' appointment once this one plays out at Treasury Select Committee over the coming weeks (I have no insider information, but let's face it, we'll be watching through our fingers!). 

For context however, in 2009 the FSA (as it was then) made a formal submission to the TSC addressing many of the failings uncovered by the retreating tide post-Lehmans/Bear Stearns/Northern Rock, and what Hector Sants & Co had planned to make up the shortfall. 

The TSC made a number of comments (sandwiched within the FSA's submission) which are worth highlighting today - I have emphasised the parts which should now echo in eternity;

The FSA's assessment of whether senior bankers were fit and proper for their posts appears to have been little more than a tick-box formality, unless the applicant had a criminal record or gave some other evidence of a shady past. That bar was demonstrably set too low. We welcome the acknowledgement from the FSA that a candidate's competence, as well as their probity, will now be thoroughly reviewed before taking up a senior post in a bank. We recognise that there may be some dangers in the FSA assessing competence, not least because the FSA will become exposed to accusations of incompetence itself, if it makes a wrong judgement

We recommend that the FSA assess whether bank executives should possess relevant qualifications. We would like to see banking qualifications become one of the core indicators against which the FSA can assess a candidate's competence. If a candidate has no relevant qualifications, the onus should be on them to prove to the FSA that they have relevant compensatory experience

And from the PRA themselves...

We strongly agree that it is important for bank executives to have the right level of skills and experience. As noted above, we have recently written to all CEOs of relationship-managed firms reminding them that it remains the firm's responsibility to ensure that the candidates they put forward are fit and proper to perform the role in question, and that firms should, therefore, have robust recruitment, referencing and due diligence processes in place

It was only three years ago - at what point do we (grim pun intended) practice what we preach on corporate governance in financial services?

Omnibus II a done deal - Greens left feeling, errr, green?

So, having become bored with collapsing into their own tedium like a room-temperature flan, the Omnibus II negotiations reached an inevitably grim climax yesterday, with a deal bashed out to everyone's mutual distaste at the last possible minute - the basic details are here from the European Commission.  

Bearing in mind the volume of noise on the subject over the last 24 hours in particular, I figured I'd better pull a consolidation post together for my own benefit if nothing else!

The highlights are (apparently - no text released as yet);

1. Transitional measures extended for 16 years
2. Massive equivalence carve out (10 year "temporary" renewable facility)
3. Transposition date moved to end-March 2015
4. Matching adjustments and volatility adjustments more generous to the industry than recommended
5. The generosity of those adjustments countered by some qualitative measures around planning and disclosure.

Winners?

• Industry - Allianz's CFO rather boldly speaks on behalf of the entire European Insurance Industry, stating the deal is "...ambitious but acceptable". Prudential's CEO thinks it is "great progress" and "a good package", while Talanx "welcome the decision very much".
• Heavily indebted governments and companies - Burkhard Balz is happy to trumpet that "...we have also ensured that insurance companies will be able to continue to fulfil their role as long-term investors" through the lengthened transitionals and juicy adjustments. This will hopefully encourage insurers to splash some cash on long-term debt instruments and infrastructure projects where they may otherwise have stayed shorter-term.
• EIOPA - While they were happy to simply "welcome" the agreement, Sharon Bowles emphasises that "This marks the point at which Eiopa becomes fully fledged".
• Sharon Bowles - has surely enhanced her reputation by finally landing the most fraught European negotiation since the Abba reunion.
• Consultancies - will surely use the "tight timescale" routine to press gang the nation's NEDs and Execs into writing one more cheque.

Ambivalent?

• Insurance Europe didn't have much to say, other than acknowledging that the deal is not ideal, though provides a "workable base". They remain concerned about the "ambitious timetable".
• Groupe Consultatif also reinforce their continued support.
• The European Council apparently couldn't be bothered to send a big hitter to trumpet the big news, leaving it to one of the COREPER lads (well, an ambassador)!

Losers?

The Left - while it is no surprise that Sven and the Greens were left sulking (and doesn't the boy blog well!), the extent of his rancour, whether Party line or personal, doesn't augur well for when he and the ECON crew take it through Plenary, for example noting that the deal;

• "...[is a] flagrant violation of common market principles"
• "...[is a] grab bag of goodies"
• "...ignores the advice of the European Systemic Risk Board"
• "...resulted in the EP adopting a far more industry-friendly package in self-denial of the original mandate voted by ECON "

Perhaps most bitterly, he then promises to "...personally make sure that all companies making use of the agreed privileges will be named and shamed on a website including their brands and the billions of missing capital". 

You don't want to make the Greens angry now, do you...